Bonhomme Richard fire

[Griz882]

I read the official report and I’ll point out the following.

“As Commanding Officer (CO), his responsibility is absolute, commensurate with his responsibilities. The execution of his duties created an environment of poor training, maintenance, and operational standards that directly led to the loss of the ship.”

The report also noted, with reference to the CO…

1. Lack of knowledge of shipwide damage control conditions and firefighting system status and a lack of risk recognition due to removed hatches, fire systems tagged out, etc.

2. Lack of a specific, detailed, and rehearsed firefighting plan for the maintenance environment to include incorporation of shore-based firefighters

3. Demonstrated lack of ship’s force firefighting proficiency.

Had the skipper done his job right he wouldn’t have had to abandon his ship to, perhaps, save lives.

 

[Spekkio]

I read the official report and I’ll point out the following.

“As Commanding Officer (CO), his responsibility is absolute, commensurate with his responsibilities. The execution of his duties created an environment of poor training, maintenance, and operational standards that directly led to the loss of the ship.”

The report also noted, with reference to the CO…

1. Lack of knowledge of shipwide damage control conditions and firefighting system status and a lack of risk recognition due to removed hatches, fire systems tagged out, etc.

2. Lack of a specific, detailed, and rehearsed firefighting plan for the maintenance environment to include incorporation of shore-based firefighters

3. Demonstrated lack of ship’s force firefighting proficiency.

Had the skipper done his job right he wouldn’t have had to abandon his ship to, perhaps, save lives.

You just quoted a bunch of opinions. Read the actual timeline.

I will agree with that last statement about 'had the CO done his job right,' but not for his decision to evacuate the crew. The CO's failings occurred significantly prior to the day of the fire (poor standards, poor maintenance practices throughout the ship, inadequately trained crew to include people who thought NWUs would spontaneously combust under FFEs, not adequately managing the risk of tagging out multiple pieces of DC equipment, etc). And even then, we're probably being a little unfair in hindsight as anyone who has done a yard period knows that it's intertwined with a 'this is the way we've always done it' mentality by the shipyard.

A properly trained crew would have sought out and called away the fire at 0800 when several crewmembers spotted smoke, but ignored it. That would have allowed the crew to attack the fire by 0810, provided that they had functional fire hoses and AFFF.

But none of that happened. The casualty wasn't even reported until 0810, not called away until 0825, and the equipment used to attack the fire didn't work. Those early minutes are precious, and are the critical difference between saving or losing the ship.

His decision to evacuate the crew at 0930 with degrading conditions and no functional equipment to fight the fire was appropriate.

 

[exNavyOffRec]

You just quoted a bunch of opinions. Read the actual timeline.

I will agree with that last statement about 'had the CO done his job right,' but not for his decision to evacuate the crew. The CO's failings occurred significantly prior to the day of the fire (poor standards, poor maintenance practices throughout the ship, inadequately trained crew to include people who thought NWUs would spontaneously combust under FFEs, not adequately managing the risk of tagging out multiple pieces of DC equipment, etc).

A properly trained crew would have sought out and called away the fire at 0800 when several crewmembers spotted smoke, but ignored it. That would have allowed the crew to attack the fire by 0815, provided that they had functional fire hoses and AFFF. As it was, the casualty wasn't even called away until 0825 and the equipment used to try to put out the fire didn't work.

But none of that happened. His decision to evacuate the crew at 0930 with no functional equipment to fight the fire was appropriate.

If I understand what is being said by a few of the post he made a series of errors prior to the day of the fire which caused the situation where he had to make the call to evacuate the ship which was the correct call. However if he had done things right in the first place he probably wouldn't have had to make the call to evacuate.

I guess the good thing in all of this is that the final call he made was correct and saved lives.

 

[Griz882]

You just quoted a bunch of opinions. Read the actual timeline.

I will agree with that last statement about 'had the CO done his job right,' but not for his decision to evacuate the crew. The CO's failings occurred significantly prior to the day of the fire (poor standards, poor maintenance practices throughout the ship, inadequately trained crew to include people who thought NWUs would spontaneously combust under FFEs, not adequately managing the risk of tagging out multiple pieces of DC equipment, etc). And even then, we're probably being a little unfair in hindsight as anyone who has done a yard period knows that it's intertwined with a 'this is the way we've always done it' mentality by the shipyard.

A properly trained crew would have sought out and called away the fire at 0800 when several crewmembers spotted smoke, but ignored it. That would have allowed the crew to attack the fire by 0815, provided that they had functional fire hoses and AFFF.

But none of that happened. The casualty wasn't even reported until 0810, not called away until 0825, and the equipment used to try to put out the fire didn't work. Those early minutes are precious, and are the critical difference between saving or losing the ship.

His decision to evacuate the crew at 0930 with degrading conditions and no functional equipment to fight the fire was appropriate.

While I understand what you are saying, we’ll have to agree to disagree.

 

[croakerfish]

Had the skipper done his job right he wouldn’t have had to abandon his ship to, perhaps, save lives.

Oh please. Don’t tell me you actually buy all the shit they try to pin on the guy. That ship was ripped apart and welded to the pier and his crew was subsidizing the contracted labor force with their man-hours. Do you really think it’s feasible to have an airtight contingency plan for DC that is comparable to your at-sea capabilities in those circumstances?

 

[Griz882]

Oh please. Don’t tell me you actually buy all the shit they try to pin on the guy. That ship was ripped apart and welded to the pier and his crew was subsidizing the contracted labor force with their man-hours. Do you really think it’s feasible to have an airtight contingency plan for DC that is comparable to your at-sea capabilities in those circumstances?

Don’t get me wrong, there were plenty of mistakes along the line up and down especially with the contract labor team but preparation is essentially his (the skipper’s) job. I agree it is likely impossible to have an airtight contingency plan but it seems (from the report) he didn’t have too much of a plan at all.

 

[wink]

Oh please. Don’t tell me you actually buy all the shit they try to pin on the guy. That ship was ripped apart and welded to the pier and his crew was subsidizing the contracted labor force with their man-hours. Do you really think it’s feasible to have an airtight contingency plan for DC that is comparable to your at-sea capabilities in those circumstances?

The ship was still with SURFPAC and it was still the Captain's responsibility. If the crew was being provided as a subsidizing work force then by God it was the CO's responsibility to provide a trained crew for the job. You can't possibly argue that having fire risk extensive maintenance done by civilians is a good time to go slack on DC readiness.

And yes, I think you can plan for any differences in a DC response for being pier side in those conditions vs at sea. I can't believe it didn't happen. Different circumstances, different plan. In fact, I'd be willing to bet you that in a couple years you will see that providing a tailored plan for the circumstances is going to be a requirement going into one of those extended maintenance periods. How would you suggest the Navy change procedures to ensure a localized card board box fire in a giant steal space doesn't destroy one of the largest combatant ships in the world?

 

[Brett327]

The ship was still with SURFPAC and it was still the Captain's responsibility. If the crew was being provided as a subsidizing work force then by God it was the CO's responsibility to provide a trained crew for the job. You can't possibly argue that having fire risk extensive maintenance done by civilians is a good time to go slack on DC readiness.

As was already said, tell me you didn't read the report, etc, etc, etc.

I'm not saying the CO isn't responsible, or that more couldn't have been done to reduce risk prior to the fire, but to casually invoke "well, the CO should have done better" to explain an incredibly complex environment and set of circumstances is a bit facile.

 

[wink]

As was already said, tell me you didn't read the report, etc, etc, etc.

I'm not saying the CO isn't responsible, or that more couldn't have been done to reduce risk prior to the fire, but to casually invoke "well, the CO should have done better" to explain an incredibly complex environment and set of circumstances is a bit facile.

I read portions of it. I read bullet point after bullet point, findings of fact, that indicate the CO should have done better. Not saying it wasn't difficult. In fact, it was likely more difficult because there wasn't a plan for the set of circumstances that the BHR was in for nearly two years. It was difficult because the crew wasn't properly trained. That is the skipper's responsibility. I hate when people use complexity as an excuse. You know what else is complex, an amphibious assault, war at sea, ship board flight operations.

If being tied up pier side with safety and DC equipment locked out and inop while maintenance is being conducted is such a complex shit show, then why not approach relevant procedures differently then when underway? It just isn't BHR. Apparently no one in the Navy has ever considered this?

I don't know what made you think I was being casual. I was not. I can only pray I'd do better.

 

[Brett327]

I read portions of it. I read bullet point after bullet point, findings of fact, that indicate the CO should have done better. Not saying it wasn't difficult. In fact, it was likely more difficult because there wasn't a plan for the set of circumstances that the BHR was in for nearly two years. It was difficult because the crew wasn't properly trained. That is the skipper's responsibility. I hate when people use complexity as an excuse. You know what else is complex, an amphibious assault, war at sea, ship board fight operations.

f being tied up pier side with safety and DC equipment locked out and inop while maintenance is being conducted is such a complex shit show, then why not approach relevant procedures differently then when underway? It just isn't BHR. Apparently no one in the Navy has ever considered this?

I don't know what made you think I was being casual. I was not. I can only pray I'd do better.

Complexity isn't an excuse... it's a reality that lay observers underappreciate. Generally speaking, circumstances can reach a point where no amount of preparation, decisive leadership, or heroic action can prevent a bad outcome... and yes, war at sea is complex, but it would be foolish to presume that merely through preparation and decisive leadership, that outcome won't also result in catastrophic defeat.

 

[Hair Warrior]

Didn’t read the after-action. Pardon my ignorance. Did they ever determine if the fire was/wasn’t deliberately set?

 

[Brett327]

Didn’t read the after-action. Pardon my ignorance. Did they ever determine if the fire was/wasn’t deliberately set?

They're moving forward with the court-martial for SR Mays.

 

[Spekkio]

f being tied up pier side with safety and DC equipment locked out and inop while maintenance is being conducted is such a complex shit show, then why not approach relevant procedures differently then when underway? It just isn't BHR. Apparently no one in the Navy has ever considered this?

The relevant procedures are treated differently then [sic] when underway.

You're asking people to make rock solid contingency plans for when someone commits arson and the duty section takes improper immediate actions. That's like blaming Ford engineers when someone dies after intentionally driving into a barrier at 75 mph and the EMTs take 30 minutes to arrive.

 

[MIDNJAC]

Didn’t read the after-action. Pardon my ignorance. Did they ever determine if the fire was/wasn’t deliberately set?

The publicly released command investigation specifically does not address criminal elements of the mishap. Just what happened following ignition.

Honestly, you guys should read that report. It is interesting, and clears up a lot of these questions. I personally agree with Spekkio's take on this one, 100%. Captain got burned hard, and it sounds like he did accept an unacceptable (on paper) status quo of ship's configuration in port while in mx availability, that led directly to the result. How many other ships and commands have done the same, out of practical necessity? Probably 100% of them. That isn't to say the findings weren't justified in the cold hard reality of an investigation into fault. But I say someone buy this guy a beer for not needlessly wasting the lives/safety of Sailors who had nothing to do with the causal factors in the middle of an unstoppable pier fire.

 

[Spekkio]

How many other ships and commands have done the same, out of practical necessity? Probably 100% of them. That isn't to say the findings weren't justified in the cold hard reality of an investigation into fault....

This x1000. It always irks me how investigations like this point everything at the CO for failing to to be clairvoyant enough to stonewall the shipyard from executing a plan to tag out DC equipment that has been done for over a decade (as if that would actually work), but doesn't address the broader maintenance planning issues and risk mitigations for shipyard fires.