Being a member of the unwashed, I'm not privy to some of the inside details but what was the reason for ditching the S-3 as an organic tanker? Was it just parts/supply/maintenance/logistics money or was there something else? It would seem like just deploying one or two US-3s to a carrier -- similar to the COD -- for tanker/small cargo would provide a much needed capability to each air wing. It's never made sense to me why the Navy relies on the USAF for refueling.
The S-3 was never envisioned as an organic tanker when it came to the fleet; the KA-6 had the role.
When the A-6's went away, something needed to take over the job.
Tanking ability isn't the reason the S-3 was retired, the ASW retirement of the Strike Group had more to do with it than anything else. As proof the S-3 had all the ASW gear removed for the last few years of its life. It could still do the ASuW mission but with the introduction of the Super Hornet and putting MH-60R (with ISAR) and MH-60S helos on the carrier, the S-3 became expendable.
As to the US-3 potential, while it does have some advantages over the C-2, these advantages do not offset the additional requirements (spare parts, trained maintainers, aircrew) of keeping the S-3 airframe active in the fleet. It came down to a cost analysis of keeping the S-3 flying. The costs exceeded the benefits, therefore it was killed.
As for the Air Force tanking, it's simple, a KC-10/135 has the capability to pass enough gas to refuel an entire strike package. The S-3 couldn't pass enough gas to serve as a mission tanker for an entire strike. It could refuel a few aircraft after takeoff or prior to landing, but not 10+ aircraft all needing lots of gas for a long flight.
With the Air Force serving as JFACC/TFACC it puts the requirement on themselves to provide tanking. You want naval air? You need to provide a big-wing tanker to get it.
