Book: Officers heavy on tech, light on strategy

[MIDNJAC]

I agree with you A4's, but unless I am reading the article incorrectly it seems as if they are saying the techies are incapable of doing what you say, which seems to be absolute horse****. Engineering certainly does involve general non-quantitative problem solving, which I think is the real key of the major anyways. To think that all engineers are just book nerds who can't comprehend anything else (as I felt the author was implying) is just ignorant. Seems to be written by someone who simply doesn't understand the field. If someone were to tell me, "because you were an engineer, I know you can't read learn the history and strategy involved with being a combat leader" I would laugh in their face.

 

[exhelodrvr]

an emphasis on technology is not an inherent weakness ... Should the USN invent a naval war to prove it can still fight one?

I disagree with the first point. It's a tossup between development of leadership-management skills and understanding the concepts of war-fighting as to where the emphasis should be for officers.

The second point is a very dangerous attitude to have, which has a tendency over the centuries to come back and bite us in the ass. No, they shouldn't be inventing a war, but they should be training/planning/studying their butts off so that they are ready for one. Unfortunately, that's not what gets people promoted in peacetime.

 

[SkywardET]

I disagree with the first point. It's a tossup between development of leadership-management skills and understanding the concepts of war-fighting as to where the emphasis should be for officers.

The second point is a very dangerous attitude to have, which has a tendency over the centuries to come back and bite us in the ass. No, they shouldn't be inventing a war, but they should be training/planning/studying their butts off so that they are ready for one. Unfortunately, that's not what gets people promoted in peacetime.

I guess we'll have to agree to disagree with the first point, that emphasis on technology is not an inherent weakness. It seems to be a mere reflection of the reality that our Navy is tremedously complex from a technical standpoint. I used the AEGIS weapon system as an example because I come from one. I do not envy the workload faced on a junior SWO first reporting aboard one.

As to the second point, I was hoping that the danger of that assumption and the way I phrased it made it plain that I was obviously against the notion, but I failed in that effort. I agree that we should obviously not be creating conflicts to ensure we can still fight them, but it seems that the author of the book completely discounts our training regime as if it does not exist.

 

[MIDNJAC]

How about dependence on technology? I think THAT is a weakness, and perhaps more towards the root of what the author was intending to discuss, had he been eloquent enough to say it in a meaningful way.

 

[OUSOONER]

How quickly we forget that history has always shown a motivated farmer with his rifle is quite the formidable foe to a state of the art modern army.

 

[SkywardET]

Well dependance on anything can be made into a weakness, but that doesn't make it wholly bad. It's just one of the numerous facets that need to be taken into consideration. If I'm not mistaken, one of the risk assessment categories used in any presentation using the tenants of ORM always includes not being able to make radio contact with whatever other entity is involved in a given evolution.

Frankly, I don't see how we can accomplish some of the things that our platforms are supposedly capable of accomplishing without depending on so much technology. In terms of mathematics, the meaningful contribution of technology often serves as a force multiplier. Consequently, our physical footprint is reduced. If we were to reduce or dependance or reliance on technology, our physical footprint would necessarily have to grow in proportion or we would have to abandon the current level of capability we now enjoy.

 

[OUSOONER]

Well dependance on anything can be made into a weakness, but that doesn't make it wholly bad. It's just one of the numerous facets that need to be taken into consideration. If I'm not mistaken, one of the risk assessment categories used in any presentation using the tenants of ORM always includes not being able to make radio contact with whatever other entity is involved in a given evolution.

Frankly, I don't see how we can accomplish some of the things that our platforms are supposedly capable of accomplishing without depending on so much technology. In terms of mathematics, the meaningful contribution of technology often serves as a force multiplier. Consequently, our physical footprint is reduced. If we were to reduce or dependance or reliance on technology, our physical footprint would necessarily have to grow in proportion or we would have to abandon the current level of capability we now enjoy.

When you say what we currently enjoy, I have to ask, then why is our military so stretched thin with respect to manpower and assets? Maybe so, if we are fighting someone with similar capabilities, but when we are fighting someone that we have to route out of caves and villages, sheer man power and strategy is warranted.

 

[SkywardET]

I see your point, but I don't know if that was what the author was getting at. Furthermore, we would be much worse off if we started limiting our capabilities because of a fear of being too technically complex.

Let's just use an example of GPS. If we were to abandon it or greatly reduce our reliance upon it over fears that Chinese or Russian ASAT capabilities could cripple us, we would have forked over the advantage given us by it pre-emptively. More applicable to your example, if you take away NVG or networks or UAVs from infantry because they might not always work or they betrayed a weakness to technology, you are volunteering your forces to fewer capabilities. The focus should always be on training to our capabilities and limitations, not limiting ourself because of artificial reasons. We should train to use GPS, but also not rely on it for 100% of a given capability.

We need a large physical footprint now because of the nature of the task, but if we also had fewer capabilities because we made ourselves 'technologically lite' we would need an even larger physical footprint on top of that.

 

[Bugsmasher]

Lind sounds awfully sure that we will never (ever!) fight a peer competitor on the open ocean again. I distinctly remember being taught that our defense strategy is based on a potential enemy's capabilities, not their intentions, because intentions can change with no warning. We would sure look like dumbasses when China gobbles up Taiwan after we scrap our Aegis ships and convert our CVNs into cargo barges.

As for kicking out the engineers, I hesitate to argue much without reading the book, since a few lines from an article can make it sound like he is generalizing. Still, he seems to assume that engineers are incapable of thinking on their feet, which is an easily dismissed stereotype. I would be interested to see if he has any grounds for that assertion at all, or if he thinks it's true just because he says it is.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Let's just use an example of GPS. If we were to abandon it or greatly reduce our reliance upon it over fears that Chinese or Russian ASAT capabilities could cripple us, we would have forked over the advantage given us by it pre-emptively. More applicable to your example, if you take away NVG or networks or UAVs from infantry because they might not always work or they betrayed a weakness to technology, you are volunteering your forces to fewer capabilities. The focus should always be on training to our capabilities and limitations, not limiting ourself because of artificial reasons. We should train to use GPS, but also not rely on it for 100% of a given capability

The way I see it (and believe me, my perspective is limited ), things like GPS, NVG, they are all tools. We have men, women and weapons to deliver to the battlefield and they are essential at times for getting us from point A to B to accomplish the mission. That is smart utilization of technology, and not weakness....in fact it is strengthening. But to prepare battle plans solely around the use of one technology that must function properly for mission accomplishment, that is just poor planning and is indeed weakness. Here is an open ended question because I don't know the answer.....could we execute a complicated military movement/operation without GPS or NVG, and do so in an equally tactical manner? I bet we have the tools to do it, even if we don't think we do.

 

[mmx1]

I think you're both getting afield of Lind's point (which, once in a while, he does have). One doesn't need an engineering or even technical degree to learn to utilize GPS - we're the end-user, not the creator of this technology. In fact, there are very few MOS's where your college degree plays a factor.

And at least along that line, his argument is that by focusing so heavily on engineering, we're training officers to be operators of technology and not practitioners of war. This drives the technology fetishism that technology drives warfare and doctrine, not the other way around.

To expand on MIDNJAC, it's not a matter of having GPS or not having GPS. It's a matter of whether understanding how your enemy thinks vice how the GPS constellation satellite works is more important.

 

[MIDNJAC]

And at least along that line, his argument is that by focusing so heavily on engineering, we're training officers to be operators of technology and not practitioners of war. This drives the technology fetishism that technology drives warfare and doctrine, not the other way around.

Well said for a math major

 

[exhelodrvr]

I guess we'll have to agree to disagree with the first point, that emphasis on technology is not an inherent weakness. It seems to be a mere reflection of the reality that our Navy is tremedously complex from a technical standpoint. I used the AEGIS weapon system as an example because I come from one. I do not envy the workload faced on a junior SWO first reporting aboard one.

As to the second point, I was hoping that the danger of that assumption and the way I phrased it made it plain that I was obviously against the notion, but I failed in that effort. I agree that we should obviously not be creating conflicts to ensure we can still fight them, but it seems that the author of the book completely discounts our training regime as if it does not exist.

I don't think the author's point is that technology is emphasized too much, but rather that he feels that technical "know-how" carry too much weight with the leadership. i.e. knowing how to use radar tactically is important, but in-depth knowledge of the technology of the system is not as important.

 

[eddie]

mothball its Aegis warships ... never fight an open-ocean war against a peer competitor such as China or Russia ... aircraft carriers as cargo ships, carrying supplies or helicopters...

Lind also recommends the Navy develop its own carrier-launched low-level ground-attack aircraft...

Uh... I like the last point, I guess. But I think the other two ideas suck... based on my non-technical knowledge of Naval history...

Guy just lost a lot of his credibility by, well, thinking to "technically" about the problem of future warfare.