Norks' New Strategy?

[Mirage]

I don't recall making that recommendation.

I said: "Nobody is going to attack him since he has nukes, so now what?"
You replied: "NK has a small arsenal and very limited I&W. Classic scenario for US/Allied first strike options."
If you didn't mean to say we might attack him first (ie, the opposite of my post you were refuting), what did you mean?

Do they really have any paranoia of the West? I really wonder if it's all just an act and they take pride in scaring the beejeezus out of the Big Powerful United States. The thing is, that family has managed to hold power there for decades, so far through three people. You don't hold power like that by being irrational.

I agree they aren't irrational. And it's that exact belief that convinces me they are terrified of us attacking. I can't think of another reason they would spend basically all their resources on their military while they have so many problems they could solve instead. Additionally, they have so many reasons to fear us... We're constantly drilling and posturing off their coast, we've threatened them with invasion many times since the last time we invaded, we've invaded and threatened to invade other countries for the same reasons as them, etc.

I think they are like a little runt showing off their Karate moves to try and deter the big kids from attacking them, and if we just ignored them then they'd stop and prioritize domestic issues instead of countering us. ROK is more than capable of defending themselves at this point, as long as we continue to deter an attack and Chinese backing.

 

[Brett327]

If you didn't mean to say we might attack him first (ie, the opposite of my post you were refuting), what did you mean?

Today, as you may know, we have an overt policy against first strike use of nuclear weapons. From a theoretical point of view, however, the scenario I outlined is, in fact, a textbook case where first use would be applicable, and further provides a deterrent effect in NKs own calculus on first use.

 

[Mirage]

Today, as you may know, we have an overt policy against first strike use of nuclear weapons. From a theoretical point of view, however, the scenario I outlined is, in fact, a textbook case where first use would be applicable, and further provides a deterrent effect in NKs own calculus on first use.

I've never heard the idea that a country threatened by a first strike would be deterred from striking first themselves. In fact, in all my studies, I've only heard the exact opposite... that if a country is threatened by a first strike, that might encourage them to strike first themselves... quite the opposite of being deterred from striking as you suggest. As you pointed out, that is our own calculus (that if we fear their first use is imminent we might attack first). That was the great fear in the early parts of the Cold War, and ultimately why we came to appreciate the MAD doctrine, where both sides were deterred from striking first because they knew they could NOT prevent a counter-attack.

Why would NK fearing our first use deter them from using first?

 

[croakerfish]

I think they are like a little runt showing off their Karate moves to try and deter the big kids from attacking them, and if we just ignored them then they'd stop and prioritize domestic issues instead of countering us.

Seems a little naive to me. I think you are ignoring the value of an antagonistic relationship with the outside world to keeping the Kims in power. This state of perpetual threat is keeping their power structure intact IMO.

 

[Brett327]

I've never heard the idea that a country threatened by a first strike would be deterred from striking first themselves.

That’s because you haven’t read Schelling.

 

[Mirage]

That’s because you haven’t read Schelling.

Can you explain the logic of this argument? It seems counterintuitive, and certainly counter to mainstream thinking on the topic, so I'm curious.

 

[Mirage]

Seems a little naive to me. I think you are ignoring the value of an antagonistic relationship with the outside world to keeping the Kims in power. This state of perpetual threat is keeping their power structure intact IMO.

And if, as you say, the antagonistic relationship is keeping Kim in power, how does our providing constant fuel for him to use to demonstrate that relationship to his people help unseat him from power and make NK a more normal state?

I don't know if the antagonistic relationship is keeping him in power or just making them think they need to be hyper focused on their military, but either way, ignoring them would seem to solve the issue, and make their saber rattling be absurd, instead of validated the way we currently make it.

 

[Brett327]

Can you explain the logic of this argument? It seems counterintuitive, and certainly counter to mainstream thinking on the topic, so I'm curious.

I recommend Arms & Influence, as well as well as Strategy & Arms Control. This is absolutely mainstream thinking and was one of the central tenets of our Cold War nuclear weapons strategy. They're short reads.

To summarize, the goal of a first strike is to eliminate/minimize any retaliatory strike, while also reducing your adversary's conventional force. In a perfect world, a first strike eliminates 100% of your adversary's nuclear and conventional forces, and you win the nuclear war. Don't lose sight of the fact that this is a theoretical framework, not a TTP or doctrine. It is the basis for several other tangential themes, like arms control, confidence building measures, and force structure decisions (like our nuclear triad).

 

[IKE]

That’s because you haven’t read Schelling.

 

[croakerfish]

And if, as you say, the antagonistic relationship is keeping Kim in power, how does our providing constant fuel for him to use to demonstrate that relationship to his people help unseat him from power and make NK a more normal state?

I don't know if the antagonistic relationship is keeping him in power or just making them think they need to be hyper focused on their military, but either way, ignoring them would seem to solve the issue, and make their saber rattling be absurd, instead of validated the way we currently make it.

By “ignoring” them, are you suggesting we withdraw our forces from South Korea, stop training with our Pacific allies, stop contributing to theater BMD? What else have we done to antagonize the peaceful mountain kingdom?

 

[Mirage]

I recommend Arms & Influence, as well as well as Strategy & Arms Control. This is absolutely mainstream thinking and was one of the central tenets of our Cold War nuclear weapons strategy. They're short reads.

To summarize, the goal of a first strike is to eliminate/minimize any retaliatory strike, while also reducing your adversary's conventional force. In a perfect world, a first strike eliminates 100% of your adversary's nuclear and conventional forces, and you win the nuclear war. Don't lose sight of the fact that this is a theoretical framework, not a TTP or doctrine. It is the basis for several other tangential themes, like arms control, confidence building measures, and force structure decisions (like our nuclear triad).

You're misunderstanding me. I understand the idea of a first strike, and already said most of what you just said in a previous post. I am very well read on nuclear strategy and cold war history.

You stated that us threatening NK with a first strike will deter them from executive a first strike. This is the part that is counter to anything I have ever read on the issue. Mainstream thinking is that you don't want the other side to think you might strike first, or they might miscalculate and strike first themselves... Thus, threatening NK with a credible first strike would be the opposite of deterrent as you stated. Can you explain how that logic works?

 

[Random8145]

I agree they aren't irrational. And it's that exact belief that convinces me they are terrified of us attacking. I can't think of another reason they would spend basically all their resources on their military while they have so many problems they could solve instead. Additionally, they have so many reasons to fear us... We're constantly drilling and posturing off their coast, we've threatened them with invasion many times since the last time we invaded, we've invaded and threatened to invade other countries for the same reasons as them, etc.

I think they are like a little runt showing off their Karate moves to try and deter the big kids from attacking them, and if we just ignored them then they'd stop and prioritize domestic issues instead of countering us. ROK is more than capable of defending themselves at this point, as long as we continue to deter an attack and Chinese backing.

This seems very naive to me. For one, I don't believe Kim would spend any resources on his people even if he had them, because the way that regime holds power is through absolute fear, through terror. More resources would only be used to enrich the regime and/or strengthen their military. If they wanted to get the U.S. and SK to stop with the exercises, that would be fairly easy to do. In fact, I'd go so far as to say that a lot of those domestic problems they have are on purpose, to keep the people repressed.

The reason for the posturing is because of aggressive acts on the part of the North Koreans themselves and how South Korea and the U.S. cannot show fear in the face of such, as showing fear only leads to further aggression. If we ignored them, they'd continue on with such, continue on building their military capabilities, and possibly attack South Korea. Your thinking on this reminds me of that old thinking about the Soviets, that if we just stopped with the militarism, they'd back off and focus on domestic issues.

 

[Brett327]

You stated that us threatening NK with a first strike will deter them from executive a first strike.

I did not say that.

 

[Mirage]

Today, as you may know, we have an overt policy against first strike use of nuclear weapons. From a theoretical point of view, however, the scenario I outlined is, in fact, a textbook case where first use would be applicable, and further provides a deterrent effect in NKs own calculus on first use.

Brett, that is what the words I've bolded above mean. What do you mean you didn't say that? What else could those words mean? If that's not what you believe, though, then cool. Glad we agree.

 

[Brett327]

Brett, that is what the words I've bolded above mean. What do you mean you didn't say that? What else could those words mean? If that's not what you believe, though, then cool. Glad we agree.

I was referring to our policy against first use. It’s an example of confidence building measures.