NEWS If War Comes, Will the U.S. Navy Be Prepared?

[Brett327]

I mean it’s still a problem though. Even if it’s not a new criticism.

What is, specifically... and quantify its effect on the force's ability to wage an effective campaign vs. China. It's just such a tired trope people casually throw out there without any real analysis. I can only speak to my experiences in TACAIR for 21 years, but with maybe 1 or 2 exceptions, I don't know a Skipper, past or present, who isn't laser-focused on being the best, most combat effective squadron they can muster. I have yet to meet a CO who would prefer GMT to flying and training for the high end fight.

 

[nodropinufaka]

What is, specifically... and quantify its effect on the force's ability to wage an effective campaign vs. China. It's just such a tired trope people casually throw out there without any real analysis. I can only speak to my experiences in TACAIR for 21 years, but with maybe 1 or 2 exceptions, I don't know a Skipper, past or present, who isn't laser-focused on being the best, most combat effective squadron they can muster. I have yet to meet a CO who would prefer GMT to flying and training for the high end fight.

How am I supposed to quantifiably measure its effects? I am just one dude and you and I both understand that to accurately quantify this a data scientists would need access to a large amount of data and time to calculate it.

And yes, Maybe in TACAIR that is the case (I have no experience in TACAIR) and you and your crews train up to be the best. But I do know that TACAIR is one small subset of the Navy and it is not going to be strictly a TACAIR fight against China and the GPC is revolved around TACAIR aircraft. There could, for all we know, be zero TACAIR involvement with the evolvement of warfare and when/where/if it takes place.

So that leaves everyone else and all the other senior officers in the Navy. And the current problems its facing with valid criticisms coming from multiple different fronts. I will admit though that there isn't much solutions but more criticisms.

One other point is that you fly for 2 years as a CO? Then where do you go? What if your predecessors aren't as prepared as you and didn't spend their career like you did? Do you still have influence in that community post CO to make that change or are you in staff work at a Fleet or COCOM? I don't know the answer as I am not in the Navy anymore and wasn't in aviation.

 

[nittany03]

The article's author has an interesting Twitter thread that summarizes her views. (If you can't get through the WSJ paywall but use Chrome, I recommend the excellent Cookie Remover plugin to clear cookies on a per-site basis.)

Once again an article where folks still on active duty are crowing how they could walk into Google, Facebook, or Amazon tomorrow and make bank. News flash . . . you can't, at least not solely on your awesomeness and the reputation of gold wings or choker whites. COMCIVPAC doesn't know crap about the Navy, and all they see is 10+ years of a resume filled with gibberish they don't understand.

Folks willing to pound the pavement, learn an industry, network, build relationships, and be humble can crush it, because the Navy gave you the skills. But TYFYS is a platitude; no one outside DoD has a clue what you did, or is going to offer you a job because of it unless you put in the work to prove why you can add value.

 

[nittany03]

Do you still have influence in that community post CO to make that change or are you in staff work at a Fleet or COCOM? I don't know the answer as I am not in the Navy anymore and wasn't in aviation.

Staff work at a fleet or COCOM is driving the decisions that ensure that the tactical proficiency of the units under them isn't utterly wasted. And at the COCOM level, it's potentially driving recommendations that effect DoD's relationships with the interagency and with allied partners that could make or break a crisis scenario. I'd submit that experienced folks going there aren't in some vacuum just because they aren't in their tactical community at the time.

 

[HSMPBR]

The leadership of the last 40 years got us into this mess...the criticism of the last 40 years is entirely valid. A bunch of yes men over promised and under-resourced a navy, and then broke out their fitreps with pointless fluff. Do that long enough and the golden path to a comfy O-6 retirement or O-7 screen board becomes "get really good at the useless fluff."

The solution? Probably the same one that we used in WW2. All of the yes men died or were fired after they lost a couple battles and a few hundred lives. All the womanizing drunks who could fight their ship rose to the top, rapidly.

We could use more headlines like

“USFF Boss Relieved After Telling CENTCOM He Can’t Have Another CSG to Drive Idiot Circles in the NAS for 7 Months”

 

[nodropinufaka]

Staff work at a fleet or COCOM is driving the decisions that ensure that the tactical proficiency of the units under them isn't utterly wasted. And at the COCOM level, it's potentially driving recommendations that effect DoD's relationships with the interagency and with allied partners that could make or break a crisis scenario. I'd submit that experienced folks going there aren't in some vacuum just because they aren't in their tactical community at the time.

Well yes, absolutely with Interagency. All good points. And that goes back to DoD and DoS hating each other which is a problem.

I more or less meant- once you move out of the community who is ensuring that the community still maintains its tactical edge? Why can it not be the senior officers who have the most experience? Is there a reason they can't stay in the community in some advisory type role? Do they have to go to fleet and CCMD?

Why can't some officers go towards the interagency security cooperation route and others stay in a community to ensure that they remain well trained?

 

[Brett327]

How am I supposed to quantifiably measure its effects? I am just one dude and you and I both understand that to accurately quantify this a data scientists would need access to a large amount of data and time to calculate it.

Yet you've stated that it is a problem to be solved. Based on your own statement, how could you possibly know whether that is true or not?

There could, for all we know, be zero TACAIR involvement with the evolvement of warfare and when/where/if it takes place.

I recommend you read some OPLANs to understand TACAIR's role. As a former 1830, I'm surprised you're not better informed on that front.

One other point is that you fly for 2 years as a CO? Then where do you go? What if your predecessors aren't as prepared as you and didn't spend their career like you did? Do you still have influence in that community post CO to make that change or are you in staff work at a Fleet or COCOM?

A typical command tour is 30 months. Post O5 command, I went to NAWDC to lead my community's Weapons School, where I have significant influence on how TACAIR fights.

 

[nittany03]

The leadership of the last 40 years got us into this mess...the criticism of the last 40 years is entirely valid. A bunch of yes men over promised and under-resourced a navy, and then broke out their fitreps with pointless fluff. Do that long enough and the golden path to a comfy O-6 retirement or O-7 screen board becomes "get really good at the useless fluff."

Funny, because the few times I've been in the room with a sitting COCOM, the vibe I got was pretty much the opposite of a guy who's worried about "useless fluff."

 

[nodropinufaka]

Yet you've stated that it is a problem to be solved. Based on your own statement, how could you possibly know whether that is true or not?

I recommend you read some OPLANs to understand TACAIR's role. As a former 1830, I'm surprised you're not better informed on that front.

A typical command tour is 30 months. Post O5 command, I went to NAWDC to lead my community's Weapons School, where I have significant influence on how TACAIR fights.

Oh I am well informed on Oplans. I was a staff planner at a CCMD before jumping ship to an 3 letter agency overseas.

This is another issues I constantly see- refusal to recognize unconventional and asymmetric warfare by senior leaders.

What exactly guarantees a conflict will have TACAIR? Nothing. It isn't necessarily about direct action anymore but capability to render a force combat ineffective- i.e. Cyber, Bio Warfare, Huge standoff ranges with long range weapons, etc. No one thought that insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan would be able to effectively stop the world most powerful land army but yet they did off of planting IEDs and rendered us almost completely combat ineffective for a significant period of time.

And without going into too much detail due to a public forum:

China can easily decide for the fight to not involve TACAIR at all. Just because it is in an OPLAN doesn't necessarily mean how it plays out or how China executes. Especially today with the advancement of weapons.

So you went on and did good for your community. That is great. But there seems to be a lot that don't. When I worked overseas - why are SCOs showing up to work as DATTs that just finished a F-18 tour and have never been in the AOR? What purpose does that serve anyone? What about the guys that go post command and to command a ROTC unit? or to a J5 staff? etc,etc,etc.

And it is clearly a problem if everyone has been talking about it for so long. We don't need quantifiable data set to recognize it. If everyone is pointing at the sky saying it is blue- do you need a scientist to come tell you it is blue to validate it?

 

[Brett327]

Oh I am well informed on Oplans.

Not with statements like this, you're not...

There could, for all we know, be zero TACAIR involvement

It isn't necessarily about direct action anymore

This is an absurd statement. We're still talking about China, right? This isn't going to be an asymmetric COIN fight.

The more you post, the more it's clear to me that you don't have the experience to be a meaningful part of this discussion.

 

[nodropinufaka]

Not with statements like this, you're not...


This is an absurd statement. We're still talking about China, right? This isn't going to be an asymmetric COIN fight.

The more you post, the more it's clear to me that you don't have the experience to be a meaningful part of this discussion.

Please explain to me how you can make a definitive statement such as how the fight is going to place.

You can’t. No one can.

 

[nodropinufaka]

I feel like senior officers saying something couldn’t happen, and the it happened, took place at some point in time. Just can’t really figure out when…. Oh wait. Smh.

Nobody Expects the Japanese Invasion: How Pearl Harbor Blindsided America

Why was the U.S. so unprepared for the attack? Because Washington thought the Japanese believed Hawaii was alert and prepared.

www.google.com

 

[Brett327]

Please explain to me how you can make a definitive statement such as how the fight is going to place.

Entertain us with your own ideas about conflict with China that do not include major force on force engagements.

 

[nodropinufaka]

Entertain us with your own ideas about conflict with China that do not include major force on force engagements.

K. You tell me how you can make the definitive statement it won’t happen.

Like I said. Unconventional and Asymmetric warfare have proven to be useful in getting to a desired end state.

First we have to identify what Chinas desired end state is. No one really knows. Take Taiwan? Control the entire SCS? Take the first island chain? Cause enough casualties quickly enough that we come to the negotiating table? No one can tell what it likely is or will be if it ever happens.

Which is exactly why you can’t make the statement that it is 100 percent going to be a force on force engagement and that TACAIR will be involved.

Cyber Warfare can cause serious damage and force negotiations depending on how much we are willing to take.

Bio warfare can do the same thing. And does it have to be in the United States? No. They can release an agent into PNG and it would still scare the shit out of us and our FVEY partners.

An ICBM could be launched as a warning shot and have a bunch more in the queue to force negotiations.

Every submarine could go underway at once and they could bluff and say they’re positioned to fire at the cities in the United States if we don’t negotiate. We may or may not know where they are

There are literally tons of scenarios that don’t involve direct force on force engagement that can get them to their desired objective- whatever that may be.

So because we don’t understand their desired end state. You can’t really make the blanket statement that it’s going to be a force on force engagement with TACAIR.

Also I don’t know if you realize but there are literally tons of organizations with Red Teams studying this.

 

[Brett327]

First we have to identify what Chinas desired end state is. No one really knows.

Another preposterous statement. Are you sure you were an Intel Officer?

Also I don’t know if you realize...

Seriously? Do tell... what is their assessment?