Iran Detains 10 U.S. Navy Personnel

[BigRed389]

The real facts about why this happened are still scarce but what is know really does point to a major navigational f$#k-up by the boat crews. This is especially sad because they could downloaded a marine plotter app on their cellphones for free that would have kept them out of trouble.

Policy is to not take cellphones out on mission. I did some short range nav fam runs near Bahrain and you lose cell phone signal pretty quickly once you get away from land anyway.

I did a tour in Coastal Warfare (now NECC) and (at the time, at least) the training and preparation provided by the TYCOM for riverine squadrons was inadequate at best. Of course it was a RC community at the time and is now active duty and I don't know what has changed.

NCW became MSRON, who does grey hull port/harbor security stuff.
They merged with RIVRON, who did the green boat stuff that Marine SCCO's and 'Nam era small boat guys used to do + the RCB open water mission to now become the composite CRF squadrons.

These boats are fairly new CB90's (RCB's) supposedly equipped with late-model Furuno plotters. Don't know whether the plotters (on both boats) were inoperative, there was no one looking at them, or there was something else going on. There are reports that one of the boats was having engine trouble but also reports that wasn't the reason they ended up in Iranian waters. If you are a US Navy crew in a disabled small boat in the Persian Gulf, your number one mission is to avoid ending up in Iran... not sure how they hosed up so badly. I all but positive the Iranians didn't "jam their comms" or whatever to cause this incident.

In addition to the Furuno (which isn't that great for nav SA anyway), they should have had a separate nav display that took the mil-GPS receiver inputs and plotted it on an electronic chart display. Very similar to what ships have in basic functionality. I doubt they were both inop, they were very reliable. Unless they were spoofed, but that should be evident to investigators in tracing the track logs. Best guess is they lost SA due to concern over fuel state and engineering casualty combined.

Concern over comms with the refueling ship may have been an issue. SATCOM had a tendency to drop off for 15 minutes or so for no apparent fucking reason every few missions. Having redundant comms channels would have been nice if that was the case. Murphy may have just hit extra hard that day.

CDR Salamander and others around the internet have made the likely-accurate point that there was a major failure of leadership by the chain of command that these crews set out to transit from Kuwait to Bahrain and ended up in Iran. There is likely a long list of failures (links in the chain...) that led to this incident. Probably there should be an investigation into the training, preparation, and procedures for operating RCBs in the Persian Gulf and probably several CO's in the chain deserve to be relieved. I suspect, for political reasons, that wont happen. I also suspect that the Coastal Riverine Force has concentrated more on MESF (Maritime Expeditionary Security Force)-style training (ashore security stuff) vs small boat handling and navigation since they were only recently created by the merger with MESF, and that was a contributing factor to this incident.

The training focus is almost certainly the root cause. I think it has more to do with the number of craft and missions that has been crammed into the composite CRS construct while training resources have been diminishing than anything else.

When we were RIVRON, we had our hands full with a 6 month workup period to convert our Det to RCB's + 6 month deployment. And that was after we went to a single type of craft, which is far more capable, but also more complex and maintenance intensive than anything else in the CRS inventory, whether it's a MSRON or RIVRON sourced craft. The current force structure has them with a mix of all types of craft in the force, with more coming online.
Combine that with pulling training funding from RIVRON side assets to level load with MSRON's shortfalls, and you could have problems.

 

[ChuckMK23]

A number of the same themes discussed in this thread making way to media - interesting that Iranian forces involved in the incident were not regular Iranian Navy... that is new information.

 

[HH-60H]

interesting that Iranian forces were not regular Iranian Navy...

Before you go any further: http://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel agencies/iran/iran_navy_forces.pdf?ver=2015-12-03-085225-987 pg 11, right column, bottom of first paragraph

 

[ChuckMK23]

R

Before you go any further: http://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel agencies/iran/iran_navy_forces.pdf?ver=2015-12-03-085225-987 pg 11, right column, bottom of first paragraph

Roger! Definite segregation between IRIN and IRGCN. (learn more every day!)

 

[CW5301]

Although he was not a POW, he was a detainee which has it's own rules and regulations to abide by. Regardless, I don't understand how someone who hasn't been through SERE would know how to conduct themselves in that situation.

I went to SERE and I have also been detained in combat in situations where I was not one of the combatants... The Code of Conduct training I had did not provide guidance for those situations as I was not a PW or a party to the conflict and (at the time at least) all of the training and guidance applied only to combatants and PWs. I don't know if current training provides for situations like this but it is a very interesting question. If it doesn't, it probably should.

 

[Brett327]

Interesting analysis and some valid points from a legal point of view from a former CPRW-11 CDRE (and my one time Divo ).

 

[CW5301]

Thanks BigRed for the informed inputs...

Policy is to not take cellphones out on mission. I did some short range nav fam runs near Bahrain and you lose cell phone signal pretty quickly once you get away from land anyway.

I referred to cellphones generically... any Android or Apple device with a GPS can run the free plotter software which provides excellent SA at sea - doesn't need cell service. Were I doing what they were doing, I would for sure have a such a device on hand, just as I used to carry a handheld GPS in my helmet bag in case all the Navy-issued gear crapped out in the middle of the ocean.

NCW became MSRON, who does grey hull port/harbor security stuff.
They merged with RIVRON, who did the green boat stuff that Marine SCCO's and 'Nam era small boat guys used to do + the RCB open water mission to now become the composite CRF squadrons.

In addition to the Furuno (which isn't that great for nav SA anyway), they should have had a separate nav display that took the mil-GPS receiver inputs and plotted it on an electronic chart display. Very similar to what ships have in basic functionality. I doubt they were both inop, they were very reliable. Unless they were spoofed, but that should be evident to investigators in tracing the track logs. Best guess is they lost SA due to concern over fuel state and engineering casualty combined.

Agree... I was under the impression that the RCB had an Furuno integrated radar/plotter, that is usually pretty accurate, pretty reliable, and pretty easy to use... the latest versions are very slick and capable, but I don't know what they really have.

Concern over comms with the refueling ship may have been an issue. SATCOM had a tendency to drop off for 15 minutes or so for no apparent fucking reason every few missions. Having redundant comms channels would have been nice if that was the case. Murphy may have just hit extra hard that day.

Also agree comms were likely a major factor. When I was in NCW we went to Wal-Mart and bought cheap walkie-talkies for short range comms because our hand-me-down PRC-148s and PRC-117s didn't work - and I saw probably those same 148s and 117s in the pics released by the Iranians. That is another area that should be looked at hard.

The training focus is almost certainly the root cause. I think it has more to do with the number of craft and missions that has been crammed into the composite CRS construct while training resources have been diminishing than anything else.

Also suspect you're dead on there as well...

When we were RIVRON, we had our hands full with a 6 month workup period to convert our Det to RCB's + 6 month deployment. And that was after we went to a single type of craft, which is far more capable, but also more complex and maintenance intensive than anything else in the CRS inventory, whether it's a MSRON or RIVRON sourced craft. The current force structure has them with a mix of all types of craft in the force, with more coming online.
Combine that with pulling training funding from RIVRON side assets to level load with MSRON's shortfalls, and you could have problems.

I've seen this a whole lot over many years and not just in the USN... military operators of small craft tend to buy boats that are way too complex and maintenance intensive, without the attendant support for training and sustainment.

 

[Hair Warrior]

/threadjack
Dumb question, but why are the two riverine boats painted in different camo patterns? (haze gray vs. jungle/woodland)

 

[wink]

I went to SERE and I have also been detained in combat in situations where I was not one of the combatants... The Code of Conduct training I had did not provide guidance for those situations as I was not a PW or a party to the conflict and (at the time at least) all of the training and guidance applied only to combatants and PWs. I don't know if current training provides for situations like this but it is a very interesting question. If it doesn't, it probably should.

You may be right about the grey areas of detention. Hopefully it will be given more attention. BUT, when in doubt, shut up. Nothing hard about that. Most guys wouldn't speak publicly in uniform about a aircraft mishap, so why speak about anything else even remotely important when a possible pawn in a propaganda war?

 

[squorch2]

Lots of luck arguing anything via UNCLOS - neither Iran nor the US have ratified it.

 

[nittany03]

Lots of luck arguing anything via UNCLOS - neither Iran nor the US have ratified it.

Yes, but Iran has signed it, and the USG accepts almost all of it as customary international law. The only exception is the article regarding deep-sea mining, which is the reason the Senate didn't ratify it.

 

[squorch2]

Signing treaties without ratifying them means nothing more than "hey, our government will take a look at this." It's the ratification that matters.

Stating that someone else is violating an international law that neither you nor the other state have ratified isn't the best optic.

(there's lots more on this about the dualist nature of law in the US and how that comes into play, but it's Friday night.)

 

[wink]

Signing treaties without ratifying them means nothing more than "hey, our government will take a look at this." It's the ratification that matters. ...

Humm...me thinks about the Iranian nuclear agreement. Anyone tell the President? As it is, can't get the Senate to ratify, just work around it, call it what you want and implement it.

 

[BigRed389]

/threadjack
Dumb question, but why are the two riverine boats painted in different camo patterns? (haze gray vs. jungle/woodland)

Dunno. Those boats were green when I had them. Probably experimenting to see which is better before they buy the replacement boats.

In all fairness, grey is probably the better color for open water ops (Mk V's are grey).

 

[Flash]

Humm...me thinks about the Iranian nuclear agreement. Anyone tell the President? As it is, can't get the Senate to ratify, just work around it, call it what you want and implement it.

Well UNCLOS is a treaty that needs ratification, period. One I think it has been hypocritical and a mistake not to ratify.