In formulating the right strategy, there is no better guide than a slim 1964 volume, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Its author was a French officer named David Galula, who saw service not only in World War II but in postwar China, Greece, Hong Kong and Algeria. If there is a Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, Galula is it.
Although much has changed in recent decades, most of his admonitions still apply, which is why so many are echoed in the new Army-Marine counterinsurgency field manual. U.S. forces have gotten better at this demanding type of warfare in Iraq, but even now they're still falling short, often through no fault of their own, in carrying out many of Galula's key precepts:
"Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is most likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population's stand…. Political, social, economic and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population."
Too often the U.S. has gotten it backward, building infrastructure, holding elections and carrying out other civil reforms in an insecure environment. Expensive projects, such as electrical and water treatment plants, have been sabotaged. Any goodwill won has been ephemeral.
Our top priority must be to establish a modicum of security. Only then can reconstruction go forward.
