Army Armed Reconaissance Helo in trouble

[HeyJoe]

Congress has the Army's troubled ARH-70A Armed Reconaissance Helo program in its sights citing program slippage and substantially increased unit costs. The service tried to make program decision earlier this year but the Army Secretary caved due to heavy pressure from the Texas delegation (which benefits most from contract). Now proposed language for 2008 would cancel the budget request and force a new competition.

 

[Oh-58Ddriver]

Dont even get me started. We cant get parts because we are getting a new helicopter but we cant get a new helicopter because congress cant play nice. Its getting old.

 

[Flash]

Congress has the Army's troubled ARH-70A Armed Reconaissance Helo program in its sights citing program slippage and substantially increased unit costs. The service tried to make program decision earlier this year but the Army Secretary caved due to heavy pressure from the Texas delegation (which benefits most from contract). Now proposed language for 2008 would cancel the budget request and force a new competition.

Any insight into the reason for the slippage and the increased cost? From what I saw it was as close to off-the-shelf as you could get and it does not make a lot of sense that the costs would spiral........unless they added this capability, or that gizmo, or another gadget........the idiocy of the procurment process never ceases to amaze me (and the services usually are jsut as guilty as the manufacturers).

The way the US Navy bought the Super Hornet was the right way to do it, buy the plane and gradually upgrade the capability when you ahv ethe money and the system has been tested and is good to go.

 

[HeyJoe]

Any insight into the reason for the slippage and the increased cost? From what I saw it was as close to off-the-shelf as you could get and it does not make a lot of sense that the costs would spiral........unless they added this capability, or that gizmo, or another gadget........the idiocy of the procurment process never ceases to amaze me (and the services usually are jsut as guilty as the manufacturers).

The way the US Navy bought the Super Hornet was the right way to do it, buy the plane and gradually upgrade the capability when you ahv ethe money and the system has been tested and is good to go.

Actually, the "process" can and does work for those who use it correctly, but you have to manage it properly or it can get out of control fast. There are a lot of pitfalls, some of which are under the program manager's control, some of which are external. One difficultly in estimating costs is the nonrecurring engineeering associated with RDT&E. It's, at best, a rough estimate because you cannot predict all the issues that may arise so if you get within + 25%, you're pretty good. Industry tries to win competitions pressing the technologcal edge (so-called bleeding edge sometimes) so if they can't deliver as promised, delays ensue and every day a program isn't delivering on time adds to costs not to mention additon costs to correct deficiencies and retest the system.

The Army has had some spectacular failures in trying to introduce technology and probably takes the prize in how not to do it: Sergeant York DIVAD, RAH-66 Comanche, XM2001 Crusader, and more recently, the Airborne Common Sensor (ACS). The Jury is still out on the Joint Common Missile (JCM)

The result was billions spent and nothing to show for it, but lessons learned.

 

[bert]

heyjoe has it right, integration costs have shot up to the point where they are looking at something closer to $10 m/copy. COTS is all well and good but it gets tricky when you try to get it all to talk to each other.

 

[Check Six]

Here is another classic example. Australian Navy bought SH2 airframes and wanted to integrate all the latest and greatest sensors and pods on it but its been six years now and they are still no closer to having them stand up a squadron.

 

[Tex_Hill]

The result was billions spent and nothing to show for it, but lessons learned.

They don't seem to be able to remember the lessons very well however.

 

[Lawman]

The way the US Navy bought the Super Hornet was the right way to do it, buy the plane and gradually upgrade the capability when you ahv ethe money and the system has been tested and is good to go.

The other side of that coin would be that the A-12 fiasco more then negated any positive performance in the procurement of the Super Hornet.

 

[HeyJoe]

Here is another classic example. Australian Navy bought SH2 airframes and wanted to integrate all the latest and greatest sensors and pods on it but its been six years now and they are still no closer to having them stand up a squadron.

Meanwhile, the Kiwis went another route to get their SH-2 models and are supremely happy, ne c'est pas?

 

[HeyJoe]

The other side of that coin would be that the A-12 fiasco more then negated any positive performance in the procurement of the Super Hornet.

The two are closely related....there was plenty of funding left across the FYDP (six year defense planning vehicle used by DoD) when A-12 was shot in the head. The non recurring caosts for F/A-18E/F stayed well under the planning wedge and Congressional mandate to stay under $5B and allowed Navy and Marine Corps to jump start JAST, which became JSF.

 

[Check Six]

Yes but the Kiwis took the SH2G with the avionics and systems it basically came with, stuff that had been used on it before whereas the Australians wanted a brand new, never been tried before, all the bells and whistles sort of package - and thats whats caused the problems.

 

[HeyJoe]

Yes but the Kiwis took the SH2G with the avionics and systems it basically came with, stuff that had been used on it before whereas the Australians wanted a brand new, never been tried before, all the bells and whistles sort of package - and thats whats caused the problems.

That's my point. Adding bells and whistles to a proven system can really drag out a program and is a minefield of hidden costs.

 

[Flash]

Actually, the "process" can and does work for those who use it correctly, but you have to manage it properly or it can get out of control fast. There are a lot of pitfalls, some of which are under the program manager's control, some of which are external. One difficultly in estimating costs is the nonrecurring engineeering associated with RDT&E. It's, at best, a rough estimate because you cannot predict all the issues that may arise so if you get within + 25%, you're pretty good. Industry tries to win competitions pressing the technologcal edge (so-called bleeding edge sometimes) so if they can't deliver as promised, delays ensue and every day a program isn't delivering on time adds to costs not to mention additon costs to correct deficiencies and retest the system.

The Army has had some spectacular failures in trying to introduce technology and probably takes the prize in how not to do it: Sergeant York DIVAD, RAH-66 Comanche, XM2001 Crusader, and more recently, the Airborne Common Sensor (ACS). The Jury is still out on the Joint Common Missile (JCM)

The result was billions spent and nothing to show for it, but lessons learned.

Well, that is my main point. Is the system really working when the Super Hornet is an exception to the rule (which worked because it was already based on a proven system)? Look at our shipbuilding procurement and its recent fiascos, which include the LCS and the LPD-17. Look at the F-22, V-22, EFV and Deepwater as well. Arguably the most egregious examples are some of the space systems, which cost an arm and a leg along with the head. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...am-delays-costs-defended-criticized/index.php

If the process works then why do we have such train wrecks when it coems to procuring these systems. Is it a lack of qualified people running the programs on the government side (too complex for unrestricted line officers)? Unrealistic expectations on the part of the services? Too many design changes? Deliberate deception on the part of the contractors?

I see too many programs that come in drastically over budget to think that the current system is not flawed. It might make sense if they were just minor overruns but they are not minor by any means. It is more an exception than a rule to see programs come in on time and under budget, that is a problem in my book.

 

[HeyJoe]

Now comes Boeing

Boeing is trying to seize upon the moment and reintroduce a revamped "Little Bird" into the equation.