Yeah, I'm not commenting on the Intel-Air relationship. I take umbrage with your comment, "the intel community seems largely focused on telling the shoes where their adversaries are." I've been a shoe for a little while and I find intel support in that vein lacking. There are some major improvements afoot, none of which is well supported by the intel community (1830s). That's where the comment about your experience comes from; without knowing your background I don't think you're too familiar with maritime strike.
My fault for not being clear here. I've recognized for quite some time that there isn't a lot of tactical intel support to the surface community. You guys get an IS, and then the DESRON staff has an 1830 as the N2, even almost every aviation squadron has more intel folks than that. So while we are both in agreement that tactical support to both the aviation and surface communities is lacking, I'm saying that this is due to the excess emphasis placed on operational and strategic level intelligence, focusing mainly on the maritime domain (hence the "shoe" comment, because the customers here are either shoes or aviators with stars on their collars making decisions about where to send the shoes). Shoes at least get the operational level support, aviators get very little.
-Re: the 1830/IS obsession with tracking white shipping. Yeah I don't totally get that; probably institutional inertia. The same institutional inertia that leads many IntelOs (not all) to be all liquored up on NSW support rather than blue water Navy jobs and issues. Is white shipping tactically relevant? Sometimes, but not to the extent that justifies the infrastructure we have in place to support it, IMO.
I can see why a fleet HQ would care a lot about white shipping. Not really tactically relevant, but worth monitoring on the watchfloor.
-Also agree that 1830s/IS's focus too much on big picture/strategic issues. I'm guessing it's because that's a lot easier than getting into the weeds and learning how other navies are operating down at the tactical level.
What I find bizarre is how we expect high school graduates with no real training in international relations / politics to make products that are briefed to admirals. And it is "easier" in that you don't have to have a depth of knowledge to be good enough at it, but I'd say it is just as hard to be really good at it as the more technical stuff.
The other piece here is that there is a demand signal for that stuff from the bosses. And the bosses are mostly folks that have to think at the operational/strategic levels. In a 20 year career it is entirely possible that I will only do 2-3 operational/sea tours and have a boss that is focused on tactical level decisions.
I could fill a warehouse with the generic knee boards and recce books that I've been issued by intel; but I've encountered precious few briefs and reports on real-deal, no-kidding, actionable tactical assessments. I think you and yours would do well to beef up this skill set in order to stay relevant.
100% agree that recce is one of the most overrated things that intel does. I always told my guys that the stuff I had up in the head was more to help them look good during SFARP lectures than anything else.