This article uses a lot of words to say, "I have no f'ing clue what I'm talking about....", brought to you by CIMSEC:
THE AGE OF THE STRIKE CARRIER IS OVER - by LT X.
THE AGE OF THE STRIKE CARRIER IS OVER - by LT X.
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- Thread starter Recovering LSO
- Start date
Ugh. What a terrible article written by a guy who's obviously a SWO. He pretty much lost me once he completely mis-characterized the Pacific War by cherry picking data. He went right from Doolittle to Guadalcanal to Oki. No mention of Coral Sea, Midway, Hailstone, Phillipine Sea, Leyte Gulf, or the countless other raids against various islands.
His characterization of tech limits against Vietnam and ODS aren't a case of the failure of the CV and CVW but a case of USN to properly adopt new technology to meet emerging threads and is a well understood shortfall of those wars.
He doesn't specify a solution other than some pie in the sky ASW V-22.
He lost me when he dismissed the Doolittle raid as "only" having strategic value with no tactical or operational merit. Spoken like someone who truly came up in a OIF/OEF/Libya world...
I don't think our projection from the sea has ever reasonably been imagined to be decisive in the way he proposes it ought to be. Rapid mobility and providing limited striking power prior to access being available for expeditionary air forces IS a strategic affect (see also: GHWB/CVW-8 v ISIS sans USAF). Fixing the adversaries attention and resources by posing a credible threat IS a strategic affect - a carrier can do that.
I'm not so sure it was a SWO that wrote it....
I don't think our projection from the sea has ever reasonably been imagined to be decisive in the way he proposes it ought to be. Rapid mobility and providing limited striking power prior to access being available for expeditionary air forces IS a strategic affect (see also: GHWB/CVW-8 v ISIS sans USAF). Fixing the adversaries attention and resources by posing a credible threat IS a strategic affect - a carrier can do that.
I'm not so sure it was a SWO that wrote it....
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Read to me more like pining after the good old days of War at Sea, with Tomcats doing their Air Defense thing, Harpoon salvos at Soviet SAGs, and S3s for organic fixed wing ASW.
That may be reasonable if thats what the projected threat deserves.
What's weird to me is...was that somehow mutually exclusive with Strike back in the Cold War?
That may be reasonable if thats what the projected threat deserves.
What's weird to me is...was that somehow mutually exclusive with Strike back in the Cold War?
This article shows that a little bit too much JPME is a dangerous thing.
"The Carrier is Dead" articles are a bit overdone and border on click bait.
Not a SWO? Do tell...
Oh just a cynical guess.
I managed to make it to the end via a skim read. The conclusion/recommendations do seem like they came from an aviator but an aviator who isn't overly familiar with current order of battle. His glom on to the V-22 for ASW is odd at best. Using the LHD for ASW is a secondary role for the LHD but it shouldn't be left alone and unafraid against an ASW threat. Seems like there are lots of holes in his logic so not sure if it's ignorance or more cherry picking.
I know @squorch2 didnt write it because it doesn't mention a Helo CAG
. Unless you wrote it, then good job. Gold stars all around a and mom should hang it on the fridge.
Must be VP. A new HSM WTI wouldn't sell out the 60R for a V-22. And there was a distinct unfamiliarity with small boys beyond a vague mention of a V-22 lily pad onboard LCS and a fascination with high altitude long loiter ASW. Might have been @CommodoreMid.I most certainly did not write that. Pretty sure I'd be forced to hand over my Tailhook membership card.... I also don't think @squorch2 wrote it. And, it was the ASW non-sense that led me to believe it's newly minted VP or HSM weapons school grad
His statement about battleships proving themselves useful, comparing them to carriers by implication, really made me laugh.
I can understand anonymity in a few cases when advocating something controversial but it certainly isn't needed in this case. Naval officers have been writing controversial things for over 100 years in Proceedings, which doesn't allow anonymous inputs I believe, and many other professional publications with few if any professional or personal repercussions. If you are going to write something like this, own it.
And on the anniversary of the Long Telegram, no less.
See Tailhook Facebook page for an opportunity to re-attack.
Beware the Romance of Leadership - War on the Rocks
I think he lets Rumsfeld off a little too easy, but it's an interesting idea - particularly if you think about it in the context of squadron level leadership, whether that is Divo, DH, or front office.
I think he lets Rumsfeld off a little too easy, but it's an interesting idea - particularly if you think about it in the context of squadron level leadership, whether that is Divo, DH, or front office.
danpass
Well-Known Member
Someone else who sees various parallels:
http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2013/rhyme-of-history.html
I heard about this when LtGen McMasters referenced it in his recent talk at CSIS: https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/the-csis-podcast/id214886950?mt=2&i=381863753