Ault Report
Saw on the picture thread that Mumble's G-father was Frank Ault (of the Ault report although not the William Ault that is NAS Whidbey)
Color me impressed.
CAPT Frank Ault is a community icon not only for his service, but unquestionably for the impact the study he ran that is commonly referred to as the Ault report. Coming off command of USS Coral Sea, the CNO assigned him to lead a no-holds barred study backed by NAVAIRSYSCOM on the less than satisfactory, if not dismal results overall (with some exceptions) of Naval fighters and their employment of Air-to-Air missiles over North Vietnam. The study was titled
Air-to-Air Missile System Capability Review and Ault was empowered to turn over any stone to get at root causes of the problems that had arisen.
At the time, the F-4 Phantom was steadily replacing the venerable F-8 Crusader as the primary fleet fighter/interceptor. In the timeframe from 1950 to 1960, aviation technology advanced so rapidly that a squadron could literally take an aircraft on deployment only to find it overtaken by another variant before returning stateside. Engine manufacturers were pushing the envelope and churning out higher performance motors that enabled designers to literally build aircraft around them. By the end of the 50s, the ultimate fighter, the F-8 Crusader was in service eclipsing everything else that came before it.
The F-8 was arguably the epitome of a long lineage of so-called "day fighters" and was holding its own over North Vietnam whereas the F-4 Phantom was lastest generation of "night fighter" lineage that used a relatively huge radar and dedicated Radar Intercept Officer to run it. The day fighter community preserved the legacy of gunfighting and aerial gunnery expertise. When nimble MiG-17s showed up over North Vietnam in 1964, Crusaders were first to trade blows and by the bombing halt in 1968 when CAPT Ault was hard at work, they had given a good accounting of themselves.
However, the newest fighter, the F-4 Phantom was beset with much poorer performance against the MiGs. Based on the developer's belief that the days of "dogfighting" were over thanks to introduction of the AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow, the F-4 Phantom carried no internal gun(s). The developers had not foreseen the impact of Rules of Engagement (ROE) that required positive ID before release of weapons necessitating fighters to go to the merge to get an ID. The F-4 Phantom was also designed to be an interceptor sacrificing maneuverability in favor of dash and top end speed. This also meant the canopy was fared into fuselage for less drag thereby reducing visibility in the rear quadrants. It was like trying to enage in a knifefight in a phonebooth with a telescopic rifle. Even when ROE was met, the missiles were failing at an alarming rate or being employed outside their performance envelope.
Ault went after these contributing factors by posing 5 questions to his team:
1. Is the Navy getting a high quality product (AAM), designed and built to specifications?
2. Are the RAGs delivering trained aircrews and maintainers to the fleet?
3. Is the fleet launching optimally ready combat aircraft-missile systems?
4. Do the combat aircrews fully understand and exploit the capabilities of the aircraft-missile system? (Corollary question: Is the aircraft-missile system properly designed and configured for the air-to-air mission?)
5. Is the air-to-air missile system (aircraft/fire control system/missile) repair and rework program returning a quality product to the Fleet?
Even before the review was completed, Ault uncovered many issues that were addressed before publication of his report. By 1968, VF-121 assigned two RAG instructors to create what became the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN). The first lecture was an intensive brief on the AIM-9 Sidewinder and how to employ it. NAVAIRSYSCOM began developing a training range to help aircrews recognize the complex employment envelopes of air-to-air missiles. It entered Naval service as the Air Combat Maneuvering Range (ACMR) at MCAS Yuma allowing Miramar based fighters to utilize it over the vast training ranges in nearby Arizona. Another range was installed at NAS Oceana to support the other home of Navy fighters. Scores of other changes to training, procedures, philosophy and manufacturing processes were made. The report became known almost immediately as the "Ault Report".
I consider it a rare privilege to have met and sat and talked with both CAPT Ault and the CNO, Admiral Moorer, who gave him the mandate to fix the problems besetting the fighter community. I daresay their impact is felt even today.
