We have a long way to go before we get to the UK's state of the Navy... we have roughly 3x the amount of ships, with vastly more tonnage and personnel...While no country will be able to match our direct military capabilities in the near future, the economic weight that comes along with it might sink us sooner than anything else...What we have proved over the past 10 years is that our military is very well equipped, well manned, and well-trained for its primary function -- going overseas and kicking ass. What we're not well equipped, well manned, and well trained for is sticking around to rebuild the place.
Yes, we're a big military. Yes, we're far bigger than anyone else. We also have far bigger commitments than anyone else. And no one needs to be as 'big' as we are to raise a ruckus in their own neighborhood. Iran can close the SOH with mines and speedboats - they don't need eleven carriers or B-2's. A bunch of Somali teenagers in fiberglass boats are keeping billion-dollar destroyers busy. Never mind the Tawan Straits and the Spratlys. And that's just the problems that exist at this moment. You're equating sheer size with capability, and they're not the same.
Capability atrophies a lot faster (and less obviously) than the size of your force, and it's a lot harder to rebuild a capability than simply expand the numerical size. Returning to the original topic, Britain lost the capability for power projection years ago. Now they're giving up on indigenous MPA, which is amazing for an island nation that's almost been starved out twice in the last 100 years.
You and Flash are correct that Britain doesn't need to duplicate what the US can do - assuming that their policy decisions and interests will always be in line with our own. For example, the UK and France are pushing for more direct intervention in Libya, but they can't do any more than they are without our assent and cooperation...in other words, they've effectively given us veto power over their foreign policy. Canada long ago made the decision to reduce the CAF to a force just big enough to contribute to NORAD and the UN, on the assumption that Canadian security and interests would always be welded to the US; now their northern coast is becoming a potential major sealane and resource area, and they're dscovering how expensive and difficult it is to rebuild the ability to patrol and defend it.
We're already heading in the direction of giving up on amphibious assault, and not without reason...it's expensive and it's been a long time since Inchon. Carriers make great targets in budget crunches, and most of us on this board know 11 carriers doesn't equate to 11 boats at sea. The bulk of the strategic bomber force is
old and so far the replacement is a wish; anyone think the new bomber will be a quick and trouble-free acquisition process? Is it difficult to imagine the program falling apart, retiring the BUFFs without a relief, and winding up with a few squadrons of aging B-1's and the handful of B-2's we have now? And we've got an Army and Marine Corps that has a generation of junior officers and NCO's that have become highly experienced and extremely good at COIN and light-infantry fighting, but our gear is trashed...where do we get the money to 'recapatalize' the force?
I think we're heading down the road of our capabilities slowly moldering away wihtout realizing it. I think in 50 years we'll wind up with a garrison force - still professional and good at what we do, but with a limited set of capabilities. Giving up capabilities means giving up options, and options drive your policy.