Stunningly wrong at almost every level. You can’t seriously claim the Russians had any strategic plan beyond using up as many serfs as possible to absorb German bullets. FYI, lend lease to the Russians kicked in within 30 days of the German invasion and the U.S. war machine was in high gear in 1940 (you seem to not know that we activated our national guard and built basing for up to 100 combat divisions before mid-1941). The tanks we provided Russia were not that important…the POL, and other supply classes kept the Soviets alive from day one until the war ended - and by 1942 American air power allowed Russia to use their brunt’s strength against the Nazis. Basically I imagine you had a lot of neo-Marxist professors in college.
Well, where to begin.
For starters, you mentioned about all the tanks and trucks and so forth we sent the Soviets. I pointed out that that didn't kick in until really about 1943, not before Pearl Harbor. As I pointed out, the U.S. wasn't going to send any major hardware to the Soviets that it was believed would likely fall to the Germans, and two, the U.S. war machine was not yet producing major output of such things. Yes, to the degree that it could be, the U.S. war machine was in high gear as much as it could be by 1940 as the Germans overrunning France panicked the U.S. military and immediately a crash program was implemented to start producing massive numbers of war material (tanks and so forth). And yes Lend-Lease started in 1941, but it didn't kick into high gear until 1943. American air power and Soviet military power worked hand-in-hand. Yes, Allied air power helped the Soviets,
but Soviet military power and victories helped the Western Allies, A LOT.
Secondly, no I did not have Marxist professors in college for history and I did not get my knowledge of WWII from college. My knowledge of the Soviets and Germans in WWII, to a good degree, comes from historians such as David M. Glantz, who was a U.S. Army Colonel and pretty much
the authority on the history of WWII on the Eastern Front, about as far from a Marxist as you can get. Here is part of the description on the back of one of his books, "Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle:"
Soviet understanding of the nature and importance of operational art in peace and war has been a hallmark of Soviet warfighting, providing a framework for the operations of multimillion man armies, often compensating for tactical failure, and producing the ultimate prize in modern warfare, strategic victory. Soviet mastery of operational art produced a host of great captains and numerous massive strategic victories, which rendered meaningless Western perceptions of Soviet military ineptitude. Whether or not those perceptions were correct, the truth emerged that the Soviets, like the proverbial chessmasters which they often are, were also astute masters of the higher levels of warfare, the operational and strategic levels.
So yes, the Russians actually
DID have a strategic plan beyond throwing massive numbers of serfs at the Germans. The idea that the reason why the Germans lost to the Soviets was because of endless waves of Soviet zombie hordes of troops and tanks is a myth that was perpetuated by the German generals after the war because they didn't want to admit that they lost to those "untermenschen." Same as the Clean Wehrmacht myth and the Hitler-was-an-idiot myth. The myth was also to a degree perpetuated by the United States because it being the Cold War, we couldn't admit the Soviets had made a major contribution in terms of defeating the Germans.
Their main overarching strategy was to knock out German Army Group Center. However, they first knocked out Army Group South at Stalingrad in 1942 (well technically Army Group B as Hitler had split the army, but Army Group A then had to flee and barely got out). This was the first major Soviet victory over the Germans and a turning point of the war as it knocked the Germans onto the defensive. It also destroyed the best German army in the field, the Sixth Army. It was not due to brainlessly throwing waves at the Germans that they succeeded at Stalingrad, it was due to a great deal of tactical, operational, and strategic planning and thinking on their part and stupidity on the part of the Germans, who underestimated the Soviets because they were subhumans in their view, so clearly not up to the German standard of military skill, and two, the dude in charge of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, von Paulus, had never even commanded a division before.
On the waves myth, there is a kernel of truth to it, but you need to understand a few things:
1) After the war, the Germans were the sole source of historical knowledge for the most part on how things went down on the Eastern Front. It was obvious to the West that the Soviets were lying because they claimed they never lost a single battle. So the Germans seemed much more authoritative. There was also, due to a lot of historians and military people at the time in the West holding similar views about the peoples of the East as the Germans, a much greater willingness to believe the German side of the story.
2) After the Soviet Union broke apart, the archives in Russia were opened up and so historians got to go and see the actual documents of how the Soviets recorded things going down. Not surprisingly, they had themselves propagandized and lied. But so had the Germans. BIG TIME.
3) At the start of the invasion, Axis forces outnumbered Soviet forces. German forces alone did not, but it was German forces along with Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, etc...invading.
4) The Soviets never in the war possessed enough manpower to overwhelm the Germans with just pure numbers. The reason this myth gets perpetuated is because as the Germans started to lose big, their numbers declined, but two, the Soviets were HIGHLY-SKILLED at secretly maneuvering large armies right in front of the Germans without their knowing.
5) The Russians are who invented the concept of the operational level of war. This grew during the 19th and early 20th century as Russian generals realized that modern wars (at least as far as Russia would fight for its security) would entail industrialization and massive forces set on massive fronts.
6) You have to take into account what time period of the war you're talking about. During the initial parts of the invasion, yes, the Soviets, not having any idea what they were doing, began throwing waves at the Germans. This was from about 1941-1942. The Soviets really began learning, both from experience fighting the Germans and their own doctrines, through 1943. And through 1944-1945, they began royally kicking German butt due to operational and strategic mastery.
Admitting that America is all about air power, a common cultural picture as it is, yet I think up to mid-Vietnam the image of Army and Marine grunts was rather heroic in such books I've seen. In that fucking Soviet Union I've grown in, the enlisted soldier was always the main cast, and audense viewed him smiling, looking at fliers and (especially) sailors as kinda circus' acrobats and clowns. And that average soldier of WWII as image had Soviet-made gun but American Willys to drive, American tobacco to smoke, American can of beef to eat, and American Studebaker to put MLRS onto it (T-34 wasn't local Wunderwaffe in popular believes, but MRL Katyusha was) - all grunt lifestyle's toys associated with American (and not British, BTW - Brits were just forwarders) help.