That is a very big point in the book, that critical information was not passed to aircrews in the thick of the fight because they 'did not need to know'. The author details that and other C2 issues that we limited ourselves with in the book, ones that I had not realized were a factor and are usually overlooked in other books about the air war. I imagine some might be familiar with some of the issues but others might be revelations to you and your comrades who fought the war.
Fortunately we have gotten a lot better about who 'needs to know' things, not perfect by any means but a lot better than was described in that book.
TINS...... While in the Gulf of Tonkin, my RIO and I were heloed over to the USS Truxton, which was serving as Red Crown at the time. We spent two days aboard, with much of our time talking to their OS controllers on how to bag a MiG.
Talking to the Chief in CIC, he casually mentioned how they translated the North Vietnamese pilots' radio transmissions. We did know of this. But what we did not know was they were doing it in real time! We had no idea; it was information we all should have been told. But there was more as we found out. The Vietnamese were doing the same thing – real time translations of our tactical calls. The difference was the bad guys relayed to their pilots our airborne tactical transmissions, but we never were given theirs. Nor did we know of that capability.
So..... With this "new" knowledge I briefed my next flight centered on deception. Using certain code words, we would complain deceptively about our missiles not tuning, a bent radar, and possibly a fuel leak while on Mig-Cap.
Sure enough, our transmitted bait worked! Soon two blue bandits (MiG 21s) popped up out of Kep coming straight for us and fast. Unfortunately as we instinctively then started transmitting aggressively - "Cats, cross-turn now!" "Buster," etc. Unfortunately the MiGs obviously were relayed this and quickly did a 180 back to Kep and out of range.
