All things MV-22 Osprey

[Flash]

Flash, you sound like someone college kid trying to make his point that he is correct over all others because he knows more than everyone. DC tour giving you insight into matters that make you go hmmm? I have no dog in this fight, doesn't concern me. However, would it not make more sense to look at up and coming programs? It seems to me that since the V-22 program has run the majority of its course...meaning from concept to fleet acquisition, concentrating on programs that are young in design would be more appropriately considered for termination. You're going to find yea and nay's for every program. What makes one or the other correct? Gonna have to demonstrate with facts is my guess.

I think it is very valuable to look at recent programs for flaws in not only the process but also in the thinking of everyone involved. Many of the same arguments that I raised in this now separate thread are the ones that were raised throughout the length of the program. I think it is very easy and lazy to say that since a program is bought and paid for that we shouldn't look at its effectiveness, both from a procurement perspective and an operational one.

You are certainly right that it is a bit like crying over spilt milk, and I did get sucked into minutiae that I certainly did not intend to get in an argument about in this thread. I don't know nearly as much about the V-22 as most Marine aviators, but I am not an idiot high school kid either (at least I don't think so). My main point remains though, I think the jury is still out on whether or not the V-22 buy is really worth the cost for the capability. A capability that could be done in large parts by much cheaper, albeit less capable, aircraft. Secretary of Defense Cheney certainly didn't think so in 1991.

Why should that still be argued over? Well, you can take it as a lesson for the many other programs that are in the pipe for not only the Marines but for the rest of the services. The same arguments that the Marines make for the V-22, increased capability at a greater cost, can be made for most programs. The issue is at what cost is the capability worth it? While most of the arguments for the V-22 are valid, the same arguments were used for the Comanche, Crusader and A-12. And they are still used for the F-22, EFV and FCS. But all of those programs have their futures in doubt right now due to massive cost overruns.

We are likely facing a future where there is significantly less money for acquisitions and where overall cost will be weighed even more heavily when compared to capability and effectiveness of weapon systems. The single-minded focus with which the Marines pursued the purchase of the V-22 might not pay off in the future, especially when there are much cheaper alternative available, no matter what is 'necessary' for the service. It may even turn out to be a huge detriment, instead of not having the best weapon system you may not end up with none at all. The Marines, and the rest of the services, seem not to have learned this lesson yet. The Army is the one service that has borne the brunt lately, with 3 major programs being cut even when their procurement was deemed necessary. But I believe the other services will have to endure some similar cuts sooner or later. I think the Navy saw the writing on the wall with the Zumwalt class.

That is why I think it is still valuable to argue about current acquisitions, like the V-22. There will have to be compromises made, like with the Super Hornet. But the Navy needed aircraft on its flight decks and fast to replace the F-14 and A-6 and we really didn't have an alternative. As a result we got a plane on time and on budget with new capabilities added every day. If the services continue to go down the path of 'the best and nothing else' then they might end up with nothing. It is time that the services and its people, including us here on AW, wake up to that reality.

And just to let you know I am not on a tour here in DC, I have a career here now. I know, the horror.

 

[bunk22]

I think it is very valuable to look at recent programs for flaws in not only the process but also in the thinking of everyone involved. Many of the same arguments that I raised in this now separate thread are the ones that were raised throughout the length of the program. I think it is very easy and lazy to say that since a program is bought and paid for that we shouldn't look at its effectiveness, both from a procurement perspective and an operational one.

You are certainly right that it is a bit like crying over spilt milk, and I did get sucked into minutiae that I certainly did not intend to get in an argument about in this thread. I don't know nearly as much about the V-22 as most Marine aviators, but I am not an idiot high school kid either (at least I don't think so). My main point remains though, I think the jury is still out on whether or not the V-22 buy is really worth the cost for the capability. A capability that could be done in large parts by much cheaper, albeit less capable, aircraft. Secretary of Defense Cheney certainly didn't think so in 1991.

Why should that still be argued over? Well, you can take it as a lesson for the many other programs that are in the pipe for not only the Marines but for the rest of the services. The same arguments that the Marines make for the V-22, increased capability at a greater cost, can be made for most programs. The issue is at what cost is the capability worth it? While most of the arguments for the V-22 are valid, the same arguments were used for the Comanche, Crusader and A-12. And they are still used for the F-22, EFV and FCS. But all of those programs have their futures in doubt right now due to massive cost overruns.

We are likely facing a future where there is significantly less money for acquisitions and where overall cost will be weighed even more heavily when compared to capability and effectiveness of weapon systems. The single-minded focus with which the Marines pursued the purchase of the V-22 might not pay off in the future, especially when there are much cheaper alternative available, no matter what is 'necessary' for the service. It may even turn out to be a huge detriment, instead of not having the best weapon system you may not end up with none at all. The Marines, and the rest of the services, seem not to have learned this lesson yet. The Army is the one service that has borne the brunt lately, with 3 major programs being cut even when their procurement was deemed necessary. But I believe the other services will have to endure some similar cuts sooner or later. I think the Navy saw the writing on the wall with the Zumwalt class.

That is why I think it is still valuable to argue about current acquisitions, like the V-22. There will have to be compromises made, like with the Super Hornet. But the Navy needed aircraft on its flight decks and fast to replace the F-14 and A-6 and we really didn't have an alternative. As a result we got a plane on time and on budget with new capabilities added every day. If the services continue to go down the path of 'the best and nothing else' then they might end up with nothing. It is time that the services and its people, including us here on AW, wake up to that reality.

And just to let you know I am not on a tour here in DC, I have a career here now. I know, the horror.

That all certainly makes sense. I would think though the best way to look at programs currently in use, like the V-22, is to present facts based on numbers. Something like a comparison against other platforms, a cost analysis if you will. Using a neutral source so as not to be biased. One might be able to then figure what is a valid assest and what is not. Even down here in little ole Pensacola, there is the debate, T-34C vs T-6B. There is a group of IP's so against a new aircraft and some are vocal. Of course they have nothing to back up what they say while the T-6 team has numbers, created by the source of course. Unless they come up with something on paper to prove otherwise, this new trainer is going to happen, even with all its delays and issues. The T-6 I would say certainly doesn't fall under the best of all, it has certain flaws (read no beta) but the program is still a go ahead as of now.

 

[phrogdriver]

Joe, Gary and Nate are several that come to mind. Do you want their MOS's and home numbers too?

I just came to this thread and don't want to rehash all that's been talked about already, but who the hell are Joe, Gary, and Nate?

PP73 is apparently one of the rational, but there are some Phrog Phanatics out there who are so stuck on the 46 they would turn down anything else, even if it dispensed free Red Bull and blowjobs.

[/IMG]

Most air and ground Marines who have first hand exposure to the V-22 are instant converts.

 

[E5B]

First off, take the T-34 and T-6 stuff to another thread.

Now...So what happens when a V-22 ACE goes ashore and DA is over 8500, can a V-22 land on an unimproved LZ for a casevac? If not then who goes? 53? Huey?
Can it carry 12 combat loaded troops in that environment?

I'm asking because I don't know.

 

[phrogdriver]

First off, take the T-34 and T-6 stuff to another thread.

Now...So what happens when a V-22 ACE goes ashore and DA is over 8500, can a V-22 land on an unimproved LZ for a casevac? If not then who goes? 53? Huey?
Can it carry 12 combat loaded troops in that environment?

I'm asking because I don't know.

THe V-22 takes the casevac. The aircraft can land at higher DAs than 8500 (done it) and the envelope is still getting expanded with testing. You take a significant power reduction, so fuel weight will be an issue with more than a couple troops on board, but that can be helped by preflight planning. Where did the 8500' DA question come from?

 

[busdriver]

Phrog, I don't know why this question popped into my head, but what are the slope limits on the Osprey?

 

[exhelodrvr]

There are two separate issues here; one is whether it ever should have been bought (could go either way on that) and the other is whether it should be canceled now (seems like it would be best not to, although could definitely make a strong argument to cancel it.)

 

[exhelodrvr]

My point was that that one of the strengths of the V-22, its combat radius combined with its speed, can make the MEU reliant on support not resident on the ships of an ESG.

That almost sounds like you are saying that it is too capable.

 

[phrogdriver]

Phrog, I don't know why this question popped into my head, but what are the slope limits on the Osprey?

Take the -46 sideslope limits and add 50%. Fore/aft slopes are actually really easy, since you can adjust the nacelles to give the wheels the slope angle you need.

Should we have started buying V-22s in the first place? OBE--overcome by events.

Should we keep buying them? Well, we're over 1/3 done swapping out squadrons. Cancellation costs paid to the contractors and the logistics costs incurred by the military would eat a lot of savings. Then there's the question of what you'd do with the ones you already got--keep them and have 1/3 of your medium-lift fleet one thing and the rest another (that'd be hard). Or, replace the V-22s and pay twice to replace the 46? In the meantime, even if you went completely off the shelf for a new replacement, you'd be talking another several years on the CH-46s.

I don't think those are serious options at all, not even counting the political realities.

 

[Gatordev]

I just re-read this, and thought you'd like to know that in the reserves... Phrogs are the ones dispensing Red Bull, Hookers, Blow, and Blowjobs. So I'm not THAT rational.

Wait, so YOU'RE giving BJ's? Suspicions confirmed.

 

[insanebikerboy]

Wait, so YOU'RE giving BJ's? Suspicions confirmed.

Zing! +1

 

[ChuckMK23]

So is there Marine Corps VMM community doing any work with AF AFSOC on best practices in operations/maintenance on the V-22 ? Surely the Marine Corps will pick up a thing a thing or two from the AF's aggressive employment of the CV-22 and vice versa. It looks like AFSOC will re-establish the old 21st SOS at Hurlburt with CV-22 and go back to serving as the platform of choice for SOCOM - they will likely see a lot of action - more than the Marine Corps will I would guess.







/

 

[Hoss]

Phrog to Osprey transition

Does anyone know the order and approximate dates when the remaining 10 HMM, CH-46E squadrons will transition over the MV-22 Osprey? So far, four VMM, MV-22 squadrons have been stood up and/or replaced the aging Phrog squadrons. They have all been concentrated at New River thus far. I'm thinking they will replace the remaining East Coast 46 squadrons then replace the remaining West Coast 46 squadrons, leaving the two Okinawa HMM squadrons as the last squadrons (besides the two reserve squadrons) to be replaced. Higher has stated that two VMM squadrons will replace two HMM squadrons per year until they are all replaced. Any input into this question would be appreciated.

 

[HeyJoe]

USMC Aviation Plan

Does anyone know the order and approximate dates when the remaining 10 HMM, CH-46E squadrons will transition over the MV-22 Osprey? So far, four VMM, MV-22 squadrons have been stood up and/or replaced the aging Phrog squadrons. They have all been concentrated at New River thus far. I'm thinking they will replace the remaining East Coast 46 squadrons then replace the remaining West Coast 46 squadrons, leaving the two Okinawa HMM squadrons as the last squadrons (besides the two reserve squadrons) to be replaced. Higher has stated that two VMM squadrons will replace two HMM squadrons per year until they are all replaced. Any input into this question would be appreciated.

It's all here in the Aviation Plan (updated for FY2009)

 

[Birdog8585]

^beat me to it - patyin all night again huh?

If you're the lazy type...

MV-22 TransitionManpower plans for the MV-22 are in execution, with MOS inventories above critical path. The first three MV-22 squadrons -VMM-263, VMM-162, and VMM-266 -stood up between 2006 and 2007. The fourth, VMM-261, began its transition in 2008. VMM-263 completed the first MV-22 operational deployment in FY08. The deployment, in support of OIF, was successful in every regard, and successive MV-22 deployments are underway.

We will introduce the MV-22 to the west coast as we continue to transition HMM squadrons to VMMs.

During late 2006, the MV-22 pilot selection process changed from a board-only process to a direct assignment process managed by MMOA-2. MMOA now manages direct assignment of CH-46E pilots for MV-22 transition. The annual DC AVN transition/conversion board continues to select pilots from outside the CH-46E community for MV-22 transition. The revised policy supports transition of the medium-lift assault support community, and will take into account the critical balance of building the VMM population aggressively while also continuing to meet ongoing warfighting requirements.