The Rest Of The Story (Not so much...)

[Flugelman]

Saw this over at Lex's place. The timeline seems a little off...

What do you pointy nose guys think?

 

[MIDNJAC]

I wasn't around then, so maybe Cat or someone else who was can comment firsthand. Second-hand, I have read a couple good books about the origins and development of Top Gun, and this isn't the first time I've heard this reference, so I'm guessing there is a grain of truth to it.

 

[Catmando]

I wasn't around then, so maybe Cat or someone else who was can comment firsthand. Second-hand, I have read a couple good books about the origins and development of Top Gun, and this isn't the first time I've heard this reference, so I'm guessing there is a grain of truth to it.

This BS popped up a couple of years ago – note the 2009 date on the article. It is a bunch of crap! One of the TOPGUN instructors wrote a long and big-time smack down on this article at the time. I will see if I can find a copy. Meanwhile, here is what I remember:

TOPGUN started and had its 1st class in 1969, while it was still only a part of the F-4 RAG, VF-121. A year later I was a RAG student with a ringside seat watching NFWS develop. I remember they invited Israeli and British fighter pilots (and maybe other countries too) in 1970 to come visit and share thoughts on the new tactics that were being developed.

While the Israeli's were impressive, the Brits were not. It was mostly a paid vacation for them. About the only thing we learned from them were beer drinking bar games, since they spent most of their time in the O'Club. Lord and one other guy had massive egos. About the only thing they gave us were a couple of their quotes in the new TacMan... quotes later removed soon after they left.

This BS article was to stir up interest in a book and nothing more.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Rog, thanks for the info Catmando. Makes sense about the Israelis......don't think they had the luxury of not knowing their trade in those days, WVR or not.

 

[scoolbubba]

Effing limeys.

 

[Catmando]

Rog, thanks for the info Catmando. Makes sense about the Israelis......don't think they had the luxury of not knowing their trade in those days, WVR or not.

I finally found the original smack-down I was looking for refuting the Brits' claims. It was written at the time of the UK Telegraph article and made the rounds via email to us old guys.

Darrel (Condor) Gary is the real deal. He was there at the beginning of TOPGUN. He played a major part in developing the syllabus and new tactics for the F-4. He is about as good a source as any, and he makes for some good reading:

Response to British false claims about Top Gun:

‘Rowland White’s interpretation of history is disingenuous, erroneous and certainly self promotional. All of the Royal Navy exchange pilots at that time (Dick Lord, Dick Moody and Peter Jago) were excellent pilots. What we learned from them was how to play mess Rugby in our whites, how to pass out in your plate at a Dining In and how to leave your breakfast on the ramp and still make your take-off time. They did make a positive contribution to the development of skill sets and tactical training within the training squadron to which we were all assigned. Many of them remain friends today. Peter lives near San Diego and flies eastern bloc aircraft long with us doing many of the same things we did in our youth. To assert that “they taught us how to fly the F-4 or that they wrote the NFWS syllabus is a complete fabrication.
It was widely understood by our pilots (USN and USAF) that we had trained for a different threat and were flying a very versatile and capable aircraft that was designed to establish air superiority in a different environment than the one we found ourselves engaged in. To further compound the problems, our command and control limitations negated our primary advantage, the ability to kill at long range. U.S. forces were routinely required to make a V.I.D. which put us in a turning fight with weapons not ideally suited for close in high “G” high T.C.A. combat. To make it even worse, the Rules of Engagement shifted the initiative to our adversaries. They exploited those R.O.E. Shame on the planners who don’t have to do the fighting. “Fight to Win” anything else is rubbish.
It was the Ault Report that gave voice to the operational forces (Fighter Pilots recently back from combat). The Ault Report cataloged all of the problems facing our forces. The easiest to fix in a short period of time was aircrew training and tactics. Missile performance was next in the line-up and we saw the results before the end of the conflict. Unlike the U.S.A.F. which was ruled by the bomber generals of S.A.C., the U.S. Navy command structure responded appropriately. They told those who experienced the problems and who complained about the situation to “go fix it”.
We studied prior conflicts and all of the prior F-4 vs MIG engagements. Adapting the two aircraft tactical unit, the Rotte/Section/Element established by Werner Molders (Luftwaffe) to the performance capabilities of our aircraft, we developed Loose Deuce maneuvering which emphasized mutual support. Taking advantage of the weapons system capability we developed offensive combat spread techniques and V.I.D tactics to maintain the offensive advantage at the terminal phase of an intercept.
We studied Maj John Boyd’s (U.S.A.F.) theory of energy maneuverability in order to understand relative aircraft performance envelopes and the comparative advantages/disadvantages of the F-4 vs our adversaries. We had the added advantage of being able to fly against captured assets. We were able to fly against the adversary aircraft in the western desert. The learning curve was very steep and resulted in dramatically revised tactics and training. We learned to use the vertical and the lag roll and other maneuvers to exploit our relative advantages. All of this was incorporated into the NFWS syllabus.
This took place against the backdrop of the bombing halt ordered by President Johnson in November of 1968. For the next three years any aerial confrontation was very limited. President Nixon lifted the ban north of the 20th parallel. By this time numerous NFWS trained pilots were assigned to Fighter Squadrons in the theater of operations. When aerial combat resumed, the results were dramatic. All of the U.S. Navy kills except for two were made by NFWS “TOPGUN” graduates. This is now a part of aviation history, legend and lore…..U.S. Naval Aviation history I might add. He who says otherwise was not there and diminishes himself by trying to assume the credit for the accomplishments of others.’
So the Brits *did* have an important role in the improvement of American fighter pilots. They introduced the concept of a full breakfast, since the typical breakfast before then was “a Coke, a smoke and a puke.”
For you glass cockpit flyers, TCA is track crossing angle.
During my short time at The School, instructors such as Huck, Manfred and Hawk spoke in awe about the visiting Israeli pilot who watered their eyes in the F-4J they borrowed from somewhere…probably VF-121. The only Brit mentioned during the course was Roy Brown.

Darrel Gary

 

[Flash]

I am pretty sure this came up before here on AW too at least once and HeyJoe posted some comments in rebuttal, can't seem to find it though......

 

[TheBubba]

Gentlemen,

Thanks for the history lesson. Always good to learn more about your chosen profession.

 

[Jim123]

Dumb question about the air-to-air VID requirement in Vietnam:

Why?

My best guess is that our side must have been worried about one of our guys mistakenly shooting down... a Russian or a Chinese, some other random neutral (??), or maybe a People's Air Force "humanitarian" aircraft. (Did any of those things even exist in the skies over there?) Or was this another road we didn't want to go down for fear of escalation and angering the North's backers?

Our, ahem, political leadership must have provided some justification... just wondering. Nothing I've ever read went into much detail about why.

 

[Catmando]

Dumb question about the air-to-air VID requirement in Vietnam:

Why?

My best guess is that our side must have been worried about one of our guys mistakenly shooting down... a Russian or a Chinese, some other random neutral (??), or maybe a People's Air Force "humanitarian" aircraft. (Did any of those things even exist in the skies over there?) Or was this another road we didn't want to go down for fear of escalation and angering the North's backers?

Our, ahem, political leadership must have provided some justification... just wondering. Nothing I've ever read went into much detail about why.

Actually that is a damn good question that gives me pause. There's not an easy answer.

1st, although ROE was fluid, there was no really hard-fast VID requirement. In fact I had a BVR "cleared to fire" with an AIM-7 – and would have, but wanted to "sweeten the shot" – on what turned out to be a sister squadron F-4 (and friend).

2nd, NVN was a small airspace with a lot of chaos and many aircraft flying around. There was no real way to know who you had locked up. We had the capability, but within the time and tactical constraints, we really didn't. So BVR clearance to fire was rare.

3rd, MiGs often popped up after a 30+A/C Alpha Strike. It was every man for himself on egress, so there was no way of knowing who the f*ck was who in the chaotic gaggle.

4th, BVR attacks would have happened more, but our Spooks didn't want to show their hand on how capable we were.

5th, Unless on MiG-Cap, Fighters were tied to the Strike Group or their Photo escort. We could not leave them, and the VNAF knew our weapons ranges and stayed away.

Finally, to my knowledge there were no "outside" other country's MiGs in the air (although some VPAF A/C were likely flown by Russkies.) If it looked like a MiG, regardless of markings, it was worth a Silver Star and dead meat.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Was there any means of electronic PHID back in those days?

 

[Catmando]

Was there any means of electronic PHID back in those days?

The term "PHID" is new to me, but I think I know what it means.

Yes, we had some of that capability. But in that melee and dynamic scenario it was mostly worthless.

Remember we were 450kts+ jinking 4+ Gs every few seconds, trying to maintain some semblance of a tactical formation and hoping not having a mid-air, or worse losing your lead. We were usually being overwhelmed by loud aural and visual blinking-red SAM and AAA cockpit threats, and then seeing and hearing actual SAM launches and barrage AAA on our RHAW. Then sighting and evading the real airborne multiple SAMS and AAA. Trying to use your black boxes to determine a radar contact as a true bandit, rather than being your stateroom mate or an A-7 from the main Strike Group was a bit of a problem, and secondary to the shit zipping around you and your survival.

So mostly if you saw him - a MiG - you tried to kill him. If you couldn't see him, you sometimes hesitated, Friend or Foe technology - if there was time to check - be damned. Twice I could have killed the BVR contact. One would have been the enemy; the other would have been my lifetime friend.

Yes, those missions were not all that common, but not unusual either. Fog of War applies.

 

[Flugelman]

Wasn't there a case where a Thud out of Thailand was downed in a blue-on-blue BVR shot? In the dim (and getting dimmer) recesses of my memory I remember reading of one.

 

[Catmando]

Wasn't there a case where a Thud out of Thailand was downed in a blue-on-blue BVR shot? In the dim (and getting dimmer) recesses of my memory I remember reading of one.

I think, and seem to recall some blue-on-blue shoot-down stories, not only by the Air Force but also by the Navy over North Vietnam. But I have no real, certain knowledge.

For obvious reasons, if these incidents really did occur, they were not readily made public. And probably in most cases as far as I am concerned, they could be mostly understandable given the circumstances, if they did occur.

 

[Jim123]

Thank you, Cat. The fog of war and all five of your points make a lot of sense the way you describe them.