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AF ordering inspections due to lax standards
- Thread starter JTS11
- Start date
I’m pretty convinced 99% of the bullshit in the Marines come from Regimental and MAG COs trying to make a star. Squadron and Battalion COs just take all the face shots for it.
I'm pretty sure you could eliminate all MAGs, and it would have zero impact.
What is the OAT and temp of this beverage????
Oh, it's an empty can. I wouldn't subject a good beer to those conditions.
A bit of a thread drift, but if you've got a little time read this C&S paper about a large-scale heliborne assault during Desert Storm that went to shit. IIRC the author takes to task the lack of 0-6 level leadership (MAG)...As you can guess, this operation is not a well-known part of USMC lore...as a helo dude, it had the hairs on the back of my neck standing up.
Adobe Acrobat
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Copying abstract for convenience:A bit of a thread drift, but if you've got a little time read this C&S paper about a large-scale heliborne assault during Desert Storm that went to shit. IIRC the author takes to task the lack of 0-6 level leadership (MAG)...As you can guess, this operation is not a well-known part of USMC lore...as a helo dude, it had the hairs on the back of my neck standing up.
Adobe Acrobat
acrobat.adobe.com
On 24 February 1991, the First Marine Expeditionary Force penetrated Iraqi defenses to begin the ground assault of Desert Storm. Task Force X-ray, a helicopter-borne force comprised of the Marines of 1st Battalion 3rd Marines, was issued an order to establish a blocking position in the vicinity of Al Burqan oil field in order to protect the First Marine Division’s right flank. Essentially unprepared, unrehearsed and without appropriate leadership, the airborne assault took place with less than favorable results. This could have been the largest Marine helicopter-borne force inserted into hostile territory since the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, the mission turned out to be a terrifying flight of near mid-air collisions and chaos over the skies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Although many factors contributed to the ineffectiveness of this mission, the essential element that stands out most is the lack of training our forces and leaders receive in large-scale helicopter-borne operations, and the indifference Commanders have towards leading them. In time of war, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade is the minimum force expected to conduct forcible entry operations. Ultimately, this can only be realized if the senior leadership recognizes the importance of the mission, presses forward with necessary training required to execute such a demanding task, and more importantly steps up to the challenge of commanding the assault. 15. NUMBER OF PAGES: 48
Kind of reminds me of the 11th Aviation Regiment’s 2003 attack on Karbala. The army turned away from existing doctrine and training to launch what amounted to a flying reenactment of the Charge of the Light Brigade.A bit of a thread drift, but if you've got a little time read this C&S paper about a large-scale heliborne assault during Desert Storm that went to shit. IIRC the author takes to task the lack of 0-6 level leadership (MAG)...As you can guess, this operation is not a well-known part of USMC lore...as a helo dude, it had the hairs on the back of my neck standing up.
Adobe Acrobat
TBF, as the author noted, this operation was planned in the infancy of NVG tech (cats and dogs operating aided/unaided, with different levels of training, and not great understood SOPs) The ACE set a solid Go/NoGo...but then didn't honor it, and got bullied. It required someone with the responsibility and authority to say no.
I think there were a lot of lessons learned from this op that informed planning docs and TACMANs for the near future.
Although, the NVG manual remained antiquated for years from the time I was a copilot through NSI. For example, there were ass-bleeding details on how to goggle up the flight (based off of early NVG tech), when we were like, fuck, if it's dark enough, just flip the goggles down, communicate it, and change your lighting condition.
The steep learning curve was painful for all US forces post fall of USSR. First Desert Storm, then Somalia, then the Balkans, etc. History tells us the post Vietnam era of 1970's and 1980's was *painful* in terms of talent and technology. The force was training for scenarios that were macro and that in all practicality could not happen. "Never again" on low intensity conflicts. Look at the mess of Grenada. AF Gen Chuck Horner saw the light and knew that DS would only be effective as a centralized air campaign. The Navy and Marines went in kicking and screaming. It would take a complete turnover of a generation of leadership for change and to release from the 70's and 80's mindsets. They say it takes 50 years to really absorb these kind of lessons. I am sure there are volumes of War College papers still to be published...
Wouldn‘t say that it’s Gen Horner. DS was 5 years after Goldwater Nichols and put these systems in place. Yes DON went kicking and screaming, but they had fought the reorg from initial proposal.
I'd argue that the example I cited was purely USMC generated, and had nothing to do with Goldwater-Nichols. There wasn't much joint about the heliborne planning for the maneuver in this case.
hlg6016
A/C Wings Here
I can vouch for that, The first and second generation equipment was bulky and awkward in comparison to todays gear but we had to start some where. And I'm talking ground level figuring stuff like how to integrate the technology with basic stuff like A/C lighting and systems.
I guess I got into the game after a lot of this stuff was sorted. But, I do know that before they figured out how to make the cockpit NVG compatible, there were filters and tape to mitigate. Not ideal.
Your description of the NVG's being bulky and awkward is what, i think, explains how the NVG manual's TTPs remained stale, after everyone was using ANVIS-9's.
I'm curious to hear what your experience with those early generations of NVGs was like from your perspective, and from a crew perspective.
Tony created a well read website called JQP years ago, and later left it.
Agree with him or not, he is an excellent communicator.
Former C-17 squadron commander.
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