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Leaving Vietnam vs AFG

Random8145

Registered User
Contributor
Is this an accurate work of history? Knowing what I know of military history, I have learned that you have to be very careful of memoirs by veterans of wars as they can be horrendously inaccurate.
 

Jim123

DD-214 in hand and I'm gonna party like it's 1998
pilot
Sometimes, winning ≈ other side gives up until later, or resistance gets driven underground until such time as it's strong enough to be direct again.

Finality isn't always a sure thing.

Insurgencies (underground resistance) survive and succeed by being externally fueled, logistically (and financially, concrete moral support, and practically). Without that external support, they wither away by becoming illegal, criminal activities (criminal under whatever regime is presently in power).
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
One of them did. Not to recycle what has already been covered, but this was always going to be the outcome, though it’s increasingly clear that the execution of the withdrawal was horribly botched.
Okay. So back to the original point: how is drawing the conclusion that it's "Bush's fault" when the war was initiated with widespread popular support and spanned 4 Presidential administrations useful for historical analysis or determining the path forward?
 

Brett327

Well-Known Member
None
Super Moderator
Contributor
Okay. So back to the original point: how is drawing the conclusion that it's "Bush's fault" when the war was initiated with widespread popular support and spanned 4 Presidential administrations useful for historical analysis or determining the path forward?
You should reread the thread.
 

taxi1

Well-Known Member
pilot
Sometimes, winning ≈ other side gives up until later, or resistance gets driven underground until such time as it's strong enough to be direct again.

Finality isn't always a sure thing.

Insurgencies (underground resistance) survive and succeed by being externally fueled, logistically (and financially, concrete moral support, and practically). Without that external support, they wither away by becoming illegal, criminal activities (criminal under whatever regime is presently in power).
Yup. In the same way that 9/11 was pretty much a Saudi operation, the Taliban has been more so a Pak op.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
I am still learning about the Vietnam War so my history is sketchy, but was Vietnam really the unwinnable war it was made out to be? My (limited) understanding of it is that the U.S. military was heavily hamstrung in its actions due to how Washington was micromanaging the whole affair. For example, instead of just going all-out and bombing the hell out of the Northern forces and their supply lines...
The first question... debatable.

To the second point, kind of a fusion of two things. First, Gen Westmorland was forbidden to launch large-scale operations into Laos, Cambodia, and China to cripple the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Cong's bases of operations, which pretty much meant that he was never able to take the fight to the enemy with the exception of some black ops. The elected officials in Washington didn't want to expand the war. When you're playing defense the entire time, the best you can hope for is a tie.

Second, a bombing campaign is effective to cripple industrial centers and supply lines for mechanized armies like Germany in WWII. It is marginally effective against disbursed, decentralized forces like the Viet Cong, especially given the collateral damage in a war where the U.S. is trying to convince the locals that it's the 'good guys.'

The comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam end with the fact that an unfavorable government is going to have control of the nation when we leave after decades of presence. The details of why we are having difficulty achieving the military and political objectives are different.
 

Random8145

Registered User
Contributor
The first question... debatable.

To the second point, kind of a fusion of two things. First, Gen Westmorland was forbidden to launch large-scale operations into Laos, Cambodia, and China to cripple the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Cong's bases of operations, which pretty much meant that he was never able to take the fight to the enemy with the exception of some black ops. The elected officials in Washington didn't want to expand the war. When you're playing defense the entire time, the best you can hope for is a tie.

Second, a bombing campaign is effective to cripple industrial centers and supply lines for mechanized armies like Germany in WWII. It is marginally effective against disbursed, decentralized forces like the Viet Cong, especially given the collateral damage in a war where the U.S. is trying to convince the locals that it's the 'good guys.'

The comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam end with the fact that an unfavorable government is going to have control of the nation when we leave after decades of presence. The details of why we are having difficulty achieving the military and political objectives are different.

So one question and one nitpick:

The nitpick: Germany in WWII was not really a mechanized army, it was mostly horse-drawn actually, although I get your point in that it was a conventional-style military force nonetheless.

The question: I get that the Vietcong were decentralized in how they fought, but their supply lines were still centralized right, so if you could take out those, then you could still cripple the guerilla forces.
 

Pags

N/A
pilot
So one question and one nitpick:

The nitpick: Germany in WWII was not really a mechanized army, it was mostly horse-drawn actually, although I get your point in that it was a conventional-style military force nonetheless.

The question: I get that the Vietcong were decentralized in how they fought, but their supply lines were still centralized right, so if you could take out those, then you could still cripple the guerilla forces.
You're picking the wrong nit. Germany was heavily industrialized in that they had large factories that could be targeted. They also had supply lines that were more vulnerable to bombing, eg trains and convoys. NV had no real industry of their own and their supply lines were foot paths in the jungle. The US tried to make "land sonobuoys" to detect traffic on the ho chi Minh trail and then also deforested the jungle to try and find and attack the supply lines.

I struggle to think of a politically viable way the US could have won Vietnam beyond playing the long game and increasing the prosperity of Vietnam so then the people want capitalism.
 

Spekkio

He bowls overhand.
So one question and one nitpick:

The nitpick: Germany in WWII was not really a mechanized army, it was mostly horse-drawn actually, although I get your point in that it was a conventional-style military force nonetheless.

The question: I get that the Vietcong were decentralized in how they fought, but their supply lines were still centralized right, so if you could take out those, then you could still cripple the guerilla forces.
The German army had tanks and was supported by aircraft. It was supplied by motor vehicles and trains. That makes it mechanized. When you bomb these things, they take a substantial amount of time and resources to replace, diminishing the ability for the Army to replace weapons of war and fight on the front lines. The same raw materials that are used to make a railway also make Panzers.

The Viet Cong had rudimentary bases made from wood, bamboo, and shrubbery that could be rebuilt rapidly and cheaply, and in many cases moved under ground. They were decentralized in that they had no industrial centers producing weapons - those all came from Russia.
 

Hotdogs

I don’t care if I hurt your feelings
pilot
Insurgencies (underground resistance) survive and succeed by being externally fueled, logistically (and financially, concrete moral support, and practically). Without that external support, they wither away by becoming illegal, criminal activities (criminal under whatever regime is presently in power).

Jim, little bit of nitpicking here but if you study insurgencies and guerrilla warfare - Its quite often the opposite. Che Guevara learned this the hard way in Bolivia. These types of movements usually only survive with significant support from the local civilian populace. Not to discount your point because I am sure external players (Pakistan) played a large role as well. The apathy in some parts of the Afghan populace probably contributed to the precipitous fall of multiple provinces.
 

Pags

N/A
pilot
Per the fact sheet, CDRUSTRANSCOM controls the contracted aircraft only - not the personnel.
Per the same fact sheet:
"Aircraft committed must be U.S.-registered and carriers must commit and maintain at least four complete crews for each aircraft."

"The air carriers continue to operate and maintain the aircraft with their resources; however, AMC controls the aircraft missions."

In short, airline pilots are flying the airline planes. AMC provides the tasking.
 
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