Europe under extreme duress

[taxi1]

Huh . . .

I was with you until he predicted Notre Dame would beat Ohio State.

 

[Griz882]

I have a few nitpicks:

1) Russia has historically been unprepared for war, but it was actually moving towards being rather well-prepared for what would become the Great Patriotic War. Because of the failures in WWI and in fighting the Japanese, Russian military thinkers had conjured up a whole operational doctrine and a lot of rebuilding of the Russian military had been taking place. The problem was Stalin then liquidated the entire officer corps that developed it all.

2) Ralph Peters writes, "Clumsy on offense, stalwart on defense. On the attack, Russian forces are stiff, yet unsteady, and readily paralyzed by surprises (as we saw on the outskirts of Kyiv in the present war’s first days). They rely on mass and the readiness to suffer “intolerable” casualties. In World War II, a prevalent comment was “U nas naroda mnoga” (“We have a lot of people.”). Heartless it may have been, but that attitude got them to Berlin."

That is not true at all. Soviet doctrine emphasized mass in the same way the West does, i.e. when going on the offense you want a numerical advantage, but that you want a numerical advantage doesn't mean that your main plan of attack is to just rely on superior numbers. To the contrary, Soviet doctrine emphasized a lot of flexibility and maneuver in attacking forces. The goal of Soviet deep operations was constant attack and maneuver, attack and maneuver, to keep the enemy off balance and clueless as to what was happening. The enemy's entire ability to fight was to annihilated. Forces would attack along one line, then a follow-on force would attack, but maybe go in a different direction. A force would attack, expire, then another force in another area would launch an attack. Attacking forces would attack so as to penetrate the German defenses and then systematically break up German forces and divide them into isolated pockets that would be destroyed or starved out. Soviet forces would attack the main German force and then attack the secondary strong point that would be expected to come to the defense of the main force. They would also attack the third strongpoint. Once into the enemy's rear area, forces would begin engaging in destroying enemy command-and-control and infrastructure. Emphasis was placed on the ability of forces to constantly maneuver and move with speed, to be secretly divided up and joined with other forces or together to form new forces, to maintain the constant tempo of attack, attack, attack. And that was after all of the deception operations that would have been conducted. Sabotage operations might also have been conducted in the rear right prior to the attack.

Post-WWII, this doctrine continued on even more with the development of nuclear weapons. The Soviets recognized that large military formations were vulnerable to nuclear attack, and that thus in a WW3 scenario, speed, flexibility of forces, and surprise would be absolutely essential. Thus the Soviets downsized the scale of individual types of forces, making them more flexible, mobile, and easier to control.

The reason Putin's forces don't demonstrate any of this is because after the breakup of the Soviet Union, much of this knowledge was forgotten, and two, the Soviet Union after Stalin was not a one-man dictatorship, so professionalism in the military could be a lot more developed. With a one man dictatorship, such professionalism is dangerous, as the military could kick said ruler out of power.

3) Peters writes, "on the contrary, the unbounded readiness to inflict destruction on anything or anyone within range is a great advantage for any military power—despite our ahistorical insistence otherwise."

Well my historical knowledge here is limited, but from what I do know, this sounds like a bad idea. If anything, it can become a major handicap. The Germans learned this the hard way when they bombed the city of Stalingrad to smithereens. That was about the worst thing they could have done. The Soviets took the rubble and piled it up into lines of trenches layered one after the other throughout the city, that the Germans constantly had to cross over. These trenches connected special strong points which served to provide interlocking fields of machine gun fire that the Germans ran into while trying to cross over said trenches. The trenches also allowed constant communication to be maintained between the strongpoints. The Soviets were able to site snipers all over the city and to set up defenses to channel groups of German tanks into special killing zones where they would be destroyed. The Germans found it very hard to maneuver and thus the city served as a true meat grinder for German forces.

Plus inflicting destruction doesn't generally break the enemy. If anything it will strengthen their resolve. The Germans bombing the British didn't break their resolve, their bombing the Soviets didn't break theirs, Allied bombing of the Germans didn't break their will to fight, and bombing of the Japanese didn't break theirs. Even the atomic bombs alone may not have worked, there was also the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan. All the Russian artillery likely has done in destroying Ukrainian cities is to steel the resolve of the Ukrainians to further resist and turn said cities into fortresses should the Russians ever try to attack them with ground forces.

4) Russian army of now not same as in 2025 - this will be very interesting, because the thing is, Putin almost got deposed, so he will likely expect loyalty above all in his military leadership, above competence, so whether the environment will be one that allows for truly better command and control of their forces will be interesting

Without getting too deep into it, you have a number of misreads here. The most glaring is that the Soviets ( and now Russians) have a history of adapting from their mistakes. They have a habit of listening about their mistakes but not hearing (learning) from them ending up with a history of doing the same, old, thing. It is difficult to find a substantial difference between Soviet offensive operations in ‘41 and ‘42, the initial advance into Chechnya in 1994, and the opening advance in Kiev last year. Basically the Russians advance utilizing a flawed doctrine, get slapped around, and take a year or so to mass enough forces to force a primitive (meaning bloody) breakthrough. In WWII the Soviets did nothing tactically exceptional beyond waiting for lend lease (and the allied bombing campaign) to give them a material edge. I do agree that 2025 will be telling. Russia no longer has the manpower to solve tactical problems with human bullet absorbers but they do have a much larger human resource pool than the Ukrainians - so it comes to motivation. We’ll see what the conscription class of ‘25 brings us.

 

[Randy Daytona]

Without getting too deep into it, you have a number of misreads here. The most glaring is that the Soviets ( and now Russians) have a history of adapting from their mistakes. They have a habit of listening about their mistakes but not hearing (learning) from them ending up with a history of doing the same, old, thing. It is difficult to find a substantial difference between Soviet offensive operations in ‘41 and ‘42, the initial advance into Chechnya in 1994, and the opening advance in Kiev last year. Basically the Russians advance utilizing a flawed doctrine, get slapped around, and take a year or so to mass enough forces to force a primitive (meaning bloody) breakthrough. In WWII the Soviets did nothing tactically exceptional beyond waiting for lend lease (and the allied bombing campaign) to give them a material edge. I do agree that 2025 will be telling. Russia no longer has the manpower to solve tactical problems with human bullet absorbers but they do have a much larger human resource pool than the Ukrainians - so it comes to motivation. We’ll see what the conscription class of ‘25 brings us.

Griz, What is your impression of the Russians vs the Japanese in Manchuria, and also of General Zhukov?

 

[Griz882]

Griz, What is your impression of the Russians vs the Japanese in Manchuria, and also of General Zhukov?

Zhukov’s work in 1939 Manchukuo was a masterpiece of defense in depth - something the Russians excel at - to include his counter attack. He remained the master of defense when fighting the Germans, but his (and others) offensive work was more a matter of allied material supporting Soviet mass to create an “affordability of action.” In short, he was a skilled leader who understood the importance of supporting your logistics to support your front.

 

[Randy Daytona]

Zhukov’s work in 1939 Manchukuo was a masterpiece of defense in depth - something the Russians excel at - to include his counter attack. He remained the master of defense when fighting the Germans, but his (and others) offensive work was more a matter of allied material supporting Soviet mass to create an “affordability of action.” In short, he was a skilled leader who understood the importance of supporting your logistics to support your front.

In your opinion, how much did Japan’s bloody experience there convince Tokyo to decide on a naval option in 1941 vs a land centric expansion?

 

[Random8145]

Without getting too deep into it, you have a number of misreads here. The most glaring is that the Soviets ( and now Russians) have a history of adapting from their mistakes. They have a habit of listening about their mistakes but not hearing (learning) from them ending up with a history of doing the same, old, thing. It is difficult to find a substantial difference between Soviet offensive operations in ‘41 and ‘42, the initial advance into Chechnya in 1994, and the opening advance in Kiev last year.

I don't think that is really a fair comparison though. As I pointed out, the Soviets in 1941 had developed a doctrine but then Stalin shot the whole brain trust. As a result, those in charge didn't know what they were doing at the time. 1994 was after the Soviet system had collapsed and with Kiev last year, the Russian military had never really been rebuilt under Putin, because to advance in it under him, loyalty and corruption are valued, not competence.

Basically the Russians advance utilizing a flawed doctrine, get slapped around, and take a year or so to mass enough forces to force a primitive (meaning bloody) breakthrough. In WWII the Soviets did nothing tactically exceptional beyond waiting for lend lease (and the allied bombing campaign) to give them a material edge.

That is an old myth of how they fought in WWII, mostly perpetuated by the German generals after the war. The Soviets did not have the numbers to just blindly charge the Germans like that and in certain instances were even at a numerical disadvantage. One thing to remember is that when Germany invaded, it wasn't just Germany, it was German + Finnish + Italian + Hungarian + Romanian + Czechoslovakian troops, making up the German led Axis forces.

 

[Random8145]

Zhukov’s work in 1939 Manchukuo was a masterpiece of defense in depth - something the Russians excel at - to include his counter attack. He remained the master of defense when fighting the Germans, but his (and others) offensive work was more a matter of allied material supporting Soviet mass to create an “affordability of action.” In short, he was a skilled leader who understood the importance of supporting your logistics to support your front.

His (and others) offensive work was a lot more involved than just waiting for Allied material help. Really, the Soviets became masters at offensive warfare.

 

[Griz882]

I don't think that is really a fair comparison though. As I pointed out, the Soviets in 1941 had developed a doctrine but then Stalin shot the whole brain trust. As a result, those in charge don't know what they were doing at the time. 1994 was after the Soviet system had collapsed and with Kiev last year, the Russian military had never really been rebuilt under Putin, because to advance in it under him, loyalty and corruption are valued, not competence.

That is an old myth of how they fought in WWII, mostly perpetuated by the German generals after the war. The Soviets did not have the numbers to just blindly charge the Germans like that and in certain instances were even at a numerical disadvantage. One thing to remember is that when Germany invaded, it wasn't just Germany, it was German + Finnish + Italian + Hungarian + Romanian + Czechoslovakian troops, making up the German led Axis forces.

No, it is not an old myth. It is historical analysis. As an historian you are, of course, able to develop your own analysis. My take is initially based on the simple fact that the Soviets suffered 8.7 million military casualties against Germany’s (and her allies) 3.5 million (these numbers are Eastern Front only) and fortified by the simple fact that Russia was simply incapable of launching a strategic offensive until U.S. lend lease filled their factories with raw materials and their tanks with fuel.

 

[Griz882]

His (and others) offensive work was a lot more involved than just waiting for Allied material help.

In the defense, yes.

 

[Random8145]

No, it is not an old myth. It is historical analysis. As an historian you are, of course, able to develop your own analysis. My take is initially based on the simple fact that the Soviets suffered 8.7 million military casualties against Germany’s (and her allies) 3.5 million (these numbers are Eastern Front only) and fortified by the simple fact that Russia was simply incapable of launching a strategic offensive until U.S. lend lease filled their factories with raw materials and their tanks with fuel.

It's a myth, perpetuated by the Germans and also by the Soviets inadvertently after the war in their claiming that they never lost a battle to the Germans, which was of course a very obvious lie and made them a not very credible source on how they conducted the war. The Soviets did suffer greater casualties, yes, but that's because they had to relearn how to fight from scratch and then were fighting on the offense against the Germans who were by then fighting on the defense. And remember, German casualties alone are misleading. The proper comparison would be Soviet casualties versus Axis casualties.

And the Soviets were very capable of launching strategic offensives before Lend-Lease really kicked in. They did so in winter of 1941 and again in 1942. Their capabilities were greatly increased logistically thanks to Lend-Lease starting in 1943.

 

[jmcquate]

Russia was simply incapable of launching a strategic offensive until U.S. lend lease filled their factories with raw materials and their tanks with fuel.

Not to mention the role of British Intelligence reading the Germans' mail, and sharing certain parts with the Soviets. Operation Citadel comes to mind.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Not to mention the role of British Intelligence reading the Germans' mail, and sharing certain parts with the Soviets. Operation Citadel comes to mind.

not to mention boat loads of P-39's

 

[Griz882]

It's a myth, perpetuated by the Germans and also by the Soviets inadvertently after the war in their claiming that they never lost a battle to the Germans, which was of course a very obvious lie and made them a not very credible source on how they conducted the war. The Soviets did suffer greater casualties, yes, but that's because they had to relearn how to fight from scratch and then were fighting on the offense against the Germans who were by then fighting on the defense. And remember, German casualties alone are misleading. The proper comparison would be Soviet casualties versus Axis casualties.

And the Soviets were very capable of launching strategic offensives before Lend-Lease really kicked in. They did so in winter of 1941 and again in 1942. Their capabilities were greatly increased logistically thanks to Lend-Lease starting in 1943.

Again…NOT a myth. History is my job, I get paid to research and write history. I’ve presented this at conferences and it has been well received. Part of my work is to actually shine a light on the U.S Army creation of the “Super Soviet” myth to “scare” Congress into supporting modern weapons systems and a larger army. My historical analysis (free of any German input) is quite clear. The Soviets were the strategically inept and tactically bumbling part of the allied effort. Outside the realm of historical research I’ll posit that had the Soviets had limited manuever room, like in Korea, 1950’s, they would have still lost over 8 million soldiers but had limited, mostly meaningless, tactical gains. Put simply, flanking maneuvers are easy if you can afford the loss of several division to hold the shoulder of the pivot.

 

[nittany03]

Zhukov’s work in 1939 Manchukuo was a masterpiece of defense in depth - something the Russians excel at - to include his counter attack. He remained the master of defense when fighting the Germans, but his (and others) offensive work was more a matter of allied material supporting Soviet mass to create an “affordability of action.” In short, he was a skilled leader who understood the importance of supporting your logistics to support your front.

One difference I seem to be noticing in recent reporting is that they don't seem to be doing this recently. I seem to be reading that the Surovkin Line was set up for a defense in depth, but whoever is now calling the shots is insisting that they defend everything at the first line. ISW has been claiming that this has caused the Russians not to be able to develop any kind of reserve formations at the operational level, and they've had to play a shell game to move units to defend the Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Which makes me wonder whether if they do eventually break, they'll break big. But not being an Army/Marine Corps type, I don't know enough about how all the minefields, etc. would still hold up the Ukrainians.

 

[Griz882]

One difference I seem to be noticing in recent reporting is that they don't seem to be doing this recently. I seem to be reading that the Surovkin Line was set up for a defense in depth, but whoever is now calling the shots is insisting that they defend everything at the first line. ISW has been claiming that this has caused the Russians not to be able to develop any kind of reserve formations at the operational level, and they've had to play a shell game to move units to defend the Ukrainian counteroffensives.

Which makes me wonder whether if they do eventually break, they'll break big. But not being an Army/Marine Corps type, I don't know enough about how all the minefields, etc. would still hold up the Ukrainians.

This is a great question. Right now Russian minefields are working very well preventing any consolidated Ukrainian breakthroughs. But it is worth considering that if the Russians lack the reserves how badly will they collapse if the Ukrainian forces are able to break the rubberband?