Here is a more scholarly source. I got it off of Proquest when I was doing research for my NPS space systems class. Here is the URL, but you need a Proquest license to access it:
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl...qil:fmt=text&req_dat=xri:pqil:pq_clntid=11969
Tai Wei Lim. Asian Affairs, an American Review. Washington: Spring 2004.Vol.31, Iss. 1; pg. 30, 10 pgs
This article is a survey of China's conventional military power and its implications. It examines China's contemporary conventional capabilities, especially in fighting territorial conflicts in the post-Cold War era.1 This article focuses on the Chinese conventional military moving toward advanced technology, technocratic orientation, and cutting-edge military applications, such as Cyberspace warfare or space-based weapons, and away from the ideological orientation and dependence on massed tactics and low-tech approaches.
This article is divided into several sections People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAP), and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which are followed by an analysis of regional military alliances, China's relationship with the United States, and technological trends and projections, including that the Chinese view hi-tech, all dimensional warfare (including cyberspace and outer space) as their best deterrent in the current East Asian security environment. Several trends are discernible: there are clear anxieties regarding the possibility of local territorial conflicts, whether in Taiwan or the contested offshore islands, as well as the perceived need to balance U.S. power in East Asia.
People's Liberation Army
The PLA has been viewed by some Western observers as having low rapid reaction capabilities with little logistical mobility beyond armored personnel carriers, trucks, and railroads.2 Since the 1970s, however, the PLA has been streamlining its organization in several ways. First, it is phasing out five hundred thousand soldiers to make it leaner and more mobile for conventional warfare scenarios.3 Second, the PLA's reaction time has been enhanced by a rapid reaction force, whose development might have been spurred on by the Taiwan independence challenge. The rapid reaction force consists of several doz.en divisions and a few brigades among China's approximately twenty armies and forty group divisions.4 Within the rapid reaction forces, some divisions are trending toward airborne troops, perhaps influenced by the success of the elite U.S. Eighty-Second Airborne Division that has been crucial in securing important victories since World War II.5
This emulation probably was accelerated by Chinese observations of the 1991 Gulf War, which has become somewhat of a prototypical warfare model for Chinese military development, partly because of the stunning success of the U.S. military in that war.6 Another affect of the 1991 Gulf War is the Chinese development of Special Operation forces that are similar to elite forces that perform sabotage, spying, and specialized destruction of communications nodes and command posts.7 As a result of its rapid reaction force augmentation, some analysts believe that, by the mid-1990s, China developed the capability to logistically deploy two divisions (approximately twenty-five thousand troops) or conduct an amphibious landing of one division (ten thousand to fourteen thousand troops) offshore either for peripheral defense or local conflicts.8
People's Liberation Army
The main weaknesses of the PLAN are an archaic submarine fleet, the lack of an aircraft carrier, aging destroyers, obsolete technologies, and the lack of allied overseas naval bases. The PLAN'S domestic submarine fleet is still dominated by the Romeo class, an outdated Soviet-era diesel submarine that is noisier than most conventional submarines. China recently has purchased Russian Kilo-class submarines, which are considered one of the quietest conventional submarines in the world.
The PLAN's ultimate strategy to build an aircraft carrier alternates between being shelved and being pursued aggressively. The original strategy, stated in a National People's Congress report, was to build two 48,000-ton aircraft carriers with forty combat aircraft each by 2005, but parts of this idea have been deferred.9 The PLAN's first evidence of putting this strategy into action was procuring a decommissioned aircraft carrier that was intended to be stripped down in Australia before being studied extensively by the Chinese.10 The second evidence was the PLAN's purchase of an ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier and converting it into an amusement park in Shenzhen-but not without extensive studies of its layout." And, although China purchased fleets of modern fighters, such as the SU-27, it does not have its own versions of F-14 Tomcats armed with phoenix missiles or short-takeoff-and-landing fighters, such as F-18s, which are carrier adaptable.12
China's southernmost naval base is Hainan. Hainan Island is used for deploying regional naval forces to potential conflicts nearby, such as in Taiwan or the disputed Diaoyu Islands. However, in geographical terms, the Hainan base is too far to project the PLAN'S power into Southeast Asian, especially to islands claimed by China and Southeast Asian countries (for example, the potentially oil-rich Spratlys or gas-rich Natunas). Collectively, the U.S. Pacific fleet and its staunch allies in Australia (hosting U.S. forces at Shoalwater Bay and coordinated exercises), Singapore, Thailand (Exercise Cobra Gold, a series of exercises to augment regional peace and the capabilities of the Royal Thai Armed Forces), and the Philippines also may limit the Chinese navy's reach.
However, China's navy is still sufficiently powerful and is challenged only by the U.S. Pacific Seventh Fleet and the Japanese Self-Defense Force Navy; other countries are unlikely to pose any credible challenge to the PLAN. Moreover, the PLAN is becoming familiar with the region's coastal routes through more port calls, perhaps the greatest efforts to do so since the Ming dynasty's Admiral Cheng Ho (Zheng He) journeys and the sailing of the Qing Beiyang Fleet to Japan in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1993, China also carried out unprecedented military exercises in its southern coastal region that showed their determination to drill and to familiarize themselves with the operational procedures of its airborne troops and amphibious marines.13
Besides increasing navigational experience, the PLAN also is upgrading its technology. This upgrading is driven mainly by what the PLAN sees as possible localized conflicts (for example, Taiwan and disputed islands) rather than power posturing. PLAN needs to be seen as a modern force especially when it comes to posturing in the periodic skirmishes that flare up between China and Japan over the disputed Diaoyu islands (the islands have become prominent hot spots after a Japanese organization constructed a lighthouse on the island).14 Such incidents provide motivation for China to upgrade in order to deter such tensions.
China's desire to upgrade its naval fleet is driven by the pride it takes in its fleet, such as the Russian-built, Sovremenny-class destroyers that other navies in the region, particularly Taiwan's navy, do not have.15 Its SS-N-22 Sunburn antiship missiles are known to be one of the most deadly antiship missiles in the world, with a range of 120 kilometers and an ability to keep large destroyers and aircraft carriers at bay.16 The Sovremenny destroyers are welcome additions to a navy that previously had obsolescent Luta destroyers as its mainstays. The Luta's high-explosive warheads may have been useful in the past for crippling large warships but now are impotent in the age of sophisticated naval cruise missiles.17 Therefore, besides upgrading the ships, the PLAN also has been busy developing indigenously produced military technologies, such as the installation of JY1 Eagle Strike and HY2 missiles for destroyers in seabattles.18 Such missiles are capable of sinking destroyers that weigh up to three thousand tons.
People's Liberation Army Air Force
China has been aggressively buying SU-27s, a rugged fighter aircraft famous for its hammerhead maneuvers and is now producing its own version, code-named "Jian 11." The SU-27 is regarded as one of the best fighters and multirole fighter-bombers in the world, although its reputation has been somewhat tarnished by a series of recent accidents (for example, the MIG-29 crash at the 1989 Paris Air Show).19 China also has purchased eighty Su-30 bombers and simultaneously developed its own fighter-bomber, the Hong-7, which reportedly contains Western parish To complement its indigenously designed fighters, China has purchased state-of-the art, beyond visual range AA-12 missiles and two thousand AS-14 air-to-air missiles, substantially boosting its capabilities for air combat.21
China is also exporting aircrafts. Though obsolete compared to U.S. fighters, China's fighter aircraft are popular exports in the region because of their affordable prices, especially if China sells them at "friendship prices" (highly discounted prices that reflect special relationships extended by the PRC for military deals). Myanmar, for example, is one of the largest customers of the export F-7M fighters (upgraded versions of the Soviet MIG 21). The P-7M is now old even by Chinese export standards, and, consequently, the Chinese defense industries are touting their new export model, the FC-10 fighter, beginning at the Fourth China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition held at Zhuhai International Airport in 2002.
Military Alliances
Military power is one aspect of Chinese power projection. Other elements include establishing close political and economic ties with regional countries. In the economic sphere, the Chinese have negotiated a free trade agreement with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries-a highly welcomed initiative, as China is perceived as diverting external investments destined for ASEAN, a region still recovering from the 1997 financial economic crisis. Such economic ties will increase interaction with the region and possibly China's leadership role as well.
The security aspects of the ASEAN-China relationship has expanded to nontraditional fields such as counter-terrorism post-September 11. ASEAN and China have jointly approached the issue of terrorism, which previously was regarded as an individual burden of countries in the region (for example, the joint declaration of counter-terrorism at the "10 plus 3" meeting [ten ASEAN nations plus China, South Korea, and Japan] in 2001).22 China also participated in the ASEAN plus 1 (China) meeting in 2000, working with ASEAN to create a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea around the disputed Spratlys Island.23 ASEAN countries seemed to agree on the approach to manage China by engagement through rule-based institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, ensuring China will become a responsible member of the region.24
Within the ASEAN region, China's major ally is the military regime in Myanmar, to whom China exports arms.25 There are reports that Myanmar also is hosting Chinese military installations in exchange for Chinese friendship. Recent developments, however, indicate the scales seemed to have tipped in favor of the United States, as some Southeast Asian countries invited the Americans back into their folds, including the Philippines and Singapore. In this manner, the United States is experiencing a renaissance of sorts in diplomacy last seen in the common stance against communism during the 1970s Vietnam War.
In addition, the United States has longstanding security alliances with South Korea, Australia, and Japan. Moreover, the United States also has quietly strengthened its relationship with India, another great power on China's border that was ambivalent toward the United States during the Cold War. Even between U.S. allies in the region, there is an intent to work more closely (for example, India and Japan), another limiting factor on Chinese power projections.26 U.S. military support and sales to other major powers in the region, such as Japan, or empowering the capabilities of second-tier powers, such as South Korea and Australia, may further check the Chinese military projection.
China is most sensitive to the cooperation between the United States and Taiwan, which, although constrained by U.S. recognition of the one-China policy, does not preclude it from amorphous military cooperation, such as helping the Taiwanese erect satellite spy facilities.27 (Correspondingly, China also is spying on the United States through a Cuban intelligence signal station, a usual tit-for-tat approach in the international spying game.28) Other areas of cooperation are not so clandestine, with companies, such as General Dynamics, supplying vital parts for Taiwan's indigenous defense fighter, the near-sale of four Kidd-class destroyers, or supplying eight Knox-class destroyers in 1999.29 These areas of cooperation are possible because of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which permits the United States to supply Taiwan with the means to defend itself.30
U.S.-China Relations
Potential conflicts with the United States may occur with the strengthening of Chinese conventional capabilities. One area of conflict may be in the perceived technological transfers of U.S. technologies converted to military use by Chinese graduate students studying in the United States; a reason given by some for the United States imposing visa restrictions to mainland Chinese students. Between May and June 2002, 41 percent of Chinese student's visa applications were rejected31; it is difficult to reconcile the high rate of rejection merely as fallout from September 11.
Military sales are another possible area of contention. The Chinese military-industrial complex, which refers to the close relationship that some government-associated companies have with the military, has been enjoying commercial success with its twenty thousand companies.32 Some of its past sales to regimes perceived as hostile to China, however, worry the United States, as these regimes are sufficiently hi-tech to pose a threat, especially since the Silkworm sinking of U.S. ships in the Gulf in the early 1980s. The C-201 and HY2 Hongying missiles are a problem for U.S. warships in the Gulf region, as the launchers for these missiles are difficult to detect. For example, in 1987, an American-owned tanker flying the Liberian flag and a Kuwaiti tanker flying the U.S. flag were hit by Chinese HY-2 missiles exported to Iran.33 As recent as the Clinton administration, these missiles were subjects of intensive U.S. debates on cruise missile proliferation (especially antiship-type missiles).34
A third area of possible conflict with the United States concerns the technological procurements that blur the line between civilian and military use. Many in the U.S. administration greet China's reverse-engineering capabilities with admiration and fear. According to some U.S. military researchers, China has managed to reverse engineer low-tech hardware, such as the French AS-350 helicopter as well as hi-tech missiles, such as the Italian AAM Asphide or the French Crotale SAM.35 The United States has been extremely sensitive about supercomputer technologies. In 1998, the Chinese had obtained large amounts of fibers to build supercomputer networks; these networks also require optic switches. Such technologies are said to have "dual use" (both for civilian and military purposes).36 China's supercomputer capability being diverted for military use had been a subject of intense debate in the U.S. Senate in 1997, resulting in the Supercomputer Export Control Policy, which was intended to curb the spread of supercomputer technologies to China.37
However, China's recent relationship with the United States in the military sphere has improved tremendously, especially as both countries have interests in the war on terrorism. For example, the Chinese are troubled by their own Muslim provinces, such as Xinjiang, which has experienced isolated terrorist incidents. The United States has brought China into its fold by securing China's pledge to fight terrorism, trying hard to get China to play a bigger role in the North Korean missile crisis, and sharing the details of its Star Wars plan, which Beijing bitterly opposes.38
Future Trends
China's technological development previously had been constrained by the lack of technical ability as well as by Western reluctance to transfer military technologies to China. As a result, China had to scrape together Western military components that it obtained after the Nixon rapprochement with Communist China in 1972. In December 1975, the United Kingdom became one of the first Western countries to supply China with military components when it sold Rolls Royce aircraft engines to China, boosting the country's air capabilities and allowing the PLAAF to upgrade their antiquated Soviet MIG-21s.39
However, with political friction resulting in the Western embargo after the Tiananmen Square incident, as well as the reluctance of Western countries to increase China's military strength after the fall of the Soviet Union, Western sources of military technologies have dwindled for China. Once again, to develop its next generation of weapons, China had to rely on its own reverse-engineering capabilities, conversion of industrial technologies for military applications, growing industrial capabilities through absorbing more hi-tech foreign direct investments, and also rely on a former adversary (Russia).
China purportedly is developing laser weapons with the ability to destroy satellites and to disrupt communication systems.40 However, a cheaper and more realizable option for disrupting communication system is computer viruses. Computer virus development programs, created to disrupt vital Pentagon and military systems, are supported by General Fu Quanyou, chief of General Staff in 2000, and others, and also with generous funding, starting in 2000.41 The U.S. military fears that Chinese Cyberspace penetration may disrupt or violate U.S. databases that are online.42
China's Harbin Industry University is developing robotic technologies under the National 863 Program.43 Created in 1986, the military and industrial applications of the program are well-known and are included in the program's public operating principles.44 The state-owned Chinese Academy of Sciences, which owns Legend computer, also has unveiled the world's twenty-fourth fastest commercial supercomputer, Deepcomp 1800, as a sign of its capabilities.45 It is interesting to note that the 863 Program promotes dual-use technologies, exerting less pressure on the economy because many of these technologies may have commercial applications.
Then, there is China's goal to complete a moon walk by 2004, which will see considerable resources allocated to space technologies, including military applications.46 China has previous experience with space technology and has launched satellites of its own, some for dual use, others for military applications. An example of a dual-use satellite that has commercial as well as reconnaissance applications is the Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1), a joint venture with Brazil and China's first electrooptical remote-sensing platform, which allows China to beam images back to ground stations directly from space.47 It is difficult to know accurately to what extent such commercial technologies have been adapted for military purposes.
The sudden interest in these hi-tech ventures is not coincidental. As with other branches of its government, China's military reforms are led by technocrats, whose numbers in the politburo rose from zero to seventy-five in 1997; their numbers are still rising.48 At the apex of the Chinese leadership hierarchy, China's top nine leaders, elected in 2002, are mostly technocratic in orientation: there are at least two engineers, one geologist, one legal expert, and one economics expert (who helped create the stock market in China).49 The introduction of a technocratic influence among Chinese military planners is important, as it deemphasizes the previously important extramilitary role under the Communist Party and also acts as a political tool to fend off crises.50 Technocrats are chosen as military planners based not only on ideological reasons but also on a track record of administrative competence, technical knowledge, or elite academic qualifications, on top of the usual political soundness and survivability.
These technocrats, many of whom were trained in the engineering schools at the prestigious Qinghua University or at American colleges, tend to have a technological orientation and worldview. Many of them were impressed by the American-style hi-tech Gulf Wars (both 1991 and 2003) as well as the 2002 Afghan operation to remove the Taliban regime. Under the technocrats, the Chinese military has, since the 1980s, successively introduced merit-based recruitment and promotion policies among its military officers in an effort to professionalize its military and attract better recruits.51 With greater professionalization and younger cohorts of senior military officers, there is also greater appreciation for high technologies within the Chinese military.
Conclusion
The technological changes and a technocratic mindset may cause a paradigm shift in Chinese conceptions of their security issues. However, a caveat needs to be added. Although the Chinese have made advances in modernizing their military, they still have some way to go in strengthening the technological element in domestic defense. In terms of its ambitions for power projections, China also may have to contend with other powers in the region, including an increasingly assertive Japan, a more interventionist Australia (similar to the Howard doctrine, which was propounded by Australian Prime Minister John Howard to conceptualize Australia as a U.S. deputy sheriff in the East Asian region), or an India armed with nuclear weapons. These regional powers may view Chinese military modernization as power projections rather than defensive measures, and these anxieties may unite them with U.S. military interests. Thus, China has to recognize that although the world has moved from bipolarity during the Cold War to U.S. monopolarity in the post-Cold War era, the East Asian region has been transformed into a multipolarity of regional powers.
In other words, although the Chinese may have made progress militarily, other regional powers also have made progress in upgrading their own military programs (many with U.S. help). With this in mind, Chinese modernization efforts may be viewed as an ongoing routine rather than a sudden growth spurt that may destabilize the region. At least for the short term, its modernization may be predicated on concern for its territorial integrity in its own perceptions, as well as a sense of vulnerability in a singular-superpower global-security environment rather than pure swaggering or territorial conquest. Viewed in such a manner, China's anxieties with modernization simply may be an effort to maintain its parity with other powers in the region rather than a concerted effort for power expansion.
[Footnote]
NOTES
1. Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 11.
2. Angus M. Fraser, The People's Liberation Army Communist China's Armed Forces (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1973), 51.
3. Federation of American Scientists (FAS), "People's Liberation Army," FAS,
http://www.fas.org/ (accessed February 1, 2003).
4. "People's Liberation Army," Globalsecurity.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
5. Tai Wei Lim, "Analysis of China's Strategic Power," Globalsecurity.org,
http://www.globalsectirity.org/ (accessed December 2002).
6. Globalsecurity.org, "People's Liberation Army."
7. Ibid.
8. Michael D. Swainc, "The Modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: Prospects and Implications for Northeast Asia," Analysis, 5, no. 3 (October 1994), 10.
9. Senator John Ashcroft, "Chinese Military Expansion and U.S. National Security" (July 9, 1997), FAS,
http://www.fas.org/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
10. Lim, "Analysis."
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Swaine, "Modernization," 14.
14. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Gang Ties Are Behind Japan's Furor Over Tiny Isles," New York Times, 10 October 1996,
http://www.nytimes.com/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
15. Annie Huang, "China's Destroyers Worry Taiwan," Associated Press, 9 February 2000, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/( accessed August 1, 2002).
16. Bates Gill, "China's Newest Warships," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 January 2000,
http://www.feer.com/ (accessed 1 August 2002).
17. Harvey W. Nelson, The Chinese Military System (Colorado: Wcstview Press, 1977), 173.
18. Tai Wei Lim, 2002.
19. Ibid.
20. Bill Gertz, "China Test-fires New Missile," Washington Times, 1 July 2002,
http://www.taiwansecurity.org/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
21. Ibid.
22. Tai Wei Lim, "ASEAN-China Dialogue: A Summary Report," Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 16 April 2002,
http://www.siiaonline.org/ (accessed 1 March 2003).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid, "Analysis."
26. Ramesh Thakur, "India's Relations with Japan: Post-Pokhran II," in Report of Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Seminar: India's Relations with China, Japan, and USA: Pokhran II (presentation, IPCS, India, 23 December 1998).
27. "U.S. Helps Taiwan Erect Satellite Spy Facility," Associated Free Press, 23 May 2000,
http://www.spacedaily.com/.
28. Hamish MacDonald, "Beijing Spies a Useful Friend in Cuba," The Age. 27 February 2003,
http://www.theage.au/ (accessed March 1, 2003).
29. Brian Hsu, "IDF Stands for I Do Fly Chcn Says," in Fas.org,
http://www.fas.org/ and
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/07/15/43818 (accessed December 1, 2002); "U.S. Set to Arm Taiwan with Destroyers," Sun Herald,
http://www.smh.com.au/, 29 September 2002 (accessed December 1, 2002); and AMI International, "Taiwan-Modernization," Amnnter.com,
http://www.amiintcr.com/ (accessed October 2001).
30. Sun Herald, "U.S. Set to Arm Taiwan."
31. Jason Leow, "Beijing's US$2B Reminder to U.S. Varsities" Straits Times Interactive, 24 October 2002,
http://www.straitstimes.asial.com.sg/ (accessed October 24, 2002).
32. Senator John Ashcroft, "Chinese Military Expansion."
33. Globalsecurity.org, "C-201/HY-2/SY-1/CSS-N-2/CSS-C-3/SEERSUCKER," Globalsecurity.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
34. Senator Bcnnett, "Senate Resolution 82 Expressing the Sense of the Senate to Urge the Clinton Administration Relative to C-802 Cruise Missiles" (May 5, 1997), FAS,
http://www.fas.org/.
35. Richard A. Bitzinger, "Going Places or Running in Place? China's Efforts to Leverage Advanced Technologies for Military Use," People's Liberation Army After Next, ed. Susan M. Puska, 14 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000).
36. Evan A. Feigenbaum, "China Military-Civilian Complex," New York Times, 22 May 1998,
http://www.nytimes.com/ (accessed December 1, 2002); and Evan A. Feigenbaum, Harvard Kennedy School of Government (undated),
http://www.ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
37. U.S. Senate, "Chines Military Expansion"; and Stephen D. Bryen, "Text of Remarks of Dr. Stephen D. Bryen Prepared for Delivery on Thursday, November 13, 1997, to the National Security Committee of the House of Representatives,"
http://www.fas.org/.
38. Associated Free Press, "U.S. Helps Taiwan Erect Satellite Spy Facility."
39. Harish Kapur, "China and Europe," Studies and Documents, II, nos. 1 and 2 (1976): 18.
40. Jon E. Dougherty, "China's Laser Weapons," Wired News Report, 4 November 1999,
http://www.wired.com/ (accessed August 1, 2002).
41. James R. Lilley, introduction to People's Liberation Army After Next, ed. Susan M. Puska, 4 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000).
42. William C. Triplet! II, "Potential Applications of PLA Information Warfare Capabilities to Critical Infrastructure," People's Liberation Army After Next, ed. Susan M. Puska, 89 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000).
43. Bitzinger, "Going Places," 12; and "National 863 Program," Cliinagate.com, hup://www.chinagate.com/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
44. Du Minghua, "863 Hi-tech Program Blueprinting China's Future,"
http://www.eclu.cn/ (accessed December 1, 2002); and Holmes S. Liao, "China's Military Technology Modernization," Taiwan Research Institute, March 2000,
http://www.dsis.org.tw/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
45. "Legend Unveils China's Fastest Computers in Bid to Join Supercomputer Elite," The Mercury News, 30 August 2002,
www.siliconvalley.com (accessed 30 August 2002).
46. "China Sets to Land on the Moon by 2010," People's Daily Online, 20 May 2002,
http://www.English.peopledaily.com.cn/ (accessed December 1, 2002).
47. Mark A. Stokes, "China's Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait" People's Liberation Army After Next, ed. Susan M. Puska, 115 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000).
48. Leslie Foong, "Run-Up to Sixteenth Parly Congress," Siniils Times interactive,
http://www.straitstimes.asial.com.sg/ (accessed November 6, 2002).
49. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China's Top Nine Leaders," 14 November 2002,
http://www.cnn.com/ (accessed March 1, 2003).
50. Kau Ying-Mao, The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation-Building (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973), xiv.
51. Swaine, "The Modernization," 9.
* I used tapes that had been released in 2002 to demonstrate that Nixon was actually careful NOT to play the Chinese against the Russians. He was currently involved in the detente negotiations and believed that upsetting the Russians would destroy those talks. Also, my research showed that Nixon was more involved than Kissinger in opening talks with the Chinese; this also flies in the face of the traditional historical view. I've wanted to use FOIA documents and interviews with key players (Kissinger, Peterson, Haig) to corroborate the tapes so that I could publish my findings, but that takes forever and I had to start the whole Student Naval Aviator thing (which, of course, takes precedence.)