Valid question, but there's also something to be said that in the next, presumably higher intensity, broader bounds conflict, there will be different sorts of theaters, with different levels of permissive environment, etc... and there will also be a need, frankly, to throw anything we can at the problem, across a range of platforms. Currently reading Freedom's Forge about the business and supply chain side of ramping up WWII industry - really a great read for a number of reasons, but certainly sobering if you compare and contrast the American economy - particularly the dependence on a truly global supply chain, not just with things like chips but raw material inputs. With that piece of reading, and I understand this is a touch of a departure from the thread topic, I really am thinking more that the next conflict is going to be a function of 'what can we field,' and not 'what is the perfect platform.'
The concern is this mission was crafter around "The Last War". I'll be curious if the buy goes to the full 75+ airframes.
That's certainly valid, but there's also something to be said for caution against over-focusing on the next war instead.
I was recently reading a pretty good history of WWII sub warfare, across all theaters, and it struck me how often during the inter-war years most of the major navies designed, trained, and built based on how "everybody knew" the Next Big War was going to be fought, which turned out to be mostly nothing like what actually happened.
Doctrine for the USN and IJN, for example, assumed their war against each other kicking off with attacks on US, British, and Dutch far western Pacific possessions (Singapore, PI, Malaya, etc), followed by both fleets massing and pushing out against each other, culminating a huge Fleet-on-Fleet battle (Yamamoto's plan for Pearl was based entirely on screwing up that plan for the US). Anyway, American, Japanese, and British subs were designed around that Big Battle concept, either as fast Fleet subs which would be scouts/skirmishers for the main body, or as big, long-range "cruiser subs" operating outside the sealanes. As it happened, since they weren't going to be doing what they planned, the Fleet subs found their niche as commerce raiders to blockade Japan, while the cruiser subs were too big and slow to fight with the main body and couldn't dive fast enough to evade ASW aircraft; almost all of them were scrapped, sunk, or sidelined before the war was over.
The Germans, on the other hand, planned their U-Boat designs and doctrine for the last war, assuming they'd need to do what they did during the Great War - break a British/French blockade, and attack convoys from North America - just do it better. They invaded Norway and Denmark and northern France at least partly to avoid getting bottled up in the North Sea like the High Seas Fleet was during WWI. Though they failed in the end, it was mainly due to being overwhelmed by the endless stream of new merchant hulls and improvements in the escorts, not because of doctrine, training, or equipment.