My point was that crew duty meant next to nothing back then, regardless of current or potential endurance. so it being a consideration for whether or not to have AAR may not have been a major consideration. I suspect there wasn't a good operational reason for mission profiles north of 15 hours to justify cost and training. As stated, missions were already going well over 10 hours without AAR and standard rest options. Remember, the stated limiting factor mentioned above was for crew rest facilities for the entire crew. I understand long mission events for the P3, and in the '70s, at least, they were done with little regard to crew rest with the exception of pilots taking a break in the rack. Those are the guys who need to be sharp in a low level prosecution. I did plenty of ASW at low level. Looking at a CRT tube at 200 feet looked just like one at 800 feet. I can't imagine the necessity to provide dedicated rest facilities for anyone but the flight deck. I admit I don't recall specific NATOPS crew duty requirements in the 1970s. Maybe someone saved their 3710 from 1978, if so I'd be curious to see what it says.
I dont think the bottom line on whether to implement AAR was the crew fatigue element, but it probably wasnt the least of the considerations. Sure everyone in the back doesnt need a rack, but their effectiveness is going to be limited as time goes on.
I've slept in a P-3 rack more than a few times. Its about the same as the racks ive seen on WWII era tin cans. At best its about the same benefit as a power nap in your car if you can even get it. Its my understanding that the aircracft commader was either required or expected to be in the flight station continuously at low altitudes (or spicy places) where they could really track subs. Even with a nap youre still pretty damn tired coming up on hour 15 or 16 of the day when taking into account the preflight planning, briefing, aircraft preflight that was never less than 2 hrs and often around 3-4.
If youre doing 4-5 hours of work before the copilot calls "rotate" then tacking on 12 hours of your own gas, and 4-5 more of gas someone brought to you (not to mention the time to climb up to go get it from the tanker, and come to think of it, break contact or whatever the ASW people call it) were looking at a 20+ hr work day by the time youre on approach. The juice wasn't worth the squeeze and just added risk. Even without the ORM and crew rest world we have now, I doubt the powers that made those decisions would have totally discounted the spot it would have put the flight station crews in.
There just wasn't a point past "sure we can do it".