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Greenland

I think you guys are kind of saying the same thing but just not agreeing on how the relationship is defined. Yes, there is realism and self-interest at the heart of it, but the level of cooperation and trust is effectively a different paradigm from what preceded Bretton-Woods. All of which is being eroded by the USA's current trajectory.
 
This gift article is a nice discussion. Opens with a story about how the Danes fought in Afghanistan by our side.


Denmark answered the call after the 9/11 attacks. It deployed thousands of soldiers to Afghanistan and Iraq, and it lost more soldiers, per capita, in Afghanistan than any NATO nation aside from the United States.

There is no more profound way to stand in solidarity with an ally.

“America has no permanent friends or enemies,” Henry Kissinger is often quoted as saying, “only interests.” That statement, championed by proponents of realpolitik, is true only if you emphasize the word “permanent.” Over the long sweep of time, allies can certainly become enemies, and enemies can become allies.

...The better expression, the one that accurately reflects the national interests of the United States, is that while any given friendship isn’t permanently guaranteed, our country has a permanent interest in maintaining international friendships and alliances. When we lose partners in alliances (much less the alliance itself) we are weaker and more vulnerable — no matter how much we try to bulk up our independent military and economic strength.

...I am writing about all this because the Trump administration may be on the verge of the most catastrophic national security mistake of my lifetime. It is attempting to bully Denmark into surrendering Greenland, its semiautonomous territory, to the United States.

We’re offering to buy it, but the offer is being made at gunpoint.

...The best description I’ve read of Trump’s flawed approach comes from Kori Schake, a senior fellow and director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Writing in Foreign Affairs last June, she noted that “since the end of World War II, American power has been rooted mostly in cooperation, not coercion.”
 
At the strategic philosophical level we could have chosen coercion as our primary mode of operation, but instead we chose cooperation and alliances. Other countries have made other choices. We've been winning for a long time, so I think we chose right.
Realism doesn't have to be paired with coercion.
 
I won't suggest they didn't, but I'm also going to say the Eastern flank countries are pulling their weight. As a percentage of GDP, Poland is spending nearly double the US the last time I checked. No one is laughing at the will to fight or the budgets in the Baltic nations.

With all that said, Europe is waking up and they are increasing spending. Also, those rotational forces are aided throughout the flank by the rest of Europe and even a rotational Canadian force - I know you might laugh at it - but the numbers are not insignificant.

I find it hard to believe the Army is stretched thin doing legitimate training exercises in a place that is reasonably likely that war could break out but you obviously would know better than I.

Edit: I see you talked about the numbers of the Army there and I get the strain, but it still doesn't address the issue that bases in Europe have, do, and will continue to provide strategically important basing locations for us to project power outside of Europe.
It’s hard to believe because most dont deal with the problem directly. Just an example of one of the many papers on the topic. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/its-still-more-expensive-to-rotate-military-forces-overseas-than-base-them-there/#:~:text=Assuming the United States maintains,Rationales and cost-benefit analysis

There is 1x total CTC in Eucom (the smallest one) that has to support all the forces in NATO and not just the rotational division. Not to mention we are ceding ranges to train Ukrainians across the NATO footprint and even home. More to that point the training conducted over there does not sustain long term readiness across the Army because of the loss of the investment in abysmal retention rates as compared to units permanently based there.

When we have to surge headquarters into place because the Northern sector can’t maintain command continuity (looking at you Germany) due to its ability to participate but not truly lead on its own continent that is absolutely worthy of criticism. Specifically when they spent all these years pushing back at criticism, and a reminder that everybody thought that war next door was going to be over in a few weeks (and nearly was). Wider Europe has had a longer than deserved time to wake up to a reality that has been bald faced in the open since 2014. Yes the Baltics have pulled their weight, but the Spanish/Italians/Germans etc are going to be the ones that have to do more than occasionally push a battalion of Dardos or Leos forward to assure and deter. The Ukrainians have a half million personnel to a front that is 1/3 the length of the problem. Thats why statements of some imagined 100k strong NATO Army are just ridiculous given the current commitment that is taxing them to the limits of their ability.

The Army wants to go to the EDRE+ model, which is really just “Reforger Redux” so we maintain the process of deploying to theatre and all the things necessary to do it. That means pushing a division out once every couple years, not an unending rotational force model.
 
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