NEWS 737MAX

[bubblehead]

This is prob the best analysis I've read about this issue, which seems to have started because Boeing was cheap. No mention of this in the main stream.

The Best Analysis Of What Really Happened To The Boeing 737 Max From A Pilot & Software Engineer

 

[Brett327]

@wink and @HAL Pilot - thanks! Appreciate the insight!

Chuck, I'm a bit shocked that someone of your reputation would be passing along a bunch of bad gouge. I'm sure you'll promptly tighten up the members of your flying club.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Chuck, I'm a bit shocked that someone of your reputation would be passing along a bunch of bad gouge. I'm sure you'll promptly tighten up the members of your flying club.

I'll get right on that - I fly with a lot of well off retired dudes - who have too much time on their hands - lol.

 

[scoolbubba]

This has been circulating within our flying club - I can't speak for the author but it rings true with what @HAL Pilot has shared...

For those interested in the recent spate of accidents involving Boeing's newest 737 variant, the real story of what is going on behind the scenes is largely not being reported. It was interesting to note that President Trump alluded to the problem in a round about way, but unless you are a pilot you probably missed the point. In essence, President Trump was saying that technology is a poor substitute for a qualified pilot in command. One of the most basic skills a pilot learns from day one is energy management of the airplane. If the plane is too slow, it will literally drop from the sky. Too fast and the wings/airframe can come apart with disastrous consequences. In the history of commercial aviation in the US and western countries, the first crop of pilots to enter commercial service were the post world war two pilots. Those guys were the real deal and not only hand flew almost all of their hours but also in some of the most demanding conditions. The second wave were the airport kids who just fell in love with the idea of being a pilot and scrimped and saved to take lessons. Both categories of pilots were skilled in the art of aviation. With the explosion of second and third world travel, there were not even close to the number of skilled pilots to fly the thousands of new generation planes coming out of airbus and Boeing. Unlike Cathay Pacific, a Hong Kong airline that was almost exclusively piloted by British pilots, the new asian airlines wanted asian pilots to man the cockpits...often with disastrous results. Asiana flight 214 crashed in SFO in 2014 because the pilots did not know how to hand fly the plane when the ground-based approach ILS was out of service. Boeing, the FAA and worldwide aviation agencies track not only accidents, but also INCIDENTS…crap that was going sideways but didn't result in a crash. The number of unqualified pilots from Asia and Africa was plain to see in the number of errors being committed on a daily basis. To make a long story short, airbus saw this eventuality decades ago and implemented automatic safety systems in anticipation of unqualified aircrews. Boeing resisted for a lot of very good reasons...but after the Asiana crash, the Chinese government basically told Boeing to "idiot-proof" the 737 as china would end up being the biggest purchaser of that model. Since Boeing had opted not to add automated control systems (which often override pilot’s inputs) they were forced to apply a band-aid solution which, unfortunately was not done well. Only one sensor was driving some very complicated algorithms which worked against the pilot’s decision-making inputs. The fact that the asian and african pilots were essentially unqualified is highly embarrassing to the respective governments and Boeing kept it quiet. When ALPA, the pilot’s union reps found the system was added without informing the pilots, they went insane… However, what they DON'T know, is that the MCAS system can be enabled or disabled per plane, and can be done remotely on a real time basis via uplink. The US airlines management, due to the superior training and piloting skills opted NOT to activate MCAR...but the Asian/African carriers DID. That is why most of the “ crappy" airlines self grounded while all the major US airlines are still flying without a problem. It's a very PC issue, but basically comes down to 30-40% of the global pilot population are really not qualified to be pilots, but more just data input managers.

This is rubbish.

 

[ChuckMK23]

This is rubbish.

Roger - rubbish!

 

[sevenhelmet]

This is prob the best analysis I've read about this issue, which seems to have started because Boeing was cheap. No mention of this in the main stream.

The Best Analysis Of What Really Happened To The Boeing 737 Max From A Pilot & Software Engineer

That appears to be the most level-headed and objective analysis I've seen. As a test pilot, I can appreciate the progressive nature of the problem in 737 development. Reading this makes me think the best solution might be to retrofit every 737 MAX with the "optional" extra AOA vane and disagreement light, in addition to full pilot training on MCAS.

Howewer, it is amazing to me that nobody did an effective failure analysis on what seems like such an obvious single-point design: "One AOA vane that can fail and cause MCAS to kick in with no pilot indications?". I temper that statement with the admission that I don't have a deep knowledge of 737 systems AND the cause of the second crash has not been conclusively determined yet. However, a bit of redundancy in the AOA system would seem to have been the smart play from day 1. Hindsight...

 

[scoolbubba]

 

[Hair Warrior]

This will count towards your JMPE/Command and Staff credit.

If only AW.com posts counted toward JPME....

 

[wink]

That appears to be the most level-headed and objective analysis I've seen. As a test pilot, I can appreciate the progressive nature of the problem in 737 development. Reading this makes me think the best solution might be to retrofit every 737 MAX with the "optional" extra AOA vane and disagreement light, in addition to full pilot training on MCAS.

Howewer, it is amazing to me that nobody did an effective failure analysis on what seems like such an obvious single-point design: "One AOA vane that can fail and cause MCAS to kick in with no pilot indications?". I temper that statement with the admission that I don't have a deep knowledge of 737 systems AND the cause of the second crash has not been conclusively determined yet. However, a bit of redundancy in the AOA system would seem to have been the smart play from day 1. Hindsight...

Just the engineer's analysis is worth a shit. Following comments are
typical...well...rubish!

 

[bubblehead]

Larger engines on an existing airframe... This has multiple downstream consequences...

The investigations (including the recent FBI one) into the 737 MAX approval will be interesting to read.

 

[Beans]

Time to buy BA yet?

 

[wink]

Larger engines on an existing airframe... This has multiple downstream consequences...

The investigations (including the recent FBI one) into the 737 MAX approval will be interesting to read.

Certainly can. But it isn't like it hasn't been done successfully many times before, including the 737.

 

[sevenhelmet]

Just the engineer's analysis is worth a shit. Following comments are
typical...well...rubish!

Yes... I never read the comments, except on AW.

 

[Flash]

The investigations (including the recent FBI one) into the 737 MAX approval will be interesting to read.

I doubt they'll find any sort of criminality, the testing regime might have flaws but it likely doesn't rise to the level of criminal conduct.

 

[sevenhelmet]

I doubt they'll find any sort of criminality, the testing regime might have flaws but it likely doesn't rise to the level of criminal conduct.

Agreed- they would have to prove that someone at Boeing knew the system was flawed, and pushed it through anyway. I don't believe that's the case, no matter that the NYT, CNN, etc. might say about it.