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[RobLyman]

Don't get me wrong, as a former naval aviator I have far more instrument time than my counterparts, so I am not the typical Army pilot. BUT, I have to say, the Army doesn't turn around and RTB, they just push through, even when they should turn around. Unfortunately it ends in tragedy too often.

I have almost 70 hours of instrument time in the LUH simulator. The Army IE course is now taught in it. I am pretty sure the LUH is a better instrument aircraft than anything in the navy RW inventory.

The Army made it work at Rucker because it had to. After the AD/National Guard Apache war and retirement of the OH-58, the AD Army tossed the guard some old beaten up 60As and some LUHs. Contrary to some opinions, the guard didn't give the LUHs away. AD Army and Rucker took them. Some units, like ours, successfully fought that action. We still have four LUHs. The 58 was cheaper to operate, but the LUH is a much better counter drug platform.

It is NOT RUGGED! Coming from IPs at Rucker and FCPs at our unit (yeah, they're not MTPs in the LUH), airframes are cracking and equipment is breaking. It just wasn't designed for rugged day-in/day-out training. A show stopper? Not yet. We'll see in a few more years. As a QC supervisor, don't even get me started with how much a pain it is to maintain aircraft IAW the Army (60s and 47s) AND aircraft IAW civilian and foreign manufacturer standards.

I have yet to fly with another Army 60 pilot that can perform a practice auto to a 10-20' hover with less than 20 kts ground speed. This includes a lot of pilots who did get a chance to learn full autos in a TH-67 or OH-58. In my opinion, it's not so much the aircraft as it is the training. If you don't think its possible, you won't emphasize or optimize the training. In some cases, the IPs I fly with can't even fly a good auto. Their argument is always the same. "When will I ever lose both engines?" And then, at the simulator, about 1/3 of them will induce a duel engine overspeed and failure by hastily misdiagnosing a high side failure with significant collective applied.

LUH = GREAT instrument training platform and barely acceptable primary trainer. With appropriate training, the lack of practice full auto capabilities can be mitigated.

 

[Gatordev]

BUT, I have to say, the Army doesn't turn around and RTB, they just push through, even when they should turn around.

I'm not hear to argue your main points, but the quoted statement above isn't always true. I've commented on this before, but I've been working ops while a division of Army guys turned around when the field was...gasp...VFR, albeit marginal VFR (~1.1K and ~4 miles). We kept getting asked how were able to keep flying. Our answer: because it's VFR?

But otherwise, I hear what you're saying about the LUH being a good instrument trainer.

 

[phrogdriver]

According to that site it's already IFR certified. This seems like a slam dunk. It's single engine, so the maintenance cost will probably be manageable, it can do full autos, has TACAN, GPS/WAAS, full AFCS, and you can even get a hoist and cargo hook off the shelf. I hear it even flies and hovers like a tiny 60. Hell it even has a hover display.

No, it's not.

 

[phrogdriver]

OK what do you think of this proposal?

1. Eliminate Helo track intermediates in the T-6

2. Remanufacture current TH-57C's to a lower cost per flight hour "Helo Basic" - configiuration. Basically a lighter weight aircraft that will displace the current TH-57B fleet. I would do 40-50 aircraft in this configuration. Use this aircraft for a "Helo Basic" syllabus.

3. New "Advanced Helo" syllabus in either the Air Force TH-1H Huey II or the TH-72 Lakota - everything we do in the TH-57C part of the syllabus today.

Seems like we coudl save a little money this way and improve the syllabus - and improve the downstream product to the FRS. Avoids development of a new aircraft.

The remanufacture of airframes that old will cost you as much as new aircraft and get you something far less capable. If you really wanted a two-helicopter solution like there was 40 years ago, you'd be better off buying a new VFR helo for the low-end.

 

[ChuckMK23]

The remanufacture of airframes that old will cost you as much as new aircraft and get you something far less capable. If you really wanted a two-helicopter solution like there was 40 years ago, you'd be better off buying a new VFR helo for the low-end.

Actually agree. I think it’s OBE because whatever aircraft is selected will be COTS and sold to Navy on power by the hour basis - regardless of which of the three aircraft are chosen.

 

[phrogdriver]

Actually agree. I think it’s OBE because whatever aircraft is selected will be COTS and sold to Navy on power by the hour basis - regardless of which of the three aircraft are chosen.

Not so sure about the power by the hour basis. The O&M funds v. acquisition funds piece makes it pretty risky to go with a lease arrangement, if that's what you're getting at.

If you're talking about maintenance contracts, that's whole other thing.

 

[RobLyman]

I'm not hear to argue your main points, but the quoted statement above isn't always true. I've commented on this before, but I've been working ops while a division of Army guys turned around when the field was...gasp...VFR, albeit marginal VFR (~1.1K and ~4 miles). We kept getting asked how were able to keep flying. Our answer: because it's VFR?

But otherwise, I hear what you're saying about the LUH being a good instrument trainer.

Well, if you are talking leadership decisions vs individual pilot decisions, you may be right. As a briefing officer I am scrutinizing risk assessments on a daily basis. My experience is that most individual Army pilots will choose to accept and/or try to fly a mission that gets them in over their head when it comes to flying instruments.

 

[Gatordev]

Well, if you are talking leadership decisions vs individual pilot decisions, you may be right. As a briefing officer I am scrutinizing risk assessments on a daily basis. My experience is that most individual Army pilots will choose to accept and/or try to fly a mission that gets them in over their head when it comes to flying instruments.

Interestingly, they turned around so they wouldn't (potentially) get in over their head. One the pilots that was part of the ground support was telling me their SOP was very restrictive for that unit. He claimed it was because the pilots were all very junior, for whatever that's worth.

But you're correct, the overall decision seemed to come from pre-set instilled leadership protocols.

Still amusing to hear the AF Log guy ask us how we were able to take off with the weather (~1300/3 w/ haze) when we were going back to the boat. "Because it's VFR?"

 

[RobLyman]

Interestingly, they turned around so they wouldn't (potentially) get in over their head. One the pilots that was part of the ground support was telling me their SOP was very restrictive for that unit. He claimed it was because the pilots were all very junior, for whatever that's worth.

But you're correct, the overall decision seemed to come from pre-set instilled leadership protocols.

Still amusing to hear the AF Log guy ask us how we were able to take off with the weather (~1300/3 w/ haze) when we were going back to the boat. "Because it's VFR?"

Were the Army aircraft also going back to a boat? If so, many units have over water weather minimums greater than VFR. Ours is 1000/3, but our IPs stay current year round regardless of deployments, which is very rare for an Army unit.

The Army's mission approval process is tiered, with low risk missions signed off at a level as low as a company commander (O-3). As the weather and illumination decrease, and the nature of the mission increases with risk, the approval authority increases. In some cases, a commander at a lower level will elect NOT to pursue higher mission approval and cancel a mission. For a flight crew who is briefed for 1500/5 (why you would have that as an option on your risk assessment is another topic), they MUST cancel the mission unless they are re-briefed for the new conditions. We do this all of the time. We'll get briefed for 1000/3. Then if the weather gets bad, we get re-briefed for 700/2 so we can do hover work at the airfield SVFR, just to reset goggle currency. Not an optimal approach to goggle currency, but with M-day pilots, weather can wreck havoc with their goggle currency. </end tangent>
To tie in to the original topic, the Army LUH is NOT authorized to land on a ship. There's another potential, though unlikely issue for using it as a Navy trainer.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Not so sure about the power by the hour basis. The O&M funds v. acquisition funds piece makes it pretty risky to go with a lease arrangement, if that's what you're getting at.

If you're talking about maintenance contracts, that's whole other thing.

Lease.

In 2 recent forums on the matter - NHA and Navy League, the guys with stars on their shoulder boards said this program will be a “commercial approach” as have the respective potential vendors. I interpret that as a lease of some kind. Granted I’m not schooled in acquisition.

 

[Gatordev]

Were the Army aircraft also going back to a boat? If so, many units have over water weather minimums greater than VFR. Ours is 1000/3, but our IPs stay current year round regardless of deployments, which is very rare for an Army unit.

The Army's mission approval process is tiered, with low risk missions signed off at a level as low as a company commander (O-3). As the weather and illumination decrease, and the nature of the mission increases with risk, the approval authority increases. In some cases, a commander at a lower level will elect NOT to pursue higher mission approval and cancel a mission. For a flight crew who is briefed for 1500/5 (why you would have that as an option on your risk assessment is another topic), they MUST cancel the mission unless they are re-briefed for the new conditions. We do this all of the time. We'll get briefed for 1000/3. Then if the weather gets bad, we get re-briefed for 700/2 so we can do hover work at the airfield SVFR, just to reset goggle currency. Not an optimal approach to goggle currency, but with M-day pilots, weather can wreck havoc with their goggle currency. </end tangent>
To tie in to the original topic, the Army LUH is NOT authorized to land on a ship. There's another potential, though unlikely issue for using it as a Navy trainer.

Negative. The whole evolution was day time only, land base to land base. The one caveat was mountainous terrain, which may have been part of the issue, but that unit operates in mountainous terrain regularly.

 

[phrogdriver]

Lease.

In 2 recent forums on the matter - NHA and Navy League, the guys with stars on their shoulder boards said this program will be a “commercial approach” as have the respective potential vendors. I interpret that as a lease of some kind. Granted I’m not schooled in acquisition.

I think they were probably referring to the COTS aspect in general v. the purchasing method in particular.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Remember folks that the HT's are *ADVANCED* training. One of the biggest beefs in standard thinking I have is the exaggeration in the leap from the from T-6 (T-34 in my day) experienced SNA to Helo Advanced. SNA's coming to Helo advanced have the fundamentals of "power + attitude = performance" in both contact and instrument flight mastered. Historically the HT's have not recognized that and had a "learn to fly all over again, because its different" mindset.

So leverage the experience our pipeline students come to us with from the T-6 and build on that in our new dual engine trainer. SNA's need early introduction pre-FRS to a aircraft with redundant systems. The basic stick wiggling skills are already there. The Air Force has long since recognized this and this mindset is incorporated into their Helo Advanced in the TH-1H syllabus up at Ft Rucker.

There is zero need to push a student through 17 contact FAM's, Another 12 contact Trans Fams and basic (non form) HTACs, etc.

The ChuckMK23 syllabus would go something like this:

• OFT and aircraft based day contact phase (5 OFT's and 10 FAMs to master the aircraft)
• Night contact and intro to NVG (2 OFT and 5 aircraft flights)
• BI/RI combined OFT
• BI/RI combined aircraft flights (30% night)
• Day and night HTAC (Form, SAR, external load, terrain, CALS, etc)

Then SNA's go off to CNATRA maintained dets in Mayport and Norfolk for Day DLQ's (everyone - regardless of service affiliation) on locally available fleet assets - single spot. SNA's learn fundamentals of overwater NAV and shipboard flight including shipboard instrument approaches. Goal is a basic understanding of the Ship / aircraft interface.

Maybe AirNav's after this.

Wings.

Goal is 100 hours in aircraft - another 75 in OFT.

So I fixed Navy advanced helo training. You're welcome Admiral Harris!

I'd fix Army IERW course by introducing 20+ hours of basic fixed wing training (contact and intrument) in a C172 or Diamond DA-40 before entering the UH-72. To Gen. Gayler, you're welcome as well.

 

[Griz882]

Remember folks that the HT's are *ADVANCED* training. One of the biggest beefs in standard thinking I have is the exaggeration in the leap from the from T-6 (T-34 in my day) experienced SNA to Helo Advanced. SNA's coming to Helo advanced have the fundamentals of "power + attitude = performance" in both contact and instrument flight mastered. Historically the HT's have not recognized that and had a "learn to fly all over again, because its different" mindset.

So leverage the experience our pipeline students come to us with from the T-6 and build on that in our new dual engine trainer. SNA's need early introduction pre-FRS to a aircraft with redundant systems. The basic stick wiggling skills are already there. The Air Force has long since recognized this and this mindset is incorporated into their Helo Advanced in the TH-1H syllabus up at Ft Rucker.

There is zero need to push a student through 17 contact FAM's, Another 12 contact Trans Fams and basic (non form) HTACs, etc.

The ChuckMK23 syllabus would go something like this:

• OFT and aircraft based day contact phase (5 OFT's and 10 FAMs to master the aircraft)
• Night contact and intro to NVG (2 OFT and 5 aircraft flights)
• BI/RI combined OFT
• BI/RI combined aircraft flights (30% night)
• Day and night HTAC (Form, SAR, external load, terrain, CALS, etc)

Then SNA's go off to CNATRA maintained dets in Mayport and Norfolk for Day DLQ's (everyone - regardless of service affiliation) on locally available fleet assets - single spot. SNA's learn fundamentals of overwater NAV and shipboard flight including shipboard instrument approaches. Goal is a basic understanding of the Ship / aircraft interface.

Maybe AirNav's after this.

Wings.

Goal is 100 hours in aircraft - another 75 in OFT.

So I fixed Navy advanced helo training. You're welcome Admiral Harris!

I'd fix Army IERW course by introducing 20+ hours of basic fixed wing training (contact and intrument) in a C172 or Diamond DA-40 before entering the UH-72. To Gen. Gayler, you're welcome as well.

Good work Admiral Chuck!

 

[Gatordev]

There is zero need to push a student through 17 contact FAM's, Another 12 contact Trans Fams and basic (non form) HTACs, etc.

The ChuckMK23 syllabus would go something like this:

• OFT and aircraft based day contact phase (5 OFT's and 10 FAMs to master the aircraft)

I'm not hear to argue for or against 10 FAMs (or 8 or 12) for HTs. I don't have the experience with the studs there, but whatever that number is, if it's not in a -60, they're still going to need the already existing amount of time in the -60 syllabus (or at least on the R side. Subtract a flight, maybe 2 for Sierra). So your syllabus, while certainly containing value, doesn't necessarily shorten anything on the backside at the RAG.

• Day and night HTAC (Form, SAR, external load, terrain, CALS, etc)

I've never really understood the point of the SAR flight in the HTs. It introduced the 30 second pattern, but beyond that, none of it really seemed to matter to me until I got to the RAG. I'm not saying it should necessarily be removed from your syllabus. It's at least pushing some buttons in a box. Unfortunately it's a much more advanced box than what they'll get in the fleet.

Then SNA's go off to CNATRA maintained dets in Mayport and Norfolk for Day DLQ's (everyone - regardless of service affiliation) on locally available fleet assets - single spot.

No. The fleet can't get enough deck time now. So now a nice to have is going to take even more time away from the fleet? Studs do fine with no boat time now until the RAG.