Why do you view that as a waste? I did, on average, just as much teaching and mentoring (in the Jet and in professional matters) as a DH as I did when I was a TO, and I intend on continuing that into my next tour.
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SECNAV to Implement Sweeping Changes
- Thread starter usnavymle
- Start date
I don't doubt it; it's the idea of forcing the the golden path on everyone. I mean at all levels, you're going to need some new blood, or everyone stagnates. And I get that by the time you get to the patch-wearing level, you're already dealing with people who are likely to continue having that opportunity as a DH and CO. But a replacement then becomes necessary, and how much money do we spend training the same stuff to new people over and over?
If you ran a business that way you'd be tarred, feathered, and run out of town on a rail. I'm no Vern Clark saying we need to become a business, but that doesn't mean our personnel policies aren't incredibly wasteful that way.
I'm not sure I agree with your premise, though. Independent of the issues of the last few years, the military inherently has a lot of turnover - more so in wartime than peacetime. You're always going to have to train new folks to replace those that move up, or move out (or wind up on the casualty list). I don't see a practical way of changing that model, nor do I agree that the current model is in need of radical overhaul.
Wait wait wait... Why should people have to earn those quals in a certain period of time....? You know, because "timing" sucks....
Worth also making sure that when someone says "this job isn't for everybody" that they're not actually telling you the truth - and speaking directly to you. Your level of cynicism is no doubt borne from your particular situation. This might sound like heresy to some, but have you ever stopped to ask if the Navy - amid its many flaws - doesn't get it right more often than it gets it wrong, and enough to execute its mission? Yeah, yeah - rah rah innovation, down with the status quo, harumphh!
There are some decent ideas out there from various white papers, working groups, and think tanks right now, but.... one thing I'm not hearing, and the one thing that really could fix, or at least treat, the issues we've got now is FITREP reform. You and many others bitch and complain about the system and how it's all about sustained superior timing, yet you're not talking at all about what it is that makes the timing important - it's the FITREP. Of course, if you go through the training command twice and get to fleet with nearly five years of commissioned service - yeah, your timing is off. YOUR timing is off. The hundreds of other ENSs who walked in the front doors of API with you are marching right along. Does the system need to reinvent itself for the outliers or do we need to take a deep breath, think really hard about what changes are really really necessary and then make smaller power corrections to begin with? You know what my answer is, but then again I'm apparently just another guy who kissed ass and gamed the system (which of course since you know me, you know is pretty far from the truth - but you believe what you need to). If you're interested in a discussion about how we could address many of the issues SECNAV, CNP, and others are discussing without turning the proverbial world upside down, let me know - we can talk about adjusting the periodicity of FITREPs.
Say it with me... The Navy is not a business...
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Plenty of companies grow their own and have their own "golden path." Providing growth opportunities within a company is a huge incentive.
The flip side to all this wanking about the personnel system is that the current system is NOT a 19th century construct but was instead put in place to rid the services of the ills of a 19th century system. Under the old system officers could remain in one rank for decades because there were no openings.
My observation is that a lot of this wishful thinking has more to do about how the system treated the individual and not whether the system functions as designed and delivers the product that is needed. You can bemoan a lot of the ills that the current system has but there doesn't seem to be a mission impact to the fleet. At the end of the day, the fleet is still able to perform its mission and the system produces officers thar are able to execute their tasking.
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
So we're stuck with one of two extremes? One where you have a 90% chance to cap out at O-3, if you can even get there after a 20 year career and another where you have a 50% chance of forcefully being shown the door (or at the very least, taken out of your operational job) if you don't screen O-4, O-5, or O-6?
And when the pendulum swings and Congress wants to cut pay/benefits because personnel costs are too high, are you sure that the high turnover and training costs aren't having an impact?
In other words, the ship's not sinking until the main weather deck's awash?
This isn't just internet wanking - a lot of senior leadership is starting to say the same thing. We spend a fuck-ton of money on technical training yet dump most of it away by insisting on making everyone stay on a path to Admiral, and if they don't, then they're out of the Navy or at least out of the cockpit.
It's not about whether good guys get promoted - they do. It's not about whether we get the mission done - we do that. It's about being good stewards of the taxpayer's money. What if you could reduce initial aviation accessions and reduce the cost of annual flight training because you kept a certain percentage of O-3/-4 on permanently? And if you got better value out of that training because a lot of the instructors had been doing it for 10+ years, as opposed to LTs newly returned from the Fleet?
It's not a binary dilemma. It's not "up or out" vs "everyone can stay around as long as they like". There are solutions which could offer a happy medium.
- Select and screen a certain percentage of guys as Permanent WTIs, VT Instructors, FRS Instructors, Adversary pilots, etc, in a similar way to the PMPs at the Academy.
- Expand the SAUs in each community to function as a UIC for permanent instructors without impacting the 'career' billets in the Fleet squadrons.
- Adopt a construct like the Air Reserve Technician model the USAFR uses, where people are hired as GS to support a Reserve unit or training unit, and hold a concurrent Reserve commission in that unit. So for example, GS-12 Joe directly supports the RAG as a ground school and/or sim instructor, and he's also LCDR Joe who keeps up his quals and currency with them, and can switch clothes as needed. It works great for the AF.
There's a lot of talk about how do you screen guys for promotion or DH/CO if there's no standard career path...there's definitely no such thing as a standard career in the Reserves, and yet they screen and promote guys there without issues. Once you dump the idea of being in the 'right jobs' and evaluate the records on their own merits, it's perfectly workable.
I didn't say that the current system was IDEAL. I said that the current system seems to be working. I'm not sure Big Navy wants there to be a lot of random mid grade officers floating around. If you get too many you're going to hit congressionally imposed caps on those officers and we'll be back at the 19th century system where no one can move up.
I somehow doubt that a glut of senior mid grade officers drawing big paychecks and eventually retirement checks will help keep personnel costs down.
Not at all. As I mentioned above, I don't know if the current system is IDEAL or PERFECT, but it does seem to be working and provided the intended services. I'm not sure what data you'd use to accurately say that the pers system is broken, but I'd guess that it would probably contain the elements of the required people showing up on time with the requisite training. If NPC is missing that mark, then I'd say that the water might be rising. If NPC is hitting that mark, where's the problem? There needs to be a way to measure these issues beyond "I don't like it." Like a lot of things in the Navy, it doesn't matter whether you the individual like it. The system wasn't designed to please you.
What happens in 10yrs when these "permanent" Super JOs decide to retire at 20 and there's no one left to fill the holes because initial accessions have been curtailed? I never was and never will be an NPC guy, but I imagine that you have to continue to feed the system with a given input. If you curtail the input you could create "pools" to provide for a short term surge but once these pools dry up it would be awhile before the pump that is NPC could refill the system.
Isn't this what the Reserves are for?
I get that the current personnel system is not PERFECT, but it does seem to work. My observation is that a lot of the complaints on this board about the current system seem to fall under two categories:
1. No Peter Pans. This is the category for the individual who is upset that the system won't let him be a JO/put pilot for life and that they have to go to the boat/staff/get a patch*.
2. Personal wrongs. This is the category for the individual who is upset that the system has done them wrong based on outlier/exceptional circumstances.
A common factor in these gripes is that they're all about how the system is failing THE INDIVIDUAL. The system isn't allowing someone to do what he/she wants and therefore the system must be broken. But that's not what the system was designed for. However, these complaints seem to have evolved from "the system is bad because it doesn't do what I want" to "the system is bad because it has wasted my valuable training/qualifications/etc". It's a nice sales pitch by those people who want to do their own thing, but I'm just not sure there's a need for a 20yr LT WTI or FRS instructor. If there's data that shows that the current construct of the VT/FRS/WTI/whatever is failing then maybe that is a solution. But lacking that data, this is just a solution looking for a problem.
*Patch aside: I don't get the hatred of the patch. JOs wanted a path that allowed them to maintain tactical proficiency and keep flying. The WTI model was born that gives a clearcut path for guys to stay in grey airplanes but no one likes it because WTIs drink the Kool-Aid, tactics are dumb, gnar, whatever.
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
Why does it have to be mid-grade, though?
The reality is that an older system that kicks fewer people out will result in more people being terminal O-2 or O-3 (or E-3/E-4). There are pluses and minuses to that. On the plus side, people will have a lot more experience than they currently do in these grades. On the minus side, the chances for promotion would be a lot more limited since no one is being forced up and out.
As for that 19th century system you keep talking about: The country was founded on the ideal of not having a large standing military. This was the way the U.S. did business up until WWII, and arguably Vietnam. The military was never intended to be a viable career except for a very select few officers who attended service academies.
We now want to have a professional standing military for a multitude of reasons, but policy hasn't really reconciled how to do that. I agree the current system 'works' insofar as the services are manned and they can do the operations they are tasked to do. However, one of the biggest enlisted recruiting pitches revolves around getting out in 4 years to use the GI Bill, not staying in to make a career of the military. The services want to call themselves professional organizations, but how can you do that when your entire manning system relies on a large portion of people with 4 years or less of operational experience? This is basically what the Navy is offering a new recruit:
-We'll pay you to learn a skill that you don't have, which will take 1-2 years. If the rate is under-manned it comes with a bonus.
-We'll then pay you to use that skill for about 3-4 years.
-Then we'll pay you to to leave and go get a degree via the GI Bill.
If you have to put in retirement paperwork with enough lead-time, and it's not reversible, then this becomes a non-issue. BUPERS will know who is retiring and when early enough to have new accessions ready. Again, this is something that police departments manage all the time. Just call a commissioner or chief and ask them how they do it.
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Some of our allies have similar personnel systems you all are advocating for and they may not be the solution that some of you all are looking for. I had a few chats with the Brit instructor at VAQ-129 who was a career/terminal Squadron Leader (O-4) 'professional' flyer and he said there were goods and bads with their mixed system. As he explained it to me, RAF aviators had the option to be career professional aviators or do the command track, he had chosen the professional aviator track. Some of the issues included friction between former 'equals' with one now the boss and the other not but flying in the same units with different attitudes and thoughts to what was important and what wasn't. Many of the 'professional' aviators also had 'narrower' or less broad-based experiences and didn't have the same knowledges when it comes to where they fit in to the larger picture. This is an issue that is most evident in Army aviation where the CWO's are great aviators but often know little outside their airframe and specialty but I have also seen it with some USAF types.
Also related is the nice fact that our leaders have just as much if not more experience than the folks they are leading. One thing you always hear from the Army aviators is about how a Battalion Commander (rough equivalent of a squadron command in the Navy) usually has much less experience than many of the CWO
he or she is leading. That is a big credibility issue and I think has contributed to many of the long-term issues in Army aviation where the most senior leaders are not the leading experts in their platforms. Who is likely to have some of the most flight experience in a Carrier Air Wing? The CAG and DCAG. They might not have the most hours but they will definitely be near the top in almost all cases. Now flip that on it's side and an O-4 in one of the VFA squadrons has 3 times the amount of flight time as the CAG and DCAG and disagrees with what the priorities for the Wing should be. Even if they aren't open about it who do you think the bulk first-tour JO's would side with? I am not talking about open mutiny but a subtle yet corrosive effect on the chain of command.
I do wish there was more opportunity for non-command O-4/5's to fly and still contribute to the flying part of naval aviation but there are few and far between in the Navy. The USAF and ANG actually does provide an avenue with their large Group and Wing staffs with numerous non-command O-4/5's still flying and mentoring the next generation but they have a completely different command structure that wouldn't fit well in the Navy. Even a little movement towards that sort of structure though would be nice but I don't see it happening.
Also related is the nice fact that our leaders have just as much if not more experience than the folks they are leading. One thing you always hear from the Army aviators is about how a Battalion Commander (rough equivalent of a squadron command in the Navy) usually has much less experience than many of the CWO
he or she is leading. That is a big credibility issue and I think has contributed to many of the long-term issues in Army aviation where the most senior leaders are not the leading experts in their platforms. Who is likely to have some of the most flight experience in a Carrier Air Wing? The CAG and DCAG. They might not have the most hours but they will definitely be near the top in almost all cases. Now flip that on it's side and an O-4 in one of the VFA squadrons has 3 times the amount of flight time as the CAG and DCAG and disagrees with what the priorities for the Wing should be. Even if they aren't open about it who do you think the bulk first-tour JO's would side with? I am not talking about open mutiny but a subtle yet corrosive effect on the chain of command.
I do wish there was more opportunity for non-command O-4/5's to fly and still contribute to the flying part of naval aviation but there are few and far between in the Navy. The USAF and ANG actually does provide an avenue with their large Group and Wing staffs with numerous non-command O-4/5's still flying and mentoring the next generation but they have a completely different command structure that wouldn't fit well in the Navy. Even a little movement towards that sort of structure though would be nice but I don't see it happening.
Eh. The essay's desired outcomes are, for the most part, already being implemented or considered, rendering it OBE. (See sailorbob for a discussion of those new plans.)
The only item that's untenable is the telework piece. For better or for worse, on sea tours we work in an industrials environment that requires physical presence. Shore tours could mayyyybe use telework. Maybe. That being said, RLSO is right to commend and encourage the author for writing and sticking her neck out.
BT
"Mission first, people always." Most have heard it, few believe it, but it informs how higher echelons think about personnel issues. Furthermore, I often read of questions such as "why are women getting out?" and "why aren't we accessing women in numbers that reflect the population?" Here is an essay that attempts to help answer those questions, with the comments and meta-comments informing those answers.
Paris' point about millennials volunteering for 13+ years of war rings true, putting to rest the myth that such essays are "all about you and your desires." If people didn't care about the health of the service, they wouldn't write at all. If they didn't care, they wouldn't be passionate when discussing these matters.
BT BT
I also know Paris, and indeed have worked with him on a couple projects. He's an intelligent officer who says what he means, which sometimes ruffles feathers. The alternative - silent, deferential officers who only speak up when they're senior - doesn't bode well for the intellectual future of the Navy.
You can 'ruffle feathers' and be a professional at the same time but you can also be rude and unprofessional while trying to get your point across, LT Paris' comments on the article fits in the latter category and he loses almost all credibility as a result.
You would be suprised how broad of knowledge senior Army warrants have.
It's not really an "issue" in the Army. Warrants in the Army do have more experience in the platform itself. That is what they do. But theyalso provide valuable advice to the commissioned officers, much like a flag officer's staff provides advice to the flag officer. They are experts in their arena and usually have more experience than the flag officer within their specific arena (assuming they aren't in the same community the flag officer grew up in).
We often have senior warrants that disagree with leadership on certain aspects. A smart warrant will use their experience and character to influence their leadership in the right direction, for the good of the unit and the success of the commissioned officer. Warrants help mentor new young officers. Those new officers that show potential, character, etc... usually get more mentoring. When they become more senior, they realize the value of the mentoring they received (or lost out on). To imply that this relationship is subtle is correct. To imply it is corrosive shows a lack of experience and knowledge of how Army Aviation works.
I am sure there are some who do a have a broad base of knowledge but I have run into many who don't. I have never seen one at a large-force exercise and rarely at a CAOC or at other forums/locations/units/staffs where they would gain 'bigger picture' experience that is normal for USAF, USMC and Navy aviators at the O-5/6 level.
I disagree, I think it is a really big problem for the Army and the fact that a CWO5 has more experience than the Generals who are aviators exemplifies it. I have seen a distinct lack of knowledge and appreciation for aviation as a whole at the mid-to-senior levels and part of the reason is that there are few folks at that level who have an aviation background compounded by the fact that those who do lack the experience their CWO's have. The general lack of knowledge when it came to aviation by otherwise very sharp, combat-experienced Army O-5/6's and above I have worked with was always a surprise to me.
It is also a factor when dealing with other services. CWO's haven't been the folks assigned to do the staff/center/etc work when the Army did play, it was the O-5/6 aviators who usually only had some of the experience their USAF/USMC/Navy counterparts had and were not the same experts their CWO's or other service counterparts were. This often resulted in a poorer information flow from the Army when it did play.
Finally as a service I think it has also harmed Army aviation program management with the RAH-66, ARH-70 and the Aerial Common Sensor suffering as a result.
I didn't say the Army way of doing things was corrosive, but it can be. I think the key phrase above is "A smart warrant", while I assume the majority of your CWO's are 'smart' I imagine just like everywhere else there are some that aren't. The balance of seniority and experience in our senior officers in the Navy ameliorates the impact of that though, a system more similar to the Army's would not.
Spekkio
He bowls overhand.
The whole 'Millenial' as a slur here is ignorant of previous history. People have been getting out of the military for family issues since the dawn of time. My great grandfather was drafted in WWII, served 3 years as a flight controller in london, then got out. Why? Because his wife was pregnant and he wanted to finally see his 3 year old daughter. My uncle did 8-and-out as a nuke EM SPU in the early 90s because his wife wanted to have a career and he wanted to help raise a newborn baby.
This isn't a matter of Millenials wanting to be able to reconcile a military career with family life. This is a long standing issue with many layers, and the question is whether it warrants fixing to the extent possible or if we're content with saying goodbye to talented or experienced people who believe that they cannot simultaneously serve in the military and raise a family. It's going to be an incresingly more important if the military wants to employ and retain women since survey after survey indicates that women are far less likely than men to accept careers that inhibit their ability to raise a family. But insinuating that making the military career track easier on families will somehow weaken our warfighting effectiveness to appease entitled millenials is a stupid argument.
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