At least the Navy hasn't caught on to recursive acronyms yet.
PHP: PHP Hypertext Preprocessor
GNU: GNU's Not Unix
And so on . . . ?
Don't give them ideas.
At least the Navy hasn't caught on to recursive acronyms yet.
PHP: PHP Hypertext Preprocessor
GNU: GNU's Not Unix
And so on . . . ?
Please point me toward the AAR you read, or provide examples as to what you are talking about.
Second part - You're right on the focus, but writing out overland CSAR as a capability and is a lesson we in Naval RW have learned many times before and the people making these decisions are inept due to their ignorance. What if Jack is 3 miles inland on an Island? "Sorry guys, I am not trained to overland". What if he is on the beach... "hell guys I have never done a brown out so can you have him swim out a few miles". Where do we draw the line? Well, what will happen is we will still go, but now with ill trained helicopter crews at a much higher risk.
The history of Navy RW CSAR is riddled with leaders and strategists making stupid assumptions about the future, giving up a capability, only to need that capability again after learning through the loss of good people. After the Korean War there was no investment into it and eventually Naval RW found themselves in Vietnam learning on the fly. Post Vietnam again we let the capability largely go away and we had Grenada, Lebanon, Libya. Many of those actions were covered with ill-trained crews and aircraft. Yes HS was around but in many cases not in position to cover those actions. And USAF ARS/RQS units were not always in place quick enough (or available) From there Desert Storm, Bosnia, OEF/OIF/OIR, etc.
It needs to be a clear that, HSC had no doctrinal place in OEF/OIF/OIR (with some limited exceptions). As much as we all wanted to be in the fight, it wasn't a Navy RW fight. Lots of GWOT baby's joined the wrong branch if that's what they wanted. To put in perspective:
Afghanistan coast: 0 mi
Iraqi coast: 36 mi
Iranian coast: 1750 mi
Russian coast: 23,400 mi
Chinese coast: 9,000 mi
Yes A2AD and the tyranny of distance will have massive affects on if we (or anybody) can make it overland in the opening days of peer MCO fight, but what about 30 days in, 60 days, 1 year. And before we start playing the game of "it will be over by then so we don't need to plan for it" I refer back to history with WW I, WW II, Vietnam, etc. Many of those same assumptions were made.
To all the fixed wing nerds, have fun knowing the Navy isn't coming to get you if you bail out over land. And before you say "but the Air Force" let me stop right there and let you know they aren't everywhere the Navy is and they will have their hands full. I would be irate if I was a Fighter Attack Guy.
Others have suggested it, but I imagine Osprey’s will take on the mission. I think the entire RW force structure will be reset once the Army selects a FVL winner.You make good points, but no HAR. Not sure how HSC can reconcile that in a from-the-sea CSAR during a near-peer fight.
Perhaps, but the Navy parted ways with the Army on FVL and is pursuing its own answer. It might not be an MH-60X, but I'm guessing it will look a lot like one.Others have suggested it, but I imagine Osprey’s will take on the mission. I think the entire RW force structure will be reset once the Army selects a FVL winner.
Perhaps, but the Navy parted ways with the Army on FVL and is pursuing its own answer. It might not be an MH-60X, but I'm guessing it will look a lot like one.
Likely no. The Clif notes version of this thread is that Big Navy doesn't want what HSC currently has due various reasons. That only ends one way.Is it conceivable that the Navy will instead double down on the expanded mission set of HSC and let that mission set drive priorities for Navy’s FVL equivalent, whether it should or not? Certainly I’m at the risk of getting over my skis here and this isn’t my world, just find the existential topic here pretty interesting and how it overlaps with acquisitions.
Likely no. The Clif notes version of this thread is that Big Navy doesn't want what HSC currently has due various reasons. That only ends one way.
There's certainly some good questions being asked in here about whether the USN is serious about organic CSAR. But that's a pretty niche high dollar capability and proficiency set that arguably the USN has never been quite serious about.
You make good points, but no HAR. Not sure how HSC can reconcile that in a from-the-sea CSAR during a near-peer fight.
Maybe the question to ask is:
Is it easier to teach these guys to land on a ship or HSC guys to do the overland mission?
View attachment 26884
Heh heh. I know the answer to this.
Way to end your argument on an insecure, douchey note.HAHAHAH I just realized, this is a HSC thread sooo yeah no self respecting VFA bro gonna be reading a rotor trash thread.
Way to end your argument on an insecure, douchey note.![]()
Russian coast: 23,400 mi
a ship hasn’t been sunk by a sub since 1982!
Mini-subs don't count. ? Besides, according to Kim it was an accident and,......"we have so far regarded the accident as a regretful accident that should not happen in the light of the fact that many missing persons and most of rescued members of the crew are fellow countrymen forced to live a tiresome life in the puppet army."With all due respect, South Korean shoes will argue with youThough the corvette lost all power instantly, the shore was so close that Samsung smartphone in the pocket of a CO got the net and this was enough for distress call directly to ROK Navy HQ. "Hello, we are evidently sinking". Nevertheless, this is a case for "feet wet" SAR study
Need to refer to the guys on the ground as "JTACs of Opportunity" and then it changes the perspective. ?dealing with CSAR