About a quarter of the way through "The War Within," and so far it's pretty damn fascinating. Some of Woodward's salient points thus far:
- The President was determined to both back his generals' plays in public and private, and to not micro-manage the war from DC (shades of Vietnam). But by mid-'06, it was becoming clear that things were going from bad to worse in IZ, yet the JCS and GEN Casey insisted on "stay the course".
- GWB comes off as very far from the puppet-buffoon caricature the Left wants us to believe.
- Col McMaster's actions in Tall Afar really were the blueprint for the rest of the war. The successes there gave those who'd been pushing for a surge or something like it a success story to point to when the rest of the country was going to hell.
- Woodward lays the vast majority of the blame for the mishandling of Iraq on Rumsfeld, to whit: the deterioration of Iraq contradicted his visions for the fast-lean Army of tomorrow. Thus, said deterioration was not to be pointed out.
- The JCS and MNF-I seemed to be convinced that there really was no military solution to Iraq and slowly slipped into focusing on force protection rather than fighting. We all want to bring all our guys home, but that's not how you win a war, and definitely not how you do a counter-insurgency.
- "Metrics" are this war's "body counts". The Pentagon and MNF-I could fill thousands of ppt slides with flow charts, tables, numbers and color-coded graphs that tracked "successes," but nobody could really tell you if we were winning or not. (note: I don't know about the rest of the book, but I totally buy this part; the Navy at least doesn't believe anything is real unless you can assign a number/code to it, preferably with buzzwords and colors)
Fascinating read. Highly reccommended.