Goodbye to the "Kiowa Warrior"?

[Flash]

In fact, the very nature of that portion of the training was "we don't normally play the ATO/joint tasking game. But we understand we have to make nice with everyone else on the playground for deep strike." So, things change. But usually it involves more capabilities, and more mission sets due to improvements in technology, increased multimission platforms and fewer assets.

In the case of the Army playing in the larger aerial campaigns of the recent past and the present, things haven’t changed that much at all. They still largely provide direct support to their forces and that is about it. As for more capabilities, the Army doesn't bring that much more in the way of capabilities than the other services already have, so what is the point? I seriously doubt that changes anytime soon with our current budget environment and the Army's attitude toward it's aircraft and aviators as just another branch like Logistics, Armor and MPs.

 

[Hotdogs]

Obviously not a helo guy and I appreciate the direction this thread went. But, the comments above don't appear to be supported by history. I am reminded of Operation Normandy. Eight Apaches escorted by MH-53s opened Desert Storm by flying through/under the Iraqi IAD, much feared at the time, to fire 27 Hellfires and destroy a key node. I'd call that "high threat". And nothing had "gone wrong" at all. It was planned. It was a natural extension of the Cold War Army attack capability. Don't Army Apache guys still lay claim to Deep Strike? If so, then how can they not know the "real capabilities and limitations" of their aircraft and the reality of the air defense game? They have done it before with great success.

I would be interested to hear the conversation going on when somebody with stars starts talking about sending attack helicopters to hit XYZ double digits SAMs against a high threat IADS with an elaborate defense in depth and a robust C2 & EW capability. Helicopter killing SAMs and MANPADs of the 80s are much more proliferated today than previous years and the more modern ones now are downright scary. I wouldn't ever confuse enthusiasm with the practicability and in some cases capability of it. So yeah it's cool to go hook and jab against some dudes radar scope to prove we can defeat certain systems, but in all reality we know things would probably be handled much differently especially when operating in a joint environment. I wouldn't put it in the realm of "make-believe," more in the realm of "train for it, but shit your pants if you ever have to do it." and I don't think I would base any acquisitions programs for a helicopter off of it either.

 

[busdriver]

I wouldn't put it in the realm of "make-believe," more in the realm of "train for it, but shit your pants if you ever have to do it."

I think I understand you a bit better now. Most of those scary helicopter killing systems you mention aren't going to be magically killed in week one, allowing us helo guy to go traipsing around at 1500' even if everything goes right. Low altitude tactics work, but it takes more than just flying lower. Yeah you shit your pants thinking about it, but how many times have you really trained to do that mission with actual threat operators and the actual supporting assets that would actually be involved? If you're like most of the rest of the DoD, the answer is probably not much in the last 10 years.

Part of the problem of history is while you may be doomed to repeat it, but that may not be from lack of study but drawing the wrong lessons learned. Just because a handful of Apaches were successful at knocking out a radar site on the outskirts of an IADS doesn't mean that you can send a Battalion of them across billiard table flat desert in a mass attack. Nor does the failure at Karbala mean that helos can't survive in an MCO IADS environment.

 

[HueyCobra8151]

Reading the comments here about Apaches doing AI amidst IADS and I keep thinking that if all you have is helicopters, then your weapon-to-target match always winds up being a helicopter.

Is there a difference between Army "deep strike" and AI? I don't recall seeing deep strike mentioned/defined in any J-Pubs.

 

[busdriver]

Sorry fellas, that was a bit sanctimonious. Guess 3 beers is enough to get silly after a deployment under GO-1. I'll just restate by saying i agree with HueyCobra. Huey, the Army doesn't speak JP very well at all from what I've seen unless it's a clause that says the Army will not be playing joint.

 

[Lawman]

Reading the comments here about Apaches doing AI amidst IADS and I keep thinking that if all you have is helicopters, then your weapon-to-target match always winds up being a helicopter.

Is there a difference between Army "deep strike" and AI? I don't recall seeing deep strike mentioned/defined in any J-Pubs.

FM 3-90-1 would be the one to start in. After that you get into 3.14-126 Attack/recon operations for specifics. It isn't in the J-fire.

I think you guys are reading to far into the deep meaning though. 30k from the FLOT... No further. After that your no longer following the doctrine your experimenting. Thats why as flash pointed out our air ops are here to support "the air campaign" the air campaign is there to support the freedom to move and assemble ground forces and exploit the attack. Our attack/recon aviation is there to perform 6 jobs; Recon, Screen, Guard, Cover, Area security, Attack/deep attack. All of those require ground units to support the logistics be them organic to the aviation unit or the greater ground force (fuel & ammo being the big 2). Karbala was a good (albeit painful) way to learn what doesn't work. Much like the Package Q strike he Air Force conducted in Desert Storm. We thought to that point that deep attack was an organic mission like the screen... It isn't.

We are retarded getting rid of the scout aircraft though. Yes The 64 can do recon, but it's like using a thoroughbred race horse to pull a mule cart as far as efficiency goes. And there is a lot of jobs that can be done by either aircraft where it just makes sense to use the cheaper helicopter. UAS can pick up some of the slack but till we can get the sensor fidelity and S/A up to par with real pilots in a cockpit it's a poor substitute.

 

[Lawman]

I would be interested to hear the conversation going on when somebody with stars starts talking about sending attack helicopters to hit XYZ double digits SAMs against a high threat IADS with an elaborate defense in depth and a robust C2 & EW capability. Helicopter killing SAMs and MANPADs of the 80s are much more proliferated today than previous years and the more modern ones now are downright scary. I wouldn't ever confuse enthusiasm with the practicability and in some cases capability of it. So yeah it's cool to go hook and jab against some dudes radar scope to prove we can defeat certain systems, but in all reality we know things would probably be handled much differently especially when operating in a joint environment. I wouldn't put it in the realm of "make-believe," more in the realm of "train for it, but shit your pants if you ever have to do it." and I don't think I would base any acquisitions programs for a helicopter off of it either.

It happened before Karbala. Old guys with experience looked at the plan the brigade planning cell had come up with and said this is retarded. They were told to shut up and color. It took that bloody nose to change tactics to what worked.

What's scary is all the bravado going on in my 3 shop a few months back when we were talking about Syria kicking off. Same kind of people same kind of jobs, no wisdom to pay attention to guys familiar with the threat. People really have no idea how unprepared we are for that war due to atrophy of skills after 10 years of idiot orbits fighting cavemen with rifles and maybe dska if they have "heavy weapons."