Been swamped at work but wanted to get back to your question. Happened to see that Andrew Sullivan linked to that posting by Mike Mazarr. His take was on the Russian perspective that this could be an existential war to them. Noticed that Tom Nichols also posted the same exact article by Mazarr and expounded upon it here so this might be the analysis you want.
Got kind of curious after both of those mentioned Mr. Mazarr and found that he is a PhD at the Rand Corporation, formerly of the National War College so I reckon that is ok. Coincidentally, Mazarr also just had an article published today in Foreign Affairs. One part in particular caught my attention:
The second vulnerability of the postwar order is the growing influence of what can be termed the “hedging middle” in world politics—countries that prefer to avoid taking sides in the U.S.-Chinese and U.S.-Russian rivalries and therefore hesitate to enforce the norms of the order. These countries—including Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey—participate in and support many elements of the international system. They broadly support the order’s norms and typically respect them. Some of these countries are set to become major economic and military players. Yet if more of them come to see a Chinese-Russian axis as a useful counterweight to U.S. and Western dominance and therefore defect from U.S.-led institutions, the postwar order will be in deep trouble.
The United States should rethink its defense of the system
www.foreignaffairs.com
Some of the analysis that I have found to be interesting is that Tom Nichols puts this whole invasion on Putin, while Peter Zeihan says this is a historical Russian strategy. Whether the Tsars, the Soviets or now Putin, it is all the same based upon geography and why Zeihan thinks that Kiev is less important than Odessa and that the Russians will continue to push west into Moldova - and perhaps come into conflict with NATO first in Romania. Both guys make solid cases - your thoughts?
