Cold War revisited

[Max the Mad Russian]

he late VADM Art Cebrowski (appropriately acknowledged by Max) developed tactics to introduce extremely long range intercepts with “Chainsaw” tactics and defense of a wide Arc using Vector Logic and semi-independent Tomcats managing their own parts of the Grid for hours on end.

When being realized, that had ruined all previous tactics and led to a creation of RUGs (Badgers/Backfires mix ) and decoys, with some missiles are to launch unguided before the main salvo to engage at least some Tomcats prior to real deal. It may seem strange, but Intel always insisted that F-14 is unable to land on a carrier with all six Phoenixes and four is its max practical load. So we never counted on six per aircraft, and oppositely, while Backfire could carry up to three Kh-22s, one in a bomb bay and two underwings, only single slug inside was actual load to utilize all aircraft's benefits.

I was far more worried about taking out the Charlie Class Sub lurking about before it could launch its load prior to getting tapped itself.

Ok, Backfires had indeed nothing but M>2 dash and group salvo as a main tactic but about 1984 it came to a concept of combined attack: the whole PAD aka anti-carrier sub division (NOT administrative unit but operational one: 8 Oskars, 1-2 Victors/Akulas, 1-2 Sierras) should shadow the CBG in three groups, with 4 Oskar-IIs being within launching range and rest 4 ones dispersed leeward to cut the CBG retreat off (or react to another CBG), but first hand was given Victors/Sierras group, which is first to kill SBG's LA-class (or two) then engage surface escort, first of all Tico-class to soften the AAW, all with torpedoes. And Backfires should make their dash approach and launch all missiles within one minute slot just five minutes before the more deadly SS-N-19s from those 4 Oscars approached the outer defence ring of CBG. If properly done, this co-ordinated attack may be quite devastating. But... Trying to do so, all the subs of the PAD should be at the 'scope depth with satellite antennas up. Suicide mission if S-3s and P-3s loaded, cocked and battle ready. That is why the Russian staffs were like "wait, what???" when USN resharped VS people almost entirely to air refueling and whole VP went to rather survelliance jobs instead of ASW.

 

[DanMa1156]

Great stuff @HeyJoe . I’m wildly jealous of you guys doing an interesting and varied mission back then. I think I’d be more interested in going back for a DH ride if it didn’t involve burning holes in the AG.

This. Not to mention real port calls.

 

[HeyJoe]

It may seem strange, but Intel always insisted that F-14 is unable to land on a carrier with all six Phoenixes and four is its max practical load. So we never counted on six per aircraft, and oppositely, while Backfire could carry up to three Kh-22s, one in a bomb bay and two underwings, only single slug inside was actual load to utilize all aircraft's benefits.

Not strange at all, it is a common misperception and an urban myth on quite a few forums. Just because it was not routine doesn’t mean it wasn’t possible. Many inside the community even thought that because we didn’t carry that many routinely for several reasons. A big one was wear and tear on not only the missiles, but the aircraft itself. Even in height of Cold War over North Sea, we carried a single Phoenix, single Sparrow and single Sidewinder. In aftermath of Ault Reort in 1968, Navy learned its lesson on leaving ordnance on aircraft for extended periods AND not checking out the missiles on and off the aircraft routinely. The Tomcat had a robust Onboard Check (OBC)/Built in Test (BIT) that tuned the missiles and went through a host of checks but Ordies had a fleet wide Captive Carry program that rotated missiles on and off our various 8bmissile stations to ensure they worked as well.

The fatigue life expended (FLE) of the aircraft is also greatly affected by what you ‘bring back” and trap with or even go into the break with. Later in life of Tomcat, I remember seeing aircraft that wer 4G” or even
“3G” jets du to FLE issues. This was not unique to the Tomcat as the Hornet went through a monste midlife crisis over its FLE and excessive Traps even before the Center Barrel replacement issue was identified. Navy and embarked Marine Hornets were running out of traps remaining and yet expeditionary Marine Hornet squadrons (D in particular) were running out of FLE. It was a huge community management issue.

Back to Tomcat and carrying six Phoenix at sea, it was done multiple times but it did mean your fuel load on the ball was basically ‘trick or treat” IF single weight setting on the arresting gear was in use. That was a convenient SOP in the tower for Air Boss and his team who had push buttons for each embarked aircraft that was verbally confirmed. However, the settings could be changed if needed or Captain could crank on a few more knots as well. This was used when aircraft had an issue like stuck flaps or asymmetric wing sweep needs a higher approach speed so gear on all four arresting engines had to be set to handle the kinetic impact of highe speed or weight than normal parameters. Both the Pax River DT testers and Pt Mugu OT testers conducted a full range of 6 Phoenix Carrier Suitability tests.

But in practice, for all the reasons stated above, it was not a routine or even special happenstance. My first Skipper used to joke that I you saw the Doomsday loadout being uploaded, you better have plenty of money in your flight suit and a chart with nearest Bingo field because the Russians were coming. He also quipped, “If they don’t get the ship and your stereo is still intact, you need not worry about the bringback issue* because you will have fired enough of them that it wasn’t an issue.

*I was stationed in Pentagon as Super Hornet was being sold as interim fix when A-12 program was cancelled. One of the top selling points was ability to bringback ordnance that the JV Hornets had to jettison routinely. All the hotspots requiring routine ordnance were never planned for Hornet life cycle and FLE was expended even faster when ordnance was carried and made worse if you trapped with it.
tr
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[Max the Mad Russian]

This was used when aircraft had an issue like stuck flaps or asymmetric wing sweep needs a higher approach speed so gear on all four arresting engines had to be set to handle the kinetic impact of highe speed or weight than normal parameters.

Bet ALRE Bos'n won't shake pilot's hand for for doing so

(D in particular)

Assume Corps D-Hornets spent very little time on the boats, so what is the D-Hornet which is out of allowed trap number?

 

[jmcquate]

HeyJoe, did you take the shot used in the Hughes add in AvWeek?

 

[HeyJoe]

Bet ALRE Bos'n won't shake pilot's hand for for doing so


Assume Corps D-Hornets spent very little time on the boats, so what is the D-Hornet which is out of allowed trap number?

Actually not a big deal. They usually put you at end of recovery. It’s better than taking Barricade. We had a squadron rep in tower with Air Boss for every recovery called the “Tower Flower”. Usually an experienced JO pilot/RIO with a PCL. Your main job was to time the interval on your jets and make sure they were 45 seconds apart but if there was any issue with your jets, the Boss wanted you next to him with PCL out and to advise on emergency considerations. Note: for Case III/ night, a LCDR pilot/RIO performed the same function in Air Ops/CATCC with CAG/DCAG usually in audience. If weather was dicey, XO or CO usually popped in as well


The D had FLE issue from flying the crap out of them ashore. They were always in high demand due to FAC (A) role which was usually not performed by C model due to high task loading.

 

[HeyJoe]

HeyJoe, did you take the shot used in the Hughes add in AvWeek?

If I remember that correctly, it was a Grumman photo taken while I was still in flight school. I did take this AvWeek photo on what turned out to be my last flight in the Tomcat.

 

[jmcquate]

If I remember that correctly, it was a Grumman photo taken while I was still in flight school. I did take this AvWeek photo on what turned out to be my last flight in the Tomcat. View attachment 26217

If I remember it correctly, it was a Gypsy Tomcat. I met the guy who was flying it, callsign "LeTourch". Apparently, a former F-8 guy whop set his mustache on fire doing a flaming shot at an F-8 shin-dig in Paris.

 

[HeyJoe]

If I remember it correctly, it was a Gypsy Tomcat. I met the guy who was flying it, callsign "LeTourch". Apparently, a former F-8 guy whop set his mustache on fire doing a flaming shot at an F-8 shin-dig in Paris.

Look like this perhaps? I got this as a gift when I was winged and it still hangs on my wall. That was a famous Grumman staged publicity photo with several different wing configurations according to the CO back then who recently contacted me. My Skipper wanted to emulate that shot and use me to take it before I left for the Pentagon where I became the Air to Air Missile Requirements Officer (RO).

 

[jmcquate]

Yup, that's it

 

[HeyJoe]

The first 2 images are from the Grumman shoot in early 80 or so. The markings changed quite a bit by 1990 when we went to solid dark blue tail for 200 and 201. Our skipper wanted a shot with 6 Phoenix as his keepsake image before he, too left for the Pentagon (following me into same office as it turned out!)


Outgoing Skipper Bob Davis and XO Tom Zelibor preflighting Gypsy 200. CAG gave special permission for them to fly together.


Skipper Bob “Sundance” Davis on preflight of Gypsy 200

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Look... this aft pallet... should be vice versa: red missile at the left and green one starboard! Just like nav lights And indeed, this aircraft is supposed to leak...

 

[AllAmerican75]

Outgoing Skipper Bob Davis and XO Tom Zelibor preflighting Gypsy 200. CAG gave special permission for them to fly together.

Is that not normally done?

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

Is that not normally done?

Maybe same way as in our shoe world: CO and XO should not leave deployed ship simultaneously - say, during port call. Who knows?

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

BTW, some Iranian Tomcat driver has stated as follows: ‘It was 1983 before we learned from the Americans – who were permanently monitoring our operations, and knew about almost every one of our problems – that by pre-positioning the afterburner exhaust nozzle to a slightly open position in anticipation of afterburner ignitions, we could prevent most of the “pop stalls”.’

Really? Such USN involvement in Iranian deals in 1983?


Look, and for you having been in Super Hornet project management team, though this is not about Cold War: the famous Aussie phrase "There's nothing super about this Hornet", coined in the defence of their F-111 fleet, was it truth from F-14 RIO's experience standpoint? Aussies had used their Aardwarks in a similar way to "Bombcat" concept, unlike those who fell in love with that fat chicken of MD bird farm that is F-15E.