Is the M-1 Abrams outclassed now?

[Lawman]

Yeah, that’s never gonna happen in a major peer conflict. Way more likely to fly into theater and jump into school buses… or ride some variation of a floaty thing into a port nearby. Basically just like the Gulf War and OIF I.

They did jump into theatre in 03. It was part of the diversionary action that proceeded what was supposed to be 4th ID invading from the north.

And since the thing that went in between the departure of “be anywhere on earth in 72 hours of notice” and the 90 float to get III Corps to a place decided to become the IndoPacom commando force, that’s why we’re making the formation more lethal.

Airborne is still the fastest way to conduct and immediate mass of a brigade size (remember ours are bigger) ground force to buy time instead of giving up strategic depth. Something that is pretty critical in certain places against any mechanized force.

 

[Lawman]

I get it, but I have to say that the even the guys from 10th SFG (they secured the DZ with the Pesh) who watched the 173rd drop in Northern Iraq thought the era of massed airborne assaults into defended areas is over. There, despite the fact there was zero resistance at the DZ, it took just under 1000 airborne troops almost 10 hours to gather at their rally points.

You know that’s called massing right?

And what took place and what we did were 2 different plans. Plus the idea of SF ODAs preceding a conventional follow on is kind of what’s supposed to happen. That’s why despite the Marines never admitting it, RRD is going to go into any amphib landing before they do.

The purpose of Airborne formations or our new Air Assault division isn’t to win a war by its self. It’s to present an Opponent with another dilemma to deal with. It’s the respect to the threat or the reaction to it that it achieves, same reason we float big grey boats around. That’s why we’re a joint force. And they are far and away not the expensive Division in the Army catalog

 

[Randy Daytona]

Good reason too.

It’s not significantly advanced or logistically cheaper than an Abrams which due to fleet size is cheaper because of established infrastructure so the Booker can’t serve in a Cavalry role to the ABCTs.

Its providing mobile protected firepower to our light formations in a way that is too heavy to go with them in the forcible entry scenario (can’t be air dropped) so we can only use it in an airfield takedown scenario. That isn’t what our airborne units are for, and when it does get to the fight it absorbs fully half the class 3/5 of the unit it’s supporting because they weren’t mtoe’d for what was essentially an attached tank platoon worth of needs.

And in the meantime of it’s development delays we got to watch a couple current technology fights and test to inform the design of the Mobile Brigade Combat Team and the Booker doesn’t work for that.

Any idea what size gun system the Army is going to try for?

The M-10 is about 40 tons:


The M-551 was about 17 tons:


and the M-50 Ontos was about 10 tons:

 

[Hotdogs]

They did jump into theatre in 03. It was part of the diversionary action that proceeded what was supposed to be 4th ID invading from the north.

And since the thing that went in between the departure of “be anywhere on earth in 72 hours of notice” and the 90 float to get III Corps to a place decided to become the IndoPacom commando force, that’s why we’re making the formation more lethal.

Airborne is still the fastest way to conduct and immediate mass of a brigade size (remember ours are bigger) ground force to buy time instead of giving up strategic depth. Something that is pretty critical in certain places against any mechanized force.

You know that’s called massing right?

And what took place and what we did were 2 different plans. Plus the idea of SF ODAs preceding a conventional follow on is kind of what’s supposed to happen. That’s why despite the Marines never admitting it, RRD is going to go into any amphib landing before they do.

The purpose of Airborne formations or our new Air Assault division isn’t to win a war by its self. It’s to present an Opponent with another dilemma to deal with. It’s the respect to the threat or the reaction to it that it achieves, same reason we float big grey boats around. That’s why we’re a joint force. And they are far and away not the expensive Division in the Army catalog

I know this makes you feel really smart, but I think you’re missing my point. The timing of said operation and strategic risk calculus will never allow it. Not that it’s not an option.

In terms of expense, you also have to account for all the USAF assets specifically organized to drop said airborne forces into theater. Similar to including ships and personnel into the Marine budget even though they’re technically Navy dollars.

 

[Griz882]

You know that’s called massing right?

Not really, at least not in the context of from this recent thread discussion. The drop into Northern Iraq wasn’t a combat jump (yes, I know they got the mustard stain) in that the Pesh already controlled the area and the 10th ensured the coordination was worked out so no trigger happy SP4 would kill the first guy he saw with olive skin and a beard. I do agree that the drop was needed to expand the air bridge that followed on with tanks and artillery, but it simply wasn’t a contested drop - and I thought that is what we were talking about.

I also didn’t mean to imply that the 82nd was a worthless unit, they are extremely well trained and capable, but the idea that they’ll be dropping directly on an enemy airfield to secure an air bridge simply won’t be happening with a near-peer enemy. They could fight well enough, but it is unlikely the troop carrier would make it through - even the JOAC notches this. That said, I can readily see them pulling off an airfield seizure at a site similar to Erbil where allied irregulars are keeping a coordinated enemy defense off balance.

 

[Lawman]

Not really, at least not in the context of from this recent thread discussion. The drop into Northern Iraq wasn’t a combat jump (yes, I know they got the mustard stain) in that the Pesh already controlled the area and the 10th ensured the coordination was worked out so no trigger happy SP4 would kill the first guy he saw with olive skin and a beard. I do agree that the drop was needed to expand the air bridge that followed on with tanks and artillery, but it simply wasn’t a contested drop - and I thought that is what we were talking about.

I also didn’t mean to imply that the 82nd was a worthless unit, they are extremely well trained and capable, but the idea that they’ll be dropping directly on an enemy airfield to secure an air bridge simply won’t be happening with a near-peer enemy. They could fight well enough, but it is unlikely the troop carrier would make it through - even the JOAC notches this. That said, I can readily see them pulling off an airfield seizure at a site similar to Erbil where allied irregulars are keeping a coordinated enemy defense off balance.

They aren’t for dropping directly into an airfield, that what we have the 3x Ranger battalions for. Funny side note, when we talked about making a 4th one of those, the planned specialty wasn’t airfield take downs, it was subterranean warfare as a unit model.
Again, hearing a Navy and Marine officer tell me who has to go live and breath at the warfighter what the Army will/wont/has/hasn’t done is kind of humorous. I don’t think there is any way the risk calculus of a single brigade air assault (which is really a badly named rapid reposition and staging) in a 24 hour period makes sense to execute as COA 1. That doesn’t mean for a second the Corps commander doesn’t want that option on the board to force the opponent force to look at the map and hold whatever reserve needed back IOT plan for that contingency. You’re the opponent commander dealing with an invasion from the North and the South now. You drop 1000 troops into Bashur… ok opponent commander, is this the opening of something way bigger you now have to handle? Is this some location you can afford to lose?


Again to Hotdogs point, “we won’t do that,” is no different or dangerous a phrase than “that’s the way we’ve always done it.” Airborne costs us very little for the capability it requires to the threat it poses. Compared to the Strike Divisions I can have a Division for less than the cost of a single ABCT, and I can move it way faster, in a host of ways that will never primarily be the jump but will always be capable of it. You now as my opponent have to respect that capability no different than you have to respect my Armor which would never do thunder runs up a highway, to the limit of its combat power in the form of track life, only to then conduct massed Armor/Mech convoys sans dismounted infantry support in an attack to seize key terrain and territory. That force would never do that… just as we would never use an Armor division to conduct a feint, while lower lethality forces formed the main effort drive… except we did both those things in 91 and 03. 1st Cav Division is the reason the Marines were able to conduct actions into Kuwait without response by a superior mechanized formation, not VII Corps doing the left hook. We put the single most powerful Armor formation on what was the historic invasion route and forced Republican guard units to respect that threat and hold in place while the Marines pushed up into Kuwait.

Why have a relatively low density capability in having airborne units? The same could be said for the Marine Corps. It’s one more problem I’m gonna bring to the fight that you now have to account for and apportion limited capability to deal with.

 

[Lawman]

Any idea what size gun system the Army is going to try for?

The M-10 is about 40 tons:
View attachment 42685

The M-551 was about 17 tons:
View attachment 42686

and the M-50 Ontos was about 10 tons:

View attachment 42687

I don’t think the next try at this is a traditional gun system honestly.

Mobile protected firepower doesn’t jive with the survivability onion being looked at with the light formations under the mobile brigade combat team design.

Personally I think we will take what has been demonstrated in lasso, switch blade, etc and combine it with what’s provided already with legacy capes like Javelin or NLAW/Spike from partner nations and try to marry up somewhere in the middle of that with a smart semi autonomous system to provide that counter mech/armor system they have to have to survive encounter with anything heavy.

Javelin is an amazing capability system when consider when it was fielded. It’s the weapon that changed the way groups like the Rangers could/would be asked to fight because it pushed out their autonomous lethality so far. But it’s huge, it’s not very maintainable long term (the CLU), and a single war round costs more than my parents house. We gotta move off that to something smaller/cheaper/smarter that can be mass produced faster than it can be.

I’d say if they ever go public, buy stock in Anduril because whatever it is they’ve probably got it on a design board somewhere just waiting to show Dr Miller.

 

[Hotdogs]

Again, hearing a Navy and Marine officer tell me who has to go live and breath at the warfighter what the Army will/wont/has/hasn’t done is kind of humorous.

You’re entitled to your own opinion. We’re living in the threat environment of 2025+, not 20 or 30 years ago. The likelihood of the US gaining localized air superiority against a peer for the given duration to execute that at scale is exceedingly small, and likely conflict (in time and space) with other less risky options that don’t entail and upfront >10% casualty rate just from executing. You make a few good points, but that’s as far as I’ll go on this subject.

 

[Griz882]

They aren’t for dropping directly into an airfield, that what we have the 3x Ranger battalions for. Funny side note, when we talked about making a 4th one of those, the planned specialty wasn’t airfield take downs, it was subterranean warfare as a unit model.
Again, hearing a Navy and Marine officer tell me who has to go live and breath at the warfighter what the Army will/wont/has/hasn’t done is kind of humorous. I don’t think there is any way the risk calculus of a single brigade air assault (which is really a badly named rapid reposition and staging) in a 24 hour period makes sense to execute as COA 1. That doesn’t mean for a second the Corps commander doesn’t want that option on the board to force the opponent force to look at the map and hold whatever reserve needed back IOT plan for that contingency. You’re the opponent commander dealing with an invasion from the North and the South now. You drop 1000 troops into Bashur… ok opponent commander, is this the opening of something way bigger you now have to handle? Is this some location you can afford to lose?


Again to Hotdogs point, “we won’t do that,” is no different or dangerous a phrase than “that’s the way we’ve always done it.” Airborne costs us very little for the capability it requires to the threat it poses. Compared to the Strike Divisions I can have a Division for less than the cost of a single ABCT, and I can move it way faster, in a host of ways that will never primarily be the jump but will always be capable of it. You now as my opponent have to respect that capability no different than you have to respect my Armor which would never do thunder runs up a highway, to the limit of its combat power in the form of track life, only to then conduct massed Armor/Mech convoys sans dismounted infantry support in an attack to seize key terrain and territory. That force would never do that… just as we would never use an Armor division to conduct a feint, while lower lethality forces formed the main effort drive… except we did both those things in 91 and 03. 1st Cav Division is the reason the Marines were able to conduct actions into Kuwait without response by a superior mechanized formation, not VII Corps doing the left hook. We put the single most powerful Armor formation on what was the historic invasion route and forced Republican guard units to respect that threat and hold in place while the Marines pushed up into Kuwait.

Why have a relatively low density capability in having airborne units? The same could be said for the Marine Corps. It’s one more problem I’m gonna bring to the fight that you now have to account for and apportion limited capability to deal with.

It appears we more or less agree. For the record I was also a soldier, well, a National Guardsman, but I did two Afghanistan and two Iraq tours and worked with ARSOF types (I am not SF qualified, but they let me drink their coffee). I’m not against airborne formations nor am I against the Marine Corps, I just think both need to, and are, planning future operations based on new realities in defensive technologies.

 

[Lawman]

It appears we more or less agree. For the record I was also a soldier, well, a National Guardsman, but I did two Afghanistan and two Iraq tours and worked with ARSOF types (I am not SF qualified, but they let me drink their coffee). I’m not against airborne formations nor am I against the Marine Corps, I just think both need to, and are, planning future operations based on new realities in defensive technologies.

We’ve been hearing ____ can’t survive on the modern battlefield since the dawn of Armies. The people making HPMs or AI drone swarms say Rotary wing aviation is just dead on arrival.

Since the start of the Russo-Ukraine war how many times has the threat picture changed, and how many times have we heard this is the end of (Armor/Artillery/Helicopters/etc) because of the prevalence of threat system ____. Yet all those systems continue on in that conflict. And there is a real danger in learning a lesson because somebody can’t solve a problem so they execute COA X.

The Airborne formation of today is not the formation of 15 or even 10 years ago, out of recognition that ways and scenarios change. This year we also start the reform of the first transformational Armored brigade combat team (1-1CD)for the same reason.