gflyer
Geriatric entertainer extraordinaire
Looks like they are releasing some preliminary info:
NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON CONTINENTAL 737 ACCIDENT IN DENVER
************************************************** **********
In its continuing investigation of the Continental Airlines
aircraft accident at Denver International Airport, the
National Transportation Safety Board has developed the
following factual information:
On December 20, 2008, at 6:18 p.m. mountain standard time,
Continental flight 1404, a Boeing 737-500 (registration
N18611), equipped with CFM56-3B1 engines, departed the left
side of runway 34R during takeoff from Denver International
Airport in Aurora, Colorado. The scheduled, domestic
passenger flight, operated under the provisions of Title 14
CFR Part 121, was en route to George Bush Intercontinental
Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. A total of 38 passengers and
crew were transported to hospitals, and five were admitted.
There were no fatalities. The airplane was substantially
damaged and experienced a post-crash fire, which was located
on the right side of the aircraft.
Inspection of the runway following the accident revealed
that it was bare and dry and free of debris. The first tire
marks were found about 1,900 feet from the runway threshold.
The aircraft exited the runway at about 2,650 feet from the
runway threshold, continued across a snow-covered grassy
drainage basin area, and crossed a taxiway and a service
road before coming to rest about 2,300 feet from the point
at which it departed the runway.
On the night of the accident, the majority of air traffic
was arriving at the airport from the south and departing
from the airport to the north.
Both members of the flight crew have been interviewed. The
accident flight was their first flight on the fourth day of
a four-day trip. The Captain, the pilot flying, had
accumulated a total of about 13,000 hours, with about 5,000
in the 737. The First Officer had flown about 7,500 hours in
his career with about 1,500 hours in the 737; he was the
pilot monitoring.
Both pilots were aware of the crosswind conditions, having
been advised by Air Traffic Control (ATC) that winds were
270 degrees at 27 knots just prior to takeoff. The weather
observation (METAR) in effect for Denver International
Airport nearest the time of the accident was reported to be
winds at 290 degrees and 24 knots with gusts to 32 knots,
visibility of 10 miles, a few clouds at 4000 feet and
scattered clouds at 10,000 feet. The temperature was
reported as -4 degrees Celsius. Wind data has been obtained
from the airport's low-level wind shear alert system
(LLWAS), consisting of 32 sensors located around the field,
which record wind speed and direction every 10 seconds. This
information will be used to determine a better estimate of
the actual crosswind component at the time of the accident.
Both pilots remarked that all appeared normal until the
aircraft began to deviate from the runway centerline. The
Captain noted that the airplane suddenly diverged to the
left, and attempts to correct the deviation with the rudder
were unsuccessful. He stated that he briefly attempted to
return the aircraft to the centerline by using the tiller to
manipulate the steering of the nose gear but was unable to
keep the aircraft on the runway. Bumping and rattling sounds
audible on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) have been time-
correlated with the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and were
found to have occurred as the airplane exited the runway and
travelled through the grassy areas adjacent to the runway.
The aircraft reached a maximum speed of 119 knots, and it
was traveling at 89 knots when the CVR and FDR stopped
recording.
Two Continental pilots who had flown the aircraft into
Denver on the previous flight were passengers on the
accident flight. Neither of the pilots was aware of any
anomalies on the inbound flight and reported that all the
aircraft's systems had operated normally.
The airplane's Quick Access Recorder (QAR) and other
electronics were retrieved and sent to the NTSB laboratory
in Washington. The QAR, which records aircraft data, often
has more parameters or information of higher fidelity than
the Flight Data Recorder (FDR). Additional items, such as
flight control and nosewheel steering actuators, were also
removed from the airplane for testing and evaluation.
Physical inspection of the engines and information from the
FDR has not indicated any evidence of pre-impact
malfunctions with either engine. The FDR data shows that
number one engine power was reduced before that of the
number two engine during the accident sequence, and
examination of the engine indicates that this reduction is
consistent with snow and earth ingestion as the airplane
departed the runway. The FDR data also shows that both
engines were commanded into reverse thrust following
rejection of the takeoff by the flight crew, which occurred
after the aircraft had already left the runway.
A preliminary examination of the rudder system revealed no
abnormalities or malfunctions. The main landing gear and
brakes, which had separated from the aircraft during the
accident sequence, were found in good condition by visual
examination. There were no signs of hydraulic leaking or
flat spots on the tires. The flight deck controls and
corresponding control surfaces were found to be in the
takeoff configuration.
There was no obvious damage to the passenger seats, which
were found secured on their tracks. The safety belts all
appeared intact although some showed evidence of fire
damage. Some components of the crew seats and restraint
systems have been removed for further examination.
The three flight attendants indicated that there were no
problems with the escape slides and that the emergency exit
lights were brightly illuminated. All occupants exited the
airplane via the left side doors and overwing exits. The
flight attendants reported that the passenger who opened the
overwing exit did so very quickly and easily. After a
bottleneck of people developed by the left overwing exit, a
Continental Airlines pilot, who was a passenger on the
flight, directed passengers out via the doors.
The aircraft has been moved from the accident site to a
secure location on airport property where an examination of
the nosegear and other components was conducted. While the
on-scene phase of the investigation has been completed, the
aircraft wreckage will remain available to the NTSB
throughout the course of the investigation.
NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON CONTINENTAL 737 ACCIDENT IN DENVER
************************************************** **********
In its continuing investigation of the Continental Airlines
aircraft accident at Denver International Airport, the
National Transportation Safety Board has developed the
following factual information:
On December 20, 2008, at 6:18 p.m. mountain standard time,
Continental flight 1404, a Boeing 737-500 (registration
N18611), equipped with CFM56-3B1 engines, departed the left
side of runway 34R during takeoff from Denver International
Airport in Aurora, Colorado. The scheduled, domestic
passenger flight, operated under the provisions of Title 14
CFR Part 121, was en route to George Bush Intercontinental
Airport (IAH), Houston, Texas. A total of 38 passengers and
crew were transported to hospitals, and five were admitted.
There were no fatalities. The airplane was substantially
damaged and experienced a post-crash fire, which was located
on the right side of the aircraft.
Inspection of the runway following the accident revealed
that it was bare and dry and free of debris. The first tire
marks were found about 1,900 feet from the runway threshold.
The aircraft exited the runway at about 2,650 feet from the
runway threshold, continued across a snow-covered grassy
drainage basin area, and crossed a taxiway and a service
road before coming to rest about 2,300 feet from the point
at which it departed the runway.
On the night of the accident, the majority of air traffic
was arriving at the airport from the south and departing
from the airport to the north.
Both members of the flight crew have been interviewed. The
accident flight was their first flight on the fourth day of
a four-day trip. The Captain, the pilot flying, had
accumulated a total of about 13,000 hours, with about 5,000
in the 737. The First Officer had flown about 7,500 hours in
his career with about 1,500 hours in the 737; he was the
pilot monitoring.
Both pilots were aware of the crosswind conditions, having
been advised by Air Traffic Control (ATC) that winds were
270 degrees at 27 knots just prior to takeoff. The weather
observation (METAR) in effect for Denver International
Airport nearest the time of the accident was reported to be
winds at 290 degrees and 24 knots with gusts to 32 knots,
visibility of 10 miles, a few clouds at 4000 feet and
scattered clouds at 10,000 feet. The temperature was
reported as -4 degrees Celsius. Wind data has been obtained
from the airport's low-level wind shear alert system
(LLWAS), consisting of 32 sensors located around the field,
which record wind speed and direction every 10 seconds. This
information will be used to determine a better estimate of
the actual crosswind component at the time of the accident.
Both pilots remarked that all appeared normal until the
aircraft began to deviate from the runway centerline. The
Captain noted that the airplane suddenly diverged to the
left, and attempts to correct the deviation with the rudder
were unsuccessful. He stated that he briefly attempted to
return the aircraft to the centerline by using the tiller to
manipulate the steering of the nose gear but was unable to
keep the aircraft on the runway. Bumping and rattling sounds
audible on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) have been time-
correlated with the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and were
found to have occurred as the airplane exited the runway and
travelled through the grassy areas adjacent to the runway.
The aircraft reached a maximum speed of 119 knots, and it
was traveling at 89 knots when the CVR and FDR stopped
recording.
Two Continental pilots who had flown the aircraft into
Denver on the previous flight were passengers on the
accident flight. Neither of the pilots was aware of any
anomalies on the inbound flight and reported that all the
aircraft's systems had operated normally.
The airplane's Quick Access Recorder (QAR) and other
electronics were retrieved and sent to the NTSB laboratory
in Washington. The QAR, which records aircraft data, often
has more parameters or information of higher fidelity than
the Flight Data Recorder (FDR). Additional items, such as
flight control and nosewheel steering actuators, were also
removed from the airplane for testing and evaluation.
Physical inspection of the engines and information from the
FDR has not indicated any evidence of pre-impact
malfunctions with either engine. The FDR data shows that
number one engine power was reduced before that of the
number two engine during the accident sequence, and
examination of the engine indicates that this reduction is
consistent with snow and earth ingestion as the airplane
departed the runway. The FDR data also shows that both
engines were commanded into reverse thrust following
rejection of the takeoff by the flight crew, which occurred
after the aircraft had already left the runway.
A preliminary examination of the rudder system revealed no
abnormalities or malfunctions. The main landing gear and
brakes, which had separated from the aircraft during the
accident sequence, were found in good condition by visual
examination. There were no signs of hydraulic leaking or
flat spots on the tires. The flight deck controls and
corresponding control surfaces were found to be in the
takeoff configuration.
There was no obvious damage to the passenger seats, which
were found secured on their tracks. The safety belts all
appeared intact although some showed evidence of fire
damage. Some components of the crew seats and restraint
systems have been removed for further examination.
The three flight attendants indicated that there were no
problems with the escape slides and that the emergency exit
lights were brightly illuminated. All occupants exited the
airplane via the left side doors and overwing exits. The
flight attendants reported that the passenger who opened the
overwing exit did so very quickly and easily. After a
bottleneck of people developed by the left overwing exit, a
Continental Airlines pilot, who was a passenger on the
flight, directed passengers out via the doors.
The aircraft has been moved from the accident site to a
secure location on airport property where an examination of
the nosegear and other components was conducted. While the
on-scene phase of the investigation has been completed, the
aircraft wreckage will remain available to the NTSB
throughout the course of the investigation.
