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ABC Mini-series - Path to 9/11
- Thread starter The Chief
- Start date
I have neither the time, nor the inclination... Ahh fvck it - Read the book(s).
Brett
As far as heads in the sand...
RICE: I remember very well that the president was aware that there were issues inside the United States. He talked to people about this. But I don't remember the al Qaeda cells as being something that we were told we needed to do something about.
BEN-VENISTE: Isn't it a fact, Dr. Rice, that the August 6 PDB warned against possible attacks in this country? And I ask you whether you recall the title of that PDB?
RICE: I believe the title was, "Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States."
RICE: I remember very well that the president was aware that there were issues inside the United States. He talked to people about this. But I don't remember the al Qaeda cells as being something that we were told we needed to do something about.
BEN-VENISTE: Isn't it a fact, Dr. Rice, that the August 6 PDB warned against possible attacks in this country? And I ask you whether you recall the title of that PDB?
RICE: I believe the title was, "Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States."
regarding the PDB:
It was a vague history of bin Laden with no actionable intel. Even the hijacker-pilots didn’t know the day of the strike until a few days before.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/11/p...&en=26595ea37d0b43c6&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND
It was in fact prepared on Bush's request because he wanted to “get serious” about bin laden after al Qaeda threatened to assasinate him while in Italy in July 2001.
Clinton and his team (esp Sandy Berger) vetoed one strike because a Prince from the UAE might have been killed also.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0325/p01s01-usfp.html
I think there is a pretty good case for Clinton dropping the terrorism "ball." He was too busy playing with cigars...
It was a vague history of bin Laden with no actionable intel. Even the hijacker-pilots didn’t know the day of the strike until a few days before.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/11/p...&en=26595ea37d0b43c6&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND
It was in fact prepared on Bush's request because he wanted to “get serious” about bin laden after al Qaeda threatened to assasinate him while in Italy in July 2001.
Clinton and his team (esp Sandy Berger) vetoed one strike because a Prince from the UAE might have been killed also.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0325/p01s01-usfp.html
I think there is a pretty good case for Clinton dropping the terrorism "ball." He was too busy playing with cigars...
But all politicians do that. Some more than others.
As long as we're referencing books, I'll reference Ron Suskind's The One Percent Doctrine:
"The book's opening anecdote tells of an unnamed CIA briefer who flew to Bush's Texas ranch during the scary summer of 2001, amid a flurry of reports of a pending al-Qaeda attack, to call the president's attention personally to the now-famous Aug. 6, 2001, memo titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." Bush reportedly heard the briefer out and replied: "All right. You've covered your ass, now." Three months later, with bin Laden holed up in the Afghan mountain redoubt of Tora Bora, the CIA official managing the Afghanistan campaign, Henry A. Crumpton (now the State Department's counterterrorism chief), brought a detailed map to Bush and Cheney. White House accounts have long insisted that Bush had every reason to believe that Pakistan's army and pro-U.S. Afghan militias had bin Laden cornered and that there was no reason to commit large numbers of U.S. troops to get him. But Crumpton's message in the Oval Office, as told through Suskind, was blunt: The surrogate forces were "definitely not" up to the job, and "we're going to lose our prey if we're not careful."
I can't find in your linked article where it talks about anyone but "policymakers [being] worried that a strike might kill a prince or other officials from the UAE, who were also lodged at the camp" - I suppose you have some info these guys don't. It's also helpful to look at this strike planning in the context of February 1999. The Clinton Administration had been excoriated in the press for its August 1998 strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan. (The article's concerns about trading liberty for security seem especially ironic in 2006 - it even anticipates warrantless wiretapping.) Additionally, Pakistan was actively assisting bin Ladin in avoiding US airstrikes and was also involved in a tense nuclear standoff with India:
"Evidence emerged during these meetings, for example, that former Pakistani intelligence chief, Hamid Gul, forewarned bin Laden of the 1998 missile strikes so that he was able to escape. In fact, both Albright and current Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as other officials, said it took 9/11 to bring Pakistan on board with the US war against Al Qaeda."
I completely believe that. Read the text of the PDB-- no ACTIONABLE intel, just a CYA history lesson. The fault here is mainly with Clinton, for letting Bin Laden slip away, and maybe partly with the intel bureaucracy for not being able to see the puzzle before it happened-- but that is a lot to ask of them. Maybe if FBI computer system had been better, and the services not prevented by law from sharing info, the "flurry of reports" might have been useful. However many of these reports were things like "Bin Laden may use explosives in the US" (which he didn't) and that they were doing surveillance on buildings in NY. Great, so what?
The problem is that al Qaeda used very good trade craft in this attack. The lesson from 9-11 is that you have to actively pursue these jihadists. Let me use a football analogy: the USA was playing goal line defense and the 6'4" al Qaeda wide receiver ran a fade pattern on our 5'9" cornerback in single coverage, and caught the pass for a touchdown. We could fault the corner for not breaking up the pass, but that isn't realistic. The problem is that they were able to get into the red zone (while Clinton was defensive coordinator) because we put no pressure on the quarterback the whole game.
You have a valid point here. My only input is something I heard from Capt. Fick, USMC Recon platoon commander and author of "One Bullet Away," at an appearance at my school. They were very fatigued after being in Afghanistan for a while, at high altitude, and going up to 10,000ft to fight a holed up enemy in caves in the middle of winter was a tall order. Part of him was pissed, because guys were fired up to go get Bin Laden, the other rational part knew it would have been an extremely tough mission. Also he spoke highly of the Northern Alliance guys.
Being "excoriated" is hardly an excuse for not doing the right thing. The article wasn't explicit, but in that case it was up to the President to let the CIA led team get Bin Laden-- I will try to find a better article. I think also when you mentioned Clinton's "top military and intelligence advisors" earlier (Miniter) those are his administration appointees (Berger, et al) not career intel/military people. So whether it was Clinton or his military/intel advisor (Berger) who nixed getting bin Laden is just splitting hairs.
Cate
Pretty much invincible
I realize that by linking to a "liberal" site, I'm probably strangling my argument in the cradle, however: Roger Cressey, a counterterrorism advisor to both Bush and Clinton, [url="http://thinkprogress.org/2006/09/06/bush-official-blasts-abc/']said that "it’s amazing…how much they’ve gotten wrong" in the movie and that the whole Clinton-took-a-pass-on-bin-Laden thing is "something straight out of Disney and fantasyland."[/url]
Said Cressey: "If you read the 9/11 Commission report, it makes it very clear. In most of those cases, George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, said because there was single source intelligence it was his recommendation to the President not to take the shot. There was never a case where we had a clear shot at Bin Laden and the decision to take it wasn’t made."
Said Cressey: "If you read the 9/11 Commission report, it makes it very clear. In most of those cases, George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, said because there was single source intelligence it was his recommendation to the President not to take the shot. There was never a case where we had a clear shot at Bin Laden and the decision to take it wasn’t made."
Might want to complete that conversation. I've seen/heard it and a bit more was said. I could care less about the subject but at least be accurate and honest.
jmiller82
Registered User
I concur with Brett and some others on here in saying that many of us don't recollect as far back as Carter, Reagan, or even Bush I (except through the news, history channel, etc.). That being said, Clinton had a BUNCH of foreign policy fVcK-ups during his nice little tenure (8 LOONNGGG years). Besides the shots at bin Laden (more than once - one in the Sudan in conjunction w/ the Sudanese gov't, and one in Afghanistan) that were not taken by the Clinton administration, the PDB was nonexistent after 6 months of "Billy-boy" being in office. While some say the PDB was not a substantive report, it still pointed to the fact that the President was interested and "in tune" with the intelligence community (i.e. he was interested in what the intel community was working on, what threats were possible, etc.). In addition to this the Clinton administration oversaw a large portion of the BRAC-induced Navy/Marine Corps installations, commands, facilities, and infrastructure closed or realligned (91 in 1993 and roughly 62 in 1995 compared to 36 in 1991). If that doesn't have far reaching "foreign policy effects," then I'm not sure what does. Now, in all fairness to Mr. Clinton and his administration, he did have a growing technological phenomenon happening - the internet and the "dot.com boom." (in fact, VP Gore seems to think "he invented the internet!") I'm not exactly clear how/if this equates to any loss/reduction of manpower or resources for the U.S. Navy, but I'm sure defense wasn't on his mind at a time like this (nor was the rest of our nation's well-being it seems - cigars, anyone?!). Anyway, my point is that while ALL of the former administrations have had mistakes and blunders that have riddled their tenures, I think we'll all agree that Mr. Clinton's time was all too long considering some of the effects and lasting "problems" (and one could even argue a resurgence of problems credited to his administration) that we are now facing (i.e. Iraq, resurgence of anti-American sentiment in the Arab world, etc.). Just my $0.02!!
Yup, you're right, I was quoting the important parts... here's a larger selection.
"RICE: I remember very well that the president was aware that there were issues inside the United States. He talked to people about this. But I don't remember the al Qaeda cells as being something that we were told we needed to do something about.
BEN-VENISTE: Isn't it a fact, Dr. Rice, that the August 6 PDB warned against possible attacks in this country? And I ask you whether you recall the title of that PDB?
RICE: I believe the title was, "Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States."
Now, the...
BEN-VENISTE: Thank you.
RICE: No, Mr. Ben-Veniste...
BEN-VENISTE: I will get into the...
RICE: I would like to finish my point here.
BEN-VENISTE: I didn't know there was a point.
RICE: Given that -- you asked me whether or not it warned of attacks.
BEN-VENISTE: I asked you what the title was.
RICE: You said, did it not warn of attacks. It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. There was no new threat information. And it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.
BEN-VENISTE: Now, you knew by August 2001 of al Qaeda involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing, is that correct? You knew that in 1999, late '99, in the millennium threat period, that we had thwarted an al Qaeda attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport and thwarted cells operating in Brooklyn, New York, and Boston, Massachusetts.
As of the August 6 briefing, you learned that al Qaeda members have resided or traveled to the United States for years and maintained a support system in the United States.
And you learned that FBI information since the 1998 blind sheikh warning of hijackings to free the blind sheikh indicated a pattern of suspicious activity in the country up until August 6 consistent with preparation for hijackings. Isn't that so?
RICE: Do you have other questions that you want me to answer as a part of the sequence?
BEN-VENISTE: Well, did you not -- you have indicated here that this was some historical document. And I am asking you whether it is not the case that you learned in the PDB memo of August 6 that the FBI was saying that it had information suggesting that preparations -- not historically, but ongoing, along with these numerous full field investigations against al Qaeda cells, that preparations were being made consistent with hijackings within the United States?
RICE: What the August 6 PDB said, and perhaps I should read it to you...
BEN-VENISTE: We would be happy to have it declassified in full at this time, including its title.
RICE: I believe, Mr. Ben-Veniste, that you've had access to this PDB. But let me just...
BEN-VENISTE: But we have not had it declassified so that it can be shown publicly, as you know.
RICE: I believe you've had access to this PDB -- exceptional access. But let me address your question.
BEN-VENISTE: Nor could we, prior to today, reveal the title of that PDB.
RICE: May I address the question, sir?
The fact is that this August 6 PDB was in response to the president's questions about whether or not something might happen or something might be planned by al Qaeda inside the United States. He asked because all of the threat reporting or the threat reporting that was actionable was about the threats abroad, not about the United States.
This particular PDB had a long section on what bin Laden had wanted to do -- speculative, much of it -- in '97, '98; that he had, in fact, liked the results of the 1993 bombing.
RICE: It had a number of discussions of -- it had a discussion of whether or not they might use hijacking to try and free a prisoner who was being held in the United States -- Ressam. It reported that the FBI had full field investigations under way.
And we checked on the issue of whether or not there was something going on with surveillance of buildings, and we were told, I believe, that the issue was the courthouse in which this might take place.
Commissioner, this was not a warning. This was a historic memo -- historical memo prepared by the agency because the president was asking questions about what we knew about the inside.
BEN-VENISTE: Well, if you are willing...
RICE: Now, we had already taken...
BEN-VENISTE: If you are willing to declassify that document, then others can make up their minds about it.
Let me ask you a general matter, beyond the fact that this memorandum provided information, not speculative, but based on intelligence information, that bin Laden had threatened to attack the United States and specifically Washington, D.C.
There was nothing reassuring, was there, in that PDB?
RICE: Certainly not. There was nothing reassuring.
But I can also tell you that there was nothing in this memo that suggested that an attack was coming on New York or Washington, D.C. There was nothing in this memo as to time, place, how or where. This was not a threat report to the president or a threat report to me.
BEN-VENISTE: We agree that there were no specifics. Let me move on, if I may."