Cornellianintel
Registered User
TurnandBurn55 said:Post-facto rationalization. Is a small-scale nuclear ransom likely to come by conventional means (ballistic missiles) or unconventional means (smuggling a suitcase bomb into the US, for example)? If a country really did have both the wherewithal to develop ballistic missile technology and nuclear weapons AS WELL as the irrationality to use them... what's to stop them from going to option b? Hardly "incredibly valuable".
And so, what does their primary deterrent become? A country with hundreds of nukes is reliant on the idea that they can deter us the same way we can them, right? What does the world become when deterrence is a one-way street and mutually assured destruction is no longer 'mutual'? Wasn't that the whole problem with that business in Cuba back in the 60s... you know, it threatened our deterrent strategy?
SDI was a great idea when it was just scary enough to force the Russians into an arms race they couldn't afford but unrealistic enough that it didn't threaten anyone's deterrent strategy overnight.
First, I can't really speak authoritatively to the likelihood of an enemy trying to smuggle a bomb into the country, but I will offer the opinion that it seems fairly unlikely that they would have an easy time secretly developing and delivering a device (or devices) capable of causing significant damage to the U.S.. Perhaps you can offer some evidence that our borders and shores are truly that poorly defended, but I think it's a tough sell. The very reason that missiles are the vehicle of choice for nuclear warheads is that it just isn't that simple a process to clandestinely smuggle in a nuclear bomb. If it were, we would have simply stashed them all over Russia (and they all over the US) in case the shite hit the fan. Hell, they couldn't even sneak a few missiles into Cuba without us picking up on it (yes, I know a "suitcase bomb" is smaller than a missile, but it wouldn't be undetectable). Furthermore, you're a little strident in assuming that anybody can competently put together a nuclear device capable of fitting inside a suitcase. The only nation suspected to have produced such bombs is the former Soviet Union. According to a position paper put out by the Center for Non Proliferation Studies (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020923.htm) the only nations capable of developing such complex devices would have to have advanced nuclear capabilities. Without regular maintenance, it is widely believed that the bombs would have little to no yield in a span of only two years. It's not the type of thing that you can build and warehouse in some sandy cave. Even well maintained bombs would not have a yield comparable to the crudest earliest nuclear devices. In other words, missiles and planes are still going to be the way nukes are delivered well into the future.
Second, their (a real Nuclear power) primary deterrent and our primary deterrent wouldn't change. As I stated before, any shield currently being developed will not be capable of interceping hundreds of Nukes. A real nuclear power could still count on a reasonable policy of Mutually Assured Destruction with the United States. Rogue states and even non-state actors who develop or acquire one, two, or even perhaps a few dozen nukes, however, will not be able to play that hand with us.
Last, I'd like to re-emphasize that the defense shield will not (yet) threaten the deterrent strategy of any world power--at least not overnight. It will, however, ensure that our hands are never tied by nations, organizations, and individuals who have shown themselves willing to act with apparent disregard for the consequences. We know beyond a reasonable doubt that nuclear technology is proliferating at a disconcerting rate to third world nations. It would be incredibly imprudent to believe that they won't possibly end up in the hands of organizations and people whom we can't negotiate or reason with, or credibly deter with our own arsenal. I'm not saying that it's inevitable, but if and when one of these organizations decides to go balls to the wall because we can't really retaliate against an enemy with no borders, you'll be glad that someone thought that limited missile defense was a good idea.
Great post. If I had any qualms about a so-called impenetrable defense shield, they would (like yours) primarily revolve around fear of a new arms race and an ill-considered disregard for the status quo. Since this isn't that type of deal, I'd say let's cross that bridge when we come to it. The proliferation that we are dealing with now is, perhaps, as destabilizing and threatening as a world in which we were truly a military hegemon.
Best,
cac