Bonhomme Richard fire

[thump]

On one hand, “This is how everyone always did it and I’m just the guy who got caught holding the bag” sounds like something you’d hear from AN Timmy at NJP.

On the other hand, if inescapable complexity places accountability above the ship CO’s level, then maybe censuring the VADM isn’t a such bad call.

 

[wink]

Generally speaking, circumstances can reach a point where no amount of preparation, decisive leadership, or heroic action can prevent a bad outcome...

I'd suggest this is not due to complexity, it is due to unknowns during the planning process. True unknowns that could not be planned for as a contingency. Fire on a ship pier side undergoing maintenance is hardly something that can not be prepared for. Taking into account specific inop DC equipment or systems is something that is known and can be considered in a plan and should be rote knowledge of the Duty Officer and duty section LPO. Not a SWO, but I did my DC PQS on my first deployment. In combat DC teams expect to not have normal resources and systems due to damage. And they train for it. How was having systems locked out for maintenance any different than that?

My point is that everyone seems to know about the challenges that arise during extensive maintenance and extended yard periods, but no one has considered developing special procedures for those circumstances? You just can't get around the fact BHR was lost due to a cardboard box fire. Does that not make some folks wonder whether it would survive even the slightest bit of bomb damage in combat, full crew compliment or not?

 

[Spekkio]

Fire on a ship pier side undergoing maintenance is hardly something that can not be prepared for. Taking into account specific inop DC equipment or systems is something that is known and can be considered in a plan and should be rote knowledge of the Duty Officer and duty section LPO.

Installing suitable alternate FF gear costs money. And when people who do budgets sit around a table and talk about spending millions of dollars on better equipment, the discussion turns to 'that never happens' or some unrealistic onus on the ship's crew.

None of this is within the control of the ship's CO. He gets what he gets, and his boss wants a ship delivered on time and doesn't want to be told the project will go long to deconflict the operability of DC equipment. Figure it out like every other ship did. Meanwhile, there wasn't even a fire main on the pier.

You are drawing a lot of (IMO false) parallels to combat operations at sea.

 

[Brett327]

You just can't get around the fact BHR was lost due to a cardboard box fire.

I think the more salient point is that you can't seem to get around the fact that it's much more complicated than that, but whatevs, Wink. You do you.

 

[MIDNJAC]

None of this is within the control of the ship's CO.

I think this is the crux of the argument here. Griz, wink, etc aren't wrong. Their points are valid, and on one hand, it reads like "skipper said it is ok to fly with empty fire bottles and the fire detector loops inop because we are on det". But I believe the argument in this case that he probably had no practical recourse.

 

[Hair Warrior]

Is the Navy/DoD/Congress planning to acquire an “extra” LHA (above what was already planned) to replace BHR?

 

[Duc'-guy25]

I think this is the crux of the argument here. Griz, wink, etc aren't wrong. Their points are valid, and on one hand, it reads like "skipper said it is ok to fly with empty fire bottles and the fire detector loops inop because we are on det". But I believe the argument in this case that he probably had no practical recourse.

You guys get fire bottles? Lucky.

 

[Gatordev]

You guys get fire bottles? Lucky.

Warning, off-topic...

I recently took a little trip through a farmer's field because of a fire light. Our particular versions of aircraft don't have fire bottles, which was something I didn't spend a lot of time worrying about. However after I pushed the fire light button on this particular day and the light didn't extinguish, I had a brief thought about how having a bottle might be nice. Then I moved on to other more pressing issues.

Fortunately it was just a light (and bad sensor).

 

[Spekkio]

I think this is the crux of the argument here. Griz, wink, etc aren't wrong. Their points are valid, and on one hand, it reads like "skipper said it is ok to fly with empty fire bottles and the fire detector loops inop because we are on det". But I believe the argument in this case that he probably had no practical recourse.

The comments that started us down this rabbit hole were Griz and wink judging the CO to be a terrible leader for evacuating his crew and regrouping on the pier when conditions in-hull became untenable. It's "bad optics" (as if perception is what the CO was thinking about at the time) and "not what we'd do in battle" as if the BHR were actively being attacked by kamikaze pilots at the time of the casualty. These comments demonstrate a gross misunderstanding of decision making.

If we're going to move the goalposts to how the CO cultivated a culture of lax standards, inadequate firefighting training, and poor ORM wrt maintenance then I can buy all of that for a dollar.

Devil's advocate: I challenge you to take command of a big deck warship and micromanage the 3M program down to a WCS level because you think that if you don't it'll burn your ship down, and then deal with the command climate repercussions of that decision. You might get fired for being a tyrant, but hey, at least we won't lose a warship while you've got the football.

But I digress. For once I'd like to see the incident report point out that in the year 2022, the CO shouldn't have to stand on an island to prevent a shipyard project from risking a ship due to inadequate maintenance ORM. Further, I'd like it to point out that the expectation that the CO and crew be the standard bearers for ship safety and casualty response generates tension between organizations that are supposed to be cooperating to deliver a well maintained ship, which ultimately leads to significant delays.

None of that is captured. And now, a retired 3-star is complaining to the press that he's being unfairly censured for a unit CO and several other flag officer's supposed incompetence.

 

[wink]

The comments that started us down this rabbit hole were Griz and wink judging the CO to be a terrible leader for evacuating his crew and regrouping on the pier when conditions in-hull became untenable. It's "bad optics" (as if perception is what the CO was thinking about at the time) and "not what we'd do in battle" as if the BHR were actively being attacked by kamikaze pilots at the time of the casualty. These comments demonstrate a gross misunderstanding of decision making.

If we're going to move the goalposts to how the CO cultivated a culture of lax standards, inadequate firefighting training, and poor ORM wrt maintenance then I can buy all of that for a dollar.

Devil's advocate: I challenge you to take command of a big deck warship and micromanage the 3M program down to a WCS level because you think that if you don't it'll burn your ship down, and then deal with the command climate repercussions of that decision. You might get fired for being a tyrant, but hey, at least we won't lose a warship while you've got the football.

But I digress. For once I'd like to see the incident report point out that in the year 2022, the CO shouldn't have to stand on an island to prevent a shipyard project from risking a ship due to inadequate maintenance ORM. Further, I'd like it to point out that the expectation that the CO and crew be the standard bearers for ship safety and casualty response generates tension between organizations that are supposed to be cooperating to deliver a well maintained ship, which ultimately leads to significant delays.

None of that is captured. And now, a retired 3-star is complaining to the press that he's being unfairly censured for a unit CO and several other flag officer's supposed incompetence.

Characterize the COs leadership how you like. I don't wish him il-will and as I said, pray I may have done better. But the reports list plenty of failings. You insist I read the report but apparently you choose to selectively reject what you please. It is just my opinion. It is shared by others who know the complexities and details better than me. So sorry if I think my mild disagreement with some here is reasonable. That is all.

 

[Griz882]

The comments that started us down this rabbit hole were Griz and wink judging the CO to be a terrible leader for evacuating his crew and regrouping on the pier…

Devil's advocate: I challenge you to take command of a big deck warship and micromanage the 3M program down to a WCS level because you think that if you don't it'll burn your ship down, and then deal with the command climate repercussions of that decision. You might get fired for being a tyrant, but hey, at least we won't lose a warship while you've got the football.

First, I never said he was a “terrible leader,” I questioned his decision making during the fire…and so did the official report. If you want to yell at me because navy policy is bad, fine, but don’t put words in my mouth.

Second, with reference to your challenge, IF I get 31 years to prepare for that confusing and horrible moment like the BHR commander got, all I can say is:



I imagine I’d have the same chances as the captain for success or failure and would accept the same fate if I got it wrong.

 

[nittany03]

Serious question: is the answer to situations like this that a ship gets formally decommed prior to every major yard period and turned fully over to the shipyard? No CO, no Navy crew, just a big non-USS hunk of metal getting worked on? Then INSURV or someone from the Navy has to conduct a full inspection afterwards and sign off that she's ready for a shakedown, at which point she gets recommissioned and turned back over to the Navy? Isn't that how they did things back in the Age of Sail?

I wonder what it would take for Lloyd's of London to underwrite a $10B liability policy for one decommissioned CVN on Huntington Ingalls Industries' books, but I also wonder whether the insurance adjusters being up their ass might actually do a better job of ORM than we've seen so far.

 

[Brett327]

Serious question: is the answer to situations like this that a ship gets formally decommed prior to every major yard period and turned fully over to the shipyard? No CO, no Navy crew, just a big non-USS hunk of metal getting worked on? Then INSURV or someone from the Navy has to conduct a full inspection afterwards and sign off that she's ready for a shakedown, at which point she gets recommissioned and turned back over to the Navy? Isn't that how they did things back in the Age of Sail?

I wonder what it would take for Lloyd's of London to underwrite a $10B liability policy for one decommissioned CVN on Huntington Ingalls Industries' books, but I also wonder whether the insurance adjusters being up their ass might actually do a better job of ORM than we've seen so far.

Nobody will ever agree to any of that... least of all, the shipyard.

 

[Hair Warrior]

Serious question: is the answer to situations like this that a ship gets formally decommed prior to every major yard period and turned fully over to the shipyard? No CO, no Navy crew, just a big non-USS hunk of metal getting worked on? Then INSURV or someone from the Navy has to conduct a full inspection afterwards and sign off that she's ready for a shakedown, at which point she gets recommissioned and turned back over to the Navy? Isn't that how they did things back in the Age of Sail?

I wonder what it would take for Lloyd's of London to underwrite a $10B liability policy for one decommissioned CVN on Huntington Ingalls Industries' books, but I also wonder whether the insurance adjusters being up their ass might actually do a better job of ORM than we've seen so far.

What you’re suggesting is all possible… with cash. But it’s cheaper to do it the way we do now.

Lord knows we’d pay some shipyard big bucks to overhaul the USS Something, then we’d spend another two years arguing with the contractor because they didn’t quite do it the way the Navy wanted.

 

[robav8r]

This entire thread is poking at a much larger bear called the material condition and readiness of DoD critical infrastructure. We have allowed some of our most important assets and facilities to degrade to a point that they are not in a state of material readiness required for their intended mission function. Bases, ships, airplanes, "systems" (with a few, small exceptions) are in need of a massive influx of capital.