FAC, SCAR and related topics

[HeyJoe]

As requested by Harrier Dude, a thread devoted to making things go away.

Desert Storm saw dramatic effect of use of precision weapons and call for more platforms to be able to carry them. At the same time, the traditional FLIR and Laser Guided Weapon combo was hampered by weather (at least between the launch platform and intended target). Joint development of GPS guided weapons ensued and JDAM and JSOW became part of the warfighter arsenal along with more specialized service specific SLAM ER, WCMD and GAM. GPS weapons offer option to be preprogrammed for targets, but as was demonstrated over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, more often than not, aircrews arriving from distant airfields or carriers (sometimes hours away) find a dynamic shifting battlespace where in-flight retargeting from another source (airborne or ground FAC for instance) or by own platform is necessary (The Navy led the way to incorporate this feature into the F-14 LANTIRN Targeting System (LTS) with addition of T3 software feature). For example, during Operation Southern Watch (OSW), the threat reacted by moving targets within the ability of the targeting cycle to respond so ROE hampered employment of preprogrammed GPS weapons as originally predicted. F-14 LTS was then used in an ISR role to update target locations on a daily basis to verify location of mobile targets like SAM sites that would move sometimes only a few hundred meters to use ROE against the coalition forces.

Thus began the rediscovery and examination of the Close Air Support (CAS) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) that were leveraged for SCAR and other mission scenarios. Note: USAF had been drifting away from CAS for some time and even their Chief of Staff (at the time, Gen McPeak) offered to give F-16s and A-10s to the Army so they could provide their own CAS while USAF concentrated on Deep Interdiction. Meanwhile, the Army politely refused and said they'd cover the forward line of troops with their AH-64 Apaches, thank you very much (USAF actually painted several F-16s in green camouflage pattern similar to A-10 and called them A-16s for experiments at Nellis). The Marines never lost faith with their ground side of the Corps and kept the TTPs for CAS alive and vibrant at MAWTS-1. Then came OEF and SPECOPS units needing virtually 24/7 air support for ISR and iron on target. Even the venerable B-52 was called on to provide persistent bombs on call and used their considerable on station time to good effect. The B-52 wasn't the only platform that modified its employment scheme to suit the needs of the warfighter. The P-3 (AIP version), which was a traditional maritime platform, was impressed into an overland role in which its considerable ISR capability was used to support SPECOPS employment and in some cases, the P-3 actually fired weapons as well. Once the Marines were established ashore at Camp Rhino and made the move to Kandahar, they brought Harriers ashore to stand alert for responsive calls for fire thereby validating the Marine Corps plan to transition their fixed wing TACAIR into JSF with STOVL capability for just this type of employment scenario (Note: USMC did one better in OIF I when Harriers were employed on two "Harrier Carriers" in the Gulf and a number were used ashore moving forward with the troops and operating from FFARP locations).

In the ten years after Desert Storm ended, an impressive capability to employ precision/accurate* weapons was introduced so that the traditional large strike groups of past (carrying unguided weapons) were overtaken by capability of virtually a section of aircraft to provide the same effect. Instead of how many aircraft needed to ensure coverage of desired aimpoints, it became how many aimpoints a single aircraft could cover (USAF took that to an extreme with their salesmanship of the B-2...but flying them all the way to Afghanistan from CONUS was tried for a few days, but then abandoned as B-52 and B-1 could do as much or better from closer airfields). So, while the aircraft and weapons mix options have evolved, so has how targets are assigned so that many aircrews have only a general notion of where they are heading and the potential targets when they brief and launch. Once in the area of operations, they may get a call from the ground, another airborne platform or develop a targeting solution of their own (if so equipped to do so).

I covered a lot of territory here and left lots of areas for continued discussion (like use of Cobra in FAC(A) role or ROVER or JTAC or.......). Over to Harrierdude et al....

 

[skidkid]

Maybe better in the Private Forum but I will hold off on moving it until there is a consensus.

 

[Harrier Dude]

Good history and analysis. I hadn't heard about the USAF and army switch to that extent. I'd heard about the A-10 offer, but chalked it up to so much scuttlebutt.

In Desert Storm, contrary to conventional wisdom, the majority of the bombs dropped were dumb iron. There was a substantial increase in LGWs that dominated the coverage on CNN, but still lots of Mk80 series and Rockeye (Mk-20/CBU-99) going down range.

When OSW got established firmly, the J-weapons started to really come into play. Advances in targeting sensors, whether it be recon or targeting pods, expanded in generational leaps.

The big leap for the Harrier was the introduction of the Litening II targeting pod. This sensor, with it's CCD (TV) and FLIR sensor, laser designator, and IR marker was a quantum leap ahead of the Nighthawk TFLIR on the FA-18 legacy platform. In my view, the navy made a mistake by committing to the AT-Flir and rejecting Litening.

This is not a hit on AT-Flir, just a statement that Litening was (and is) a great sensor available NOW, while AT-Flir was waiting on seemingly endless holds. The Harrier community got the Litening in the fleet in 2001/2 and (through MAWTS-1) quickly developed TTPs for it's employment.

Fast forward to OIF 1. As Southern Watch was ending and the forces were being assembled in the region for the imminent war, it quickly became apparent that precision weapons would be much more prevelant. Almost exclusive.

I was on the East Coast "Harrier Carrier", the Bataan, and all I ever carried was GBU-16/12s and a Litening pod. A few sorties went out with GP bombs (some with TDD noses!), but I never got to carry any. VMA-214 (the shore based squadron in OIF 1) carried lots of other weapons, including Rockeye, GP bombs, Mk-77 (firebombs), 25 MM, and Maverick. They didn't have to deal with the bring back issues that we did. They DID have to deal with sandstorms, SCUD alerts, and all the other BS. I'll bet it was worth the trade.

Unfortunately for the Iraqis, they never got the word on our ordnance loads. They had erected bunkers around all of their fixed sites in an apparent attempt to shield them from the "near-hits" and frags from strings of GP bombs like in Desert Storm. Instead, the bunkers just highlighted them for easy ID and shacks of laser guided bombs. I guess we're not the only armed force to get caught planning to fight the last war.

CAS was fairly non-doctrinal. As we shifted away from the linear battlefield, defining CAS and establishing fire support coordinating measures became different than we had practiced in the past. The KI-CAS conops divided the country into Kill boxes, and the kill boxes into "key pads", like a phone touch pad.

The bottom line for control was that kill boxes, or individual pads could be opened or closed depending on what was happenning in them. If it was open, you could drop on any legitimate target as long as ROE was met. If it was closed, you had to get a cleared hot from somebody there before you could drop (again, with ROE met). I thought that the system was outstanding and simple to execute. I won't discuss detailed TTP/ROE due to classification concerns. If I'm not absolutley sure that it's UNCLASS, I won't put it in this forum.

Along with the kill boxes, 2 new types of control of CAS were in effect. They were originally misunderstood as 3 types of CAS. Type 1 was "old school" CAS. They had 9-lines as visual acquisition of target and aircraft. Type 2 involved precision coordinates generated from the ground and did not require the FAC to see the aircraft, or the aircraft to see the target. Type 3 was similar to "Armed Recce short of the FSCL". Basically, the FAC would ID a target set, talk the aircraft onto it, and allow the aircraft to destroy all of that set without further restraints.

This set of conditions allowed rapid and flexible targeting of everything in the battlespace while maintaining control and preventing blue-on-blue. That is not to say that it was perfect. There was the well-publicized An Nasariah incident of A-10s engaging Marine AAVs under type 3 control. That incident could well burn up several pages of another thread and get ugly quickly, so I'll leave that alone. That was not the norm, though.

The ATO cycle had services working together like never before. Aircraft would support ground units from all services and countries. Kill boxes were handed over from section to section with fairly seamless transitions. A section (or division) would arrive on station, talk to the guys currently working the kill box, and get the gouge. The departing section would hand over the killbox and often stay to lase or PID targets with their sensors.

Ironically, the ATO was quite specific as to where you were supposed to go, who you were supposed to talk to, and what mission you were supposed to perform (CAS, FAC(A), SCAR, Armed Recce), but that only lasted until feet dry. Once on station it was 50-50 whether you got diverted to another kill box for another mission. Often times the C&C asset you were supposed to contact didn't answer, so you'd "go shopping" for somebody else. Eventually somebody would answer and give you some work. There was quite a bit of rapid fuel planning and flex scheduling going on to make this happen.

It seemed like the majority of the folks that I dropped for were on the move at the time. They would either give me a talk on or a 10 digit grid and control type 3. I'm sure that the skid guys have a much different (and frankly more exciting) story on that.

Since the killbox system worked so well, the powers that be have of course decided to change it. ROE is vastly different now as well (as it should be, given the different situation).

The current JP 3-09.3 has more loosely defined what is CAS and what is DAS based on the ground commanders estimate of the situation. The focus on the grunts is good, but bringing it all together is problematic. If each commander can define what is CAS and DAS within his battlespace, keeping aircrews updated is difficult. There are many commanders and many individual battlespaces in our feild of view. There are no more hard and fast lines. As Marines, this is less of a problem. If we can talk to our Marines on the ground, we can figure out what they want and how we can give it to them effectively.

The air force, however, is a very doctrinally entrenched institution. They want absolutley clear rules and responsibilities. In short, the much hated phrase "Who owns the bombs". They seem ever more concerned with making sure they can't be blamed if something goes wrong, and ever more indifferent as to what's happenning below them on the ground.

Heyjoe, did you say that you went to the latest JCAS symposium? Did this get beaten into the ground again there?

I'm sure that the air force guys reading this would be pissed and disagree with me. Go ahead. Prove me wrong. Until I see an air force pilot use initiative and put the ground guys physical well-being above his own legal standing, I won't believe it.

That should not be construed as a blanket indictment of the air force, just a long observed opinion of the way they do CAS. It should be pointed out that even though the Iraqis never launched a fighter sortie during OIF 1, nobody knew that they weren't going to. The first few days of the war it was assumed that there would be a lot of red air. They had flown quite a bit during the last part of OSW. I was never worried for a minute about that. Not because I'm immune to air to air, but because I knew that we had the worlds best fighters covering us with itchy trigger fingers.

Also of note, I think that's it's worth mentioning that the TACAIR guys had it relatively easy, compared with the RW CAS and ground bubbas from a threat perspective. I'd really like to hear from Skidkid about his perspective.

As far as the future of CAS goes, I'm not sure what will happen. We need to actually practice what we preach in terms of decentralized control. We need to start like any good plan and work from the target back. Find out what the grunts want (JTACs, flexible fires, responsive support) and then enhance our current TTPs to meet those needs. Sometimes the answer is not more rules and procedures; it's less. We need to get away from preemptively assigning legal standing in an effort to deflect blame for when an incident inevitably occurs. We need to focus on the war fighter. All else is secondary.

This is Air Warrior, not Air Lawyer.

 

[HeyJoe]

The air force, however, is a very doctrinally entrenched institution. They want absolutley clear rules and responsibilities. In short, the much hated phrase "Who owns the bombs". They seem ever more concerned with making sure they can't be blamed if something goes wrong, and ever more indifferent as to what's happenning below them on the ground.

Heyjoe, did you say that you went to the latest JCAS symposium? Did this get beaten into the ground again there?

I'm sure that the air force guys reading this would be pissed and disagree with me. Go ahead. Prove me wrong. Until I see an air force pilot use initiative and put the ground guys physical well-being above his own legal standing, I won't believe it.

Yep and it certainly came up in a big way with a female A-10 driver fresh from down range mentioning in her presentation as a big issue...something like "we have to be sure of a valid target before we drop". I was sitting with the SEAL who started the JTAC course at Fallon and stayed with it for 6 years. He is "the man" when it comes to CAS, JTAC, etc. I almost had to hold him back. There was a strong showing from USMC and Army, particularly those who were boots on the ground and they were adamant about pushing back at her and the policy. Like your earlier comments in the other thread, much grumbling in audience saying we'd rather work with USMC and USN any day. Even an USAF 0-5 who was fresh from CAOC told me off-line that he say a big difference between the services even when both had ROVER capability (ie too much chat and CYA by F-16 before dropping when Tomcats had teeth out as soon as they checked in).

As to Litening II, what a great story and it keeps getting better with F/A-18D getting them as well. There's a video showing F/A-18 unable to prosecute a target due to NITEHawk performance and Harriers coming in and getting job done pronto using downlink capability. Have to see if it can be uploaded...it's a keeper and it's unclass.

Great post...is that what you were looking for, Eddie?

 

[mmx1]

tag.

Thx for the info, gentlemen. Let's keep it UNCLASS so plebes like me can listen and learn.

 

[HeyJoe]

Maybe better in the Private Forum but I will hold off on moving it until there is a consensus.

Eddie did ask for more...is he allowed in the "private room?"

tag.

Thx for the info, gentlemen. Let's keep it UNCLASS so plebes like me can listen and learn.

It will be UNCLASS regardless...this isn't the SIPRNet even in the "private" forum

 

[Lawman]

Gotta say guys Ive probably learned more about the prosecution of CAS in these last 2 threads then I had in the rest of my time on AW. Great stuff.


And Harrier Dude, in regards to that whole rules and doctrine way of thinking, Id bet the A-10's FRAT's in Desert Storm, and that F-16 that dropped on the Canadians had a lot to do with that. Not saying that its right or anything but Ill bet things would be running a bit differntly had the shoe been on the other foot.

Still though great stuff, and with me 5 days from "entering the suck" at OCS on my air contract this has only strengthened my feelings towards the community, platform, and mission Im interested in with the Marine Corps.

 

[phrogpilot73]

Type 1, 2, and 3 control still confuses grunts. Combine that with the A-10 incident in Iraq, and most commanders (my Battalion CO as well) are hestiant to allow us to utilize Type 3 control. I have tried to explain it, to the point of being blue in the face. I think I'm finally softening up the CO, as I have taken to dumbing it down. I think that using the example of changing a battery is a good one. However, it's still an uphill battle...

 

[Harrier Dude]

Good point. I've been fighting the battle over this for awhile now. I think that it's clear that the system is too complicated, now that the J-world sea-lawyering began.

My point is, I may get better looking when I drink, but I don't get any smarter when I fly. There's no reason to think any of us will get any smarter when we're pinned down under fire. If a MAWTS trained Air Officer with a masters degree is having trouble explaining the differences between CAS and DAS and the types of control to a Grunt Colonel with an equal (if not much better) education and two commands with Force Recon, then it IS too complicated.

Part of the problem is that most range regs out there won't allow anything other than type 1 control. You can forget about the abysmal embarrassment of G-10 for CAS training. If the grunts can't see it work in action, it's hard for them to push the "I believe" button. Doing this for the first time in combat isn't the optimal solution.

Don't take me the wrong way about the complication. It could be very simple, but the devil is in the details. I am a big fan of the kill box method of fire support coordination. I also believe strongly that all 3 methods of control are good. One of the new problems that we're facing is that there is a fundamental misconception that one or more of the control methods is easier/harder than the rest.

Some grunts believe that "all I want is type 2 and 3 capability", because they think that it relieves them of all of the integration functions that slow down the process. Not so. CAS is CAS. All of the deconfliction has to be done between fire and maneuver regardless of control method employed. The new army JFO course has amplified that misconception because they are "certifying" type 2 and 3 observers. It makes no sense.

That logic relys on the flawed assumption that type 1 is harder than 2 or 3. It ALL depends on the situation at hand. Depending on what you have available for a mark, or what gucci gear you have to generate coordinates and/or lase the target, type 1 may be easier. I know I'm preaching to the choir, but let me give three examples of CAS, and one of TGO that maybe you can use with your CO.

Example 1: You are in the defense in a desert environment and are dug in. You have patrols out in front and are in radio contact with them. You have been there for a few days, and do not have any power for laptop computers or the GLDD. Navy Hornets are on station with MK-82s and 20mm. Your 81s are up and registered, ready to respond for calls for fire. Weather is 5000 overcast with 5 miles vis. You see 3 technical vehicles with armed insurgents 800m to you front. They have limited defilade from direct fire weapons, but you can still see their position. What works best? In this case (in my opinion), type 2 is out becasue you don't have access to coordinates good enough to really deconflict/ensure a tight CEP with an auto delivery. Also, they could move and you don't have a laser (or LGW, for that matter). Type 3 is not optimal because you have patrols out that might be easily be confused for your target. Type 1 would be easiest (and more importantly, more effective) because you could mark with 81s, bring the hornets in beneath the layer, and control their attack visually to adjust their hits.

Example #2. Same as before, but the weather is 1000' overcast with 2 miles vis. The jets are now replaced with a B-1 armed with JDAM and the technicals are not able to move because you have them pinned down with direct fire weapons. Your GLDD and laptop (loaded with PSSOF) are now working. What now? The weather and weapon match are not good for type 1. Type 3 remains a problem because of your patrols and the weather. You have solid coordinates for a JDAM, so type 2 would work best. Please note that you do NOT have to have JDAM to do type 2 (as you know), it just complements it well.

Example #3. New situation. You are now on the move in a convoy towards the enemy. Tempo is fast and you are bypassing many enemy positions in the drive toward the capitol. You just saw an enemy parking lot full of arty tubes next to a burning oil tank and a very conspicuous red and white checkered water tower about 5 km back behind you. You wrote down a rough grid off your PLGR as you passed it. The last thing your CO wants is arty in his rear firing and you just had a division of Cobras check in with a full load. What now? Well you can't see the target area anymore because you're on the move, so type 1 control is out. It's an area target with multiple DMPIs and you don't have good enough grids to assure good hits and deconfliction, so type 2 is not optimum. You could talk the Cobras on to that lot using the landmarks and grid you have and control them type 3

"Scarface 11, do you see the parking lot vic PS123456? What do you see near it?"

"I see a burning oil tank and a red and white water tower approximately 200m east of the lot. In the lot are 15-20 arty tubes with prime movers"

"Scarface 11, you are cleared to engage those tubes. Make your runs North and South. Do not engage anything east of the lot. Report complete."

Obviously, this would have to be run through the FSCC just like the other two, but with the "warm fuzzy" that your FSC has in the Cobras SA, he'd likely approve it.

Now, to highlight the problem of CAS vs DAS, another example.

Example #4: A recon team is on a hill 30 km in front of the FLOT. They are operating as the eyes of the division commander for the coming advancement of a BN the following day. They are not in contact with the BN due to proximity and LOS restraints. They are in good defilade and are very well concealed with Ghillie suits. They have a GLDD, a laptop, and their personal weapons. They see an insurgent camp in the middle of killbox AB01 which is well concealed by terrain and cammie netting. It's about 1000 meters in their front. The days ATO has aircraft fragged for XINT into that killbox with SPINS specifying to contact A1Z on Purple 36 for TGO. A flight of 2 USAF F-16s checks in to work. They are armed with 4X GBU-12 and 4X Mk-20, plus gun. What type of control do you use now?

Trick question. You're not doing CAS. You are not intgrating fire with maneuver. What you could do is tell them where the targets are at, lase for them, and provide BDA. You could give them your position, if you want to for safety, but the bad guys have radios, too.

The bad part here is that many USAF pilots would not drop in that situation without a JTAC in the loop. To them, since you're there, it's CAS.

I'm not sure I understand the "changing a battery" analogy. Maybe this will help.

By the way, have you had a chance to go to the MAWTS-1 Air Officers Course, Phrog? If not, I'd highly reccomend it. POC is Maj. TenKley at MAWTS-1.

For all: I'm SURE that all of this is UNCLASS. It's all in the JCAS pub and many other UNCLASS docs. Just trying to avoid being the butt of a JAGMAN.

 

[phrogpilot73]

I'm not sure I understand the "changing a battery" analogy. Maybe this will help.

By the way, have you had a chance to go to the MAWTS-1 Air Officers Course, Phrog? If not, I'd highly reccomend it. POC is Maj. TenKley at MAWTS-1.

Yup, I have been to MAWTS-1 Air O course, in conjunction with Desert Talon. I know Mongo pretty well, and learned alot while I was there.

As for the changing a battery, I found it to be the easiest way to explain how Type 3 can work. The situation I give them is that we have identified targets (or target), and that the battery in my radio is dying. I pass a Type 3 control 9-line with as many (or as little) restrictions as I want - basically give examples using FAHs that are just as restrictive as Type 1 or 2, and do not engage past a certain grid line. I give them an engagement window, something that I think will give me time to change my battery. It's a pretty dumbed-down and simple scenario that they seem to understand. Sorry if I confused you.

 

[Harrier Dude]

OK. I get the battery example, although I can see why he didn't really buy it. If I were him, and didn't know any better, I would be thinking "How long does it take to change a battery?". Also, since you still retain abort authority, who's going to do that while your battery is being changed?

I've always kind of thought of type 3 control as more of a visibility and expeditous engagement scenario based on SA, risk, and tempo.

In OIF 1 we did this a lot, although probably a little non-doctrinally by todays standard. Same with type 2 control.

Have you been able to practice this anywhere except WTI AOC?

 

[skidkid]

I think the confusion is across the board though getting better. I had some Harriers check on one time in Yuma and they wanted to mark with the IR pointer on the Lpod (great mark by the way) but they kept asking for Type 2 control for that I had to tell them "No type 1 still in effect, your MARK my Control" This was a year and a half ago and I think it is getting better.
That A-10 pilot in OIF I really set us back a lot in getting this out to the grunts, there was blame to go around on that one, it was jsut the A-10 guy bad day for all involved.
New JCAS is redifining the requirements yet again.

 

[Harrier Dude]

but they kept asking for Type 2 control for that I had to tell them "No type 1 still in effect, your MARK my Control"

I think that what they were driving at is that they wanted to do medium altitude level-laydowns and knew that you wouldn't be able to see them if the were lights out (probably). Under type 1 they're probably going to have to roll in with light on and maybe pop flares to get your eyes on, depending on the wx, etc. I know what a pain we are to see (and frankly, happy about it).

What is the best way for a pilot to get that across? Obviously, the ground commander sets what type of control is in effect, and it's briefed in the CAS check-in. If I want to apply tactics that are best supported by type 2 control, how's the best way to get that across?

If I have a TPOD and GBUs, a delivery that will let you (and the bad guys) see me isn't what I would rather do, given the choice. This is WAY situationally dependent, but with a GBU/TPOD set up, we're simply not going to miss. That's not ego, that's technology.

That's one thing I LOVE about the IR marker. I can give the FAC a HUGE warm fuzzy about what I'm aiming at long before release and he can adjust as nessecary even after release (to a point). I hadn't seen it from the ground until WTI AOC. That, the 25mm at night, and the Huey minigun were the coolest thing I saw there.

Don't get me wrong. I still believe in type 1 control when it's required. I think the tendency lately is to use technology as an excuse for not doing the hard look for the A/C that may very well be required. I just think that we need to work all 3 types of control more often.

Have they changed the R2507 range regs to allow types 2 and 3? I did it at WTI AOC, but I was under the impression that it was a one shot waiver.

 

[phrogpilot73]

What is the best way for a pilot to get that across? Obviously, the ground commander sets what type of control is in effect, and it's briefed in the CAS check-in. If I want to apply tactics that are best supported by type 2 control, how's the best way to get that across?

Have they changed the R2507 range regs to allow types 2 and 3? I did it at WTI AOC, but I was under the impression that it was a one shot waiver.

I would say that the best way for the aircrew to get it across would be to request type 2 and explain that it's for your own tactics. I know that type 2 is generally more accepted by both the FSC and the commanders, so I don't think anyone would bat an eye if you requested it.

I don't know that the range regs have been changed, here in Lejeune the range regs still require Type 1, but a couple of times we "forgot" that part in order to show Type 2 and 3 to the FSC/Battalion CO so they could see just how effective it could be. Realistically, we still saw the target and the aircraft, so it could been just as easily Type 1 but we demonstrated Type 2 and 3 and how you can be just as restrictive in your remarks.

The battery changing anology is just a simplified way of explaining it. I know on a 148 it takes about 30 secs to change the battery, but I use the example to prove that I can still control the aircraft and give him restrictions allowing fires to be brought to bear even though I'm temporarily out of the fight. As for the abort authority, on the hill I would rely on the other FAC/Air Officer. Of course, real world I don't think I would run a 9-line if I had to change a battery.

As for redefining Types 1, 2, and 3, my understanding (and the most up to date JCAS Pub) is that the requirements to see the aircraft/target in Type 2 and 3 are the same. The only difference between the two is controlling each individual attack in Type 2 (through a cleared hot call), and Type 3 is giving the aircrew the option to run as many attacks/reattacks as they deem fit (by clearing them to engage in a time window). Are they changing the definition beyond that?

 

[Harrier Dude]

I don't think so, but then again, I wasn't at the last JCAS symposium. Bottom line (the way I read it) is that type 2 you have to see the exact target at some point (including scout/COLT/UAS, but do not have to see the attack) and do not have to see the a/c at all. You could keep your head down or button up that way.

In type 3 you just need the approx position for a target/array of targets via sight, UAS, or scout/COLT/observer. Then it's a talk on to "armed recce short of the FSCL". You don't have to see the target or a/c during all of this.

I know, I know.....don't confuse it by talking about the FSCL, but for us older dudes, that's what it boils down to, with restrictions, of course.