USAF Fighter Weapons School
Wilcox cut his teeth on screenplays and it shows in his books as there is a lot of emphasis on the emotions and passions of the day, which he covers as well as Wolf did in "The Right Stuff". A serious researcher will find his work frustrating in terms of actual dates and other historical detail, but they (he did cover Naval Aviation through the 90s in his follow-on books) are worthy additions to any library.
1. Navy Fighter Weapons School = TOPGUN (one word, all caps)
2. Top Gun (two words) = equal Tom Cruise Movie
3. USAF established their Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB in 1954 (it grew out of their aerial gunnery school established in 1949).
4. By 1960, it had dropped the early jets (F-84 and F-84) and concentrated on the F-100 and F-105.
5. Many famous USAF fighter pilots made great contributions to Fighter Tactics, Technques and PRocedures while serving as FWS instructors (John Boyd, Boots Blesse) in post Korea era prior to advent of aerial combat over skies of North Vietnam.
6. In 1965, the F-4 Phantom arrived at Nellis AFB and was added to Fighter Weapons School course syllabus, but classic air combat maneuvering was not emphasized. Note: USAF actually had some notable success with the 8th TFW (Wolf Pack) under command of WWII ace and outstanding leader, COL Robin Olds who took lackluster performance of his wing and kicked serious ass over North Vietnam during his one year tenure 1966-67 eliminating half the North Vietnamese MiG-21 inventory in a single mission during Operation Bolo in January 1967. He himself racked up 4 kills and was leading scorer until his departure (he purposely avoided scoring a 5th kill fearing he'd be sent home).
The late BGEN Robin Olds who looked the part and led his Wing to outstanding successes in 1967 timeframe
7. Many factors contributed to deemphasis of classic air-to-air syllabus after arrival of F-4 Phantom that ultimately contributed to dismal showing of exchange ratio over North Vietnam both Air Force and Navy aircrews from 1965 to the bombing halt over North Vietnam imposed by President Johnson in 1968:
- The F-4 Phantom was very dissimilar in performance and design from the nimble MiGs it faced over Vietnam. The Navy transitioned primarily Interceptor Squadrons (night fighter legacy) into the Phantom and ACM wasn't a priority or a corporate skill due to expertise of aircrews and widespread belief that the AIM-7 Sparrow missile had eliminated the "dogfight" due to its head-on beyond visual range capability. The Air Force literally ended in same place because of widespread prewar practice of ACM being outlawed due to potential for mishaps.
- The AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder as well as AIM-4 Falcon (integrated with F-4D Phantoms in lieu of "Navy" Sidewinder) were not dogfight missiles and suffered from unreliability issues (partially design and some maintenance issues). Aircrews also were unfamiliar with complex employment envelopes and fired many missiles out of the envelope.
8. The CNO picked the right guy during the Bombing Halt to tackle why success in the aerial arena wasn't even close to Korea or WWII performance. CAPT Frank Ault (Mumbles knows him best because he's his grandson) was given a wide charter to fix the problem. He did convincingly and creation of Navy Fighter Weapons School (aka TOPGUN) was the most visible manifestation of a new era in attitude and performance. Wilcox does a superlative job detailing how 2 VF-121 RAG instructors were assigned to create TOPGUN as a VF-121 department. LCDR Dan Pederson and LT Jim Ruliffson made it happen with a typewriter, salvaged trailer and two folding metal chairs. By the time the Bombing Halt ended in 1972, the Navy Fighter Community had completed the transition to the F-4 Phantom on all the big decks and transformed the community ACM prowess through TOPGUN approach and, importantly, establishment (and realization) of Dissimilar Air Combat trainign using the A-4 Skyhawk as a surrogate for the deadly MiG-17 and both borrowed USAF T-38s and friendly ADF F-106s to simulate the even more deadly MiG-21. The Air Force Fighter Weapons School continued business as usual concentrating on air-to-ground skills.
9. When aerial combat erupted in a big way when US strike packages resumed operations over North Vietnam in spring 1972, TOPGUN graduates showed by May timeframe that they knew how to fight the Phantom and success ratios soared peaking at 22 to 1 and ultimately settling in at 12.5 to 1. Meanwhile, by summer timeframe, the Air Force continued to lose aircraft at roughly same exchange rates and even went to parity before a rush syllabus was instituted at Nellis (TOP OFF) and T-38s were impressed into an Aggressor role to provide Dissimilar Air Combat Training favored by Navy. By late summer, a navy det of F-8 Crusaders was sent to Thailand along with return of the famed now Gen Robin Olds to provide crash course in lost skills. Air Force success rates improved but not as dramatically as Navy.
Wilcox cut his teeth on screenplays and it shows in his books as there is a lot of emphasis on the emotions and passions of the day, which he covers as well as Wolf did in "The Right Stuff". A serious researcher will find his work frustrating in terms of actual dates and other historical detail, but they (he did cover Naval Aviation through the 90s in his follow-on books) are worthy additions to any library.
1. Navy Fighter Weapons School = TOPGUN (one word, all caps)
2. Top Gun (two words) = equal Tom Cruise Movie
3. USAF established their Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB in 1954 (it grew out of their aerial gunnery school established in 1949).
4. By 1960, it had dropped the early jets (F-84 and F-84) and concentrated on the F-100 and F-105.
5. Many famous USAF fighter pilots made great contributions to Fighter Tactics, Technques and PRocedures while serving as FWS instructors (John Boyd, Boots Blesse) in post Korea era prior to advent of aerial combat over skies of North Vietnam.
6. In 1965, the F-4 Phantom arrived at Nellis AFB and was added to Fighter Weapons School course syllabus, but classic air combat maneuvering was not emphasized. Note: USAF actually had some notable success with the 8th TFW (Wolf Pack) under command of WWII ace and outstanding leader, COL Robin Olds who took lackluster performance of his wing and kicked serious ass over North Vietnam during his one year tenure 1966-67 eliminating half the North Vietnamese MiG-21 inventory in a single mission during Operation Bolo in January 1967. He himself racked up 4 kills and was leading scorer until his departure (he purposely avoided scoring a 5th kill fearing he'd be sent home).
The late BGEN Robin Olds who looked the part and led his Wing to outstanding successes in 1967 timeframe
7. Many factors contributed to deemphasis of classic air-to-air syllabus after arrival of F-4 Phantom that ultimately contributed to dismal showing of exchange ratio over North Vietnam both Air Force and Navy aircrews from 1965 to the bombing halt over North Vietnam imposed by President Johnson in 1968:
- The F-4 Phantom was very dissimilar in performance and design from the nimble MiGs it faced over Vietnam. The Navy transitioned primarily Interceptor Squadrons (night fighter legacy) into the Phantom and ACM wasn't a priority or a corporate skill due to expertise of aircrews and widespread belief that the AIM-7 Sparrow missile had eliminated the "dogfight" due to its head-on beyond visual range capability. The Air Force literally ended in same place because of widespread prewar practice of ACM being outlawed due to potential for mishaps.
- The AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder as well as AIM-4 Falcon (integrated with F-4D Phantoms in lieu of "Navy" Sidewinder) were not dogfight missiles and suffered from unreliability issues (partially design and some maintenance issues). Aircrews also were unfamiliar with complex employment envelopes and fired many missiles out of the envelope.
8. The CNO picked the right guy during the Bombing Halt to tackle why success in the aerial arena wasn't even close to Korea or WWII performance. CAPT Frank Ault (Mumbles knows him best because he's his grandson) was given a wide charter to fix the problem. He did convincingly and creation of Navy Fighter Weapons School (aka TOPGUN) was the most visible manifestation of a new era in attitude and performance. Wilcox does a superlative job detailing how 2 VF-121 RAG instructors were assigned to create TOPGUN as a VF-121 department. LCDR Dan Pederson and LT Jim Ruliffson made it happen with a typewriter, salvaged trailer and two folding metal chairs. By the time the Bombing Halt ended in 1972, the Navy Fighter Community had completed the transition to the F-4 Phantom on all the big decks and transformed the community ACM prowess through TOPGUN approach and, importantly, establishment (and realization) of Dissimilar Air Combat trainign using the A-4 Skyhawk as a surrogate for the deadly MiG-17 and both borrowed USAF T-38s and friendly ADF F-106s to simulate the even more deadly MiG-21. The Air Force Fighter Weapons School continued business as usual concentrating on air-to-ground skills.
9. When aerial combat erupted in a big way when US strike packages resumed operations over North Vietnam in spring 1972, TOPGUN graduates showed by May timeframe that they knew how to fight the Phantom and success ratios soared peaking at 22 to 1 and ultimately settling in at 12.5 to 1. Meanwhile, by summer timeframe, the Air Force continued to lose aircraft at roughly same exchange rates and even went to parity before a rush syllabus was instituted at Nellis (TOP OFF) and T-38s were impressed into an Aggressor role to provide Dissimilar Air Combat Training favored by Navy. By late summer, a navy det of F-8 Crusaders was sent to Thailand along with return of the famed now Gen Robin Olds to provide crash course in lost skills. Air Force success rates improved but not as dramatically as Navy.
