SSKs or SSPs have no place in U.S. doctrine.
If unmanned, cheap, expendable, and semi-autonomous, it might be worth prototyping.I can't see how you'd get an SSK into a place like the SCS or ECS in time of conflict and have it come out alive.
SSKs or SSPs have no place in U.S. doctrine.
If unmanned, cheap, expendable, and semi-autonomous, it might be worth prototyping.I can't see how you'd get an SSK into a place like the SCS or ECS in time of conflict and have it come out alive.
I remember that scene, it was a good documentary. 😁I think I found a picture from a Navy Times article about it. Could've sworn it was an East Coast boat though. Made stops in Charleston and Norfolk.
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Based on what? We have more submarines forward deployed at any given time than every other nation in the world by an order of magnitude.But cost and time to operational capability is not tenable right now. Tell me where to find the funds, skilled labor, shipyard availability, and speed production, and I will reconsider my qualified support for augmenting the sub fleet with conventional boats.
I don't think anyone puts UUVs in the same category as SSKs / SSPs. We are pursuing UUV technology. Aside from technical challenges like battery life, the question does arise - how do you employ a UUV in combat operations when you can't communicate with it and / or it needs to be on a relatively short tether? What platform is employing UUVs and is it worth the decrease of ammunition the platform carries?If unmanned, cheap, expendable, and semi-autonomous, it might be worth prototyping.
The desire to have more submarines is based on an operational requirement that SSKs cannot do - blue water ASuW against modern, capable DDGs. If you think that shipyard construction resources are already constrained making SSNs, adding a requirement to also build SSKs will make the problem worse, not better.
nd oh, btw, the production delays are not strictly due to the nuclear propulsion plant - combat systems (in the shipyard sense) are frequently the long pole in the tent and there are also frequent non-nuclear HM&E delays. The nuclear part usually goes as scheduled.
f you want to improve production and maintenance timelines then EB, NNSY, and PNSY need to pay better than $1/hr above minimum wage so people actually want to work there to weld pipes and run electrical cables in cramped spaces.
f you make SSKs, you'll be giving theater commanders a tool that is virtually useless... and they aren't even asking for them. Might as well tell the USMC they're getting more Abrams and they're going to like it while we're at it. We build our military around use cases that support our doctrine, not the other way around.
This discussion is based on an article posted above. Apparently you missed it. Of course you will disagree with it, Once you read it you will see most everything you just posted misses the mark, so I will refrain from replying point by point. I will simply say again, we can not afford all the SSNs we want and presumable need. You can not get from here to there. As to the virtual uselessness of a convention sub, I would put one underway up against a SSN at Electric Boat in the 6th year of construction or the number of unfunded SSNs. Your dreams are less useful then any SSK.Based on what? We have more submarines forward deployed at any given time than every other nation in the world by an order of magnitude.
The desire to have more submarines is based on an operational requirement that SSKs cannot do - blue water ASuW against modern, capable DDGs. If you think that shipyard construction resources are already constrained making SSNs, adding a requirement to also build SSKs will make the problem worse, not better.
And oh, btw, the production delays are not strictly due to the nuclear propulsion plant - combat systems (in the shipyard sense) are frequently the long pole in the tent and there are also frequent non-nuclear HM&E delays. The nuclear part usually goes as scheduled.
If you want to improve production and maintenance timelines then EB, NNSY, and PNSY need to pay better than $1/hr above minimum wage so people actually want to work there to weld pipes and run electrical cables in cramped spaces.
If you make SSKs, you'll be giving theater commanders a tool that is virtually useless... and they aren't even asking for them. Might as well tell the USMC they're getting more Abrams and they're going to like it while we're at it. We build our military around use cases that support our doctrine, not the other way around.
We need naval platforms that can fight effectively 'over there.'
I have intimate first-hand knowledge of the successes and challenges of the VACL program and the tactical capabilities and limitations of SSNs vs SSKs vs SSPs that far exceeds the cursory research the author of the article decided to perform.This discussion is based on an article posted above. Apparently you missed it. Of course you will disagree with it, Once you read it you will see most everything you just posted misses the mark, so I will refrain from replying point by point. I will simply say again, we can not afford all the SSNs we want and presumable need. You can not get from here to there. As to the virtual uselessness of a convention sub, I would put one underway up against a SSN at Electric Boat in the 6th year of construction or the number of unfunded SSNs. Your dreams are less useful then any SSK.
The article proposed buying the submarines from Japan off of a hot production line so as to not interfere with our current production in the US.We cannot build SSKs at a faster rate than SSNs. That is what I was trying to explain to you - the nuclear propulsion plant isn't the critical path item to constructing submarines. And even if we could, we don't have an operational use for them.
Right... and Japan cannot produce SSKs at a fast enough rate to have a surplus to sell to the U.S. They are also producing about 1 submarine per year.The article proposed buying the submarines from Japan off of a hot production line so as to not interfere with our current production in the US.
If the market was there, Japan most certainly would ride to meet it. They most certainly would have the shipyard availability if needed. The prioritization of shipbuilding would shift. With 583 shipyards, the Japanese would make it happen. Plus, sub-assembly work doesn't need a shipyard.Japan cannot produce SSKs at a fast enough rate to have a surplus to sell to the U.S.
King for a day, I would make the UUV version of that robot lawnmower which performs scheduled “patrols” but always returns to a fully autonomous base station for refueling/ recharging, data refresh, and maintenance. Recharging could be solar/tidal. Data via satellite. A forward, light element such as a Marine Littoral Regiment can install such a base station on a chosen island and either semi-caretake it from a nearby position on that island, or leave it behind while island hopping. The UUV would be cheap enough and expendable enough that the loss is minimal if lost or captured.I don't think anyone puts UUVs in the same category as SSKs / SSPs. We are pursuing UUV technology. Aside from technical challenges like battery life, the question does arise - how do you employ a UUV in combat operations when you can't communicate with it and / or it needs to be on a relatively short tether? What platform is employing UUVs and is it worth the decrease of ammunition the platform carries?
I get the sense that UUVs are one of those things that we are developing and hoping that we can find a tactical use case once the technology matures enough to make viable platforms. Then again, there were quite a few years between the Benz Motorwagon in 1886 and fielding Jeeps in WWII.
You skipped a step... what useful warfare function(s) is it doing by "mowing the lawn" for a bit?King for a day, I would make the UUV version of that robot lawnmower which performs scheduled “patrols” but always returns to a fully autonomous base station for refueling/ recharging, data refresh, and maintenance. Recharging could be solar/tidal. Data via satellite. A forward, light element such as a Marine Littoral Regiment can install such a base station on a chosen island and either semi-caretake it from a nearby position on that island, or leave it behind while island hopping. The UUV would be cheap enough and expendable enough that the loss is minimal if lost or captured.
Aiding in sea control/sea denial in a future peer fight in the littorals. For example, find/fix enemy surface ships and submarines, and securely relay targeting data. Also, port security and maritime domain awareness.You skipped a step... what useful warfare function(s) is it doing by "mowing the lawn" for a bit?
What warfare functions do you want it to do in the next 25 years?