Is this an accurate work of history? Knowing what I know of military history, I have learned that you have to be very careful of memoirs by veterans of wars as they can be horrendously inaccurate.
Okay. So back to the original point: how is drawing the conclusion that it's "Bush's fault" when the war was initiated with widespread popular support and spanned 4 Presidential administrations useful for historical analysis or determining the path forward?One of them did. Not to recycle what has already been covered, but this was always going to be the outcome, though it’s increasingly clear that the execution of the withdrawal was horribly botched.
You should reread the thread.Okay. So back to the original point: how is drawing the conclusion that it's "Bush's fault" when the war was initiated with widespread popular support and spanned 4 Presidential administrations useful for historical analysis or determining the path forward?
Yup. In the same way that 9/11 was pretty much a Saudi operation, the Taliban has been more so a Pak op.Sometimes, winning ≈ other side gives up until later, or resistance gets driven underground until such time as it's strong enough to be direct again.
Finality isn't always a sure thing.
Insurgencies (underground resistance) survive and succeed by being externally fueled, logistically (and financially, concrete moral support, and practically). Without that external support, they wither away by becoming illegal, criminal activities (criminal under whatever regime is presently in power).
The first question... debatable.I am still learning about the Vietnam War so my history is sketchy, but was Vietnam really the unwinnable war it was made out to be? My (limited) understanding of it is that the U.S. military was heavily hamstrung in its actions due to how Washington was micromanaging the whole affair. For example, instead of just going all-out and bombing the hell out of the Northern forces and their supply lines...
The first question... debatable.
To the second point, kind of a fusion of two things. First, Gen Westmorland was forbidden to launch large-scale operations into Laos, Cambodia, and China to cripple the Ho Chi Minh trail and the Viet Cong's bases of operations, which pretty much meant that he was never able to take the fight to the enemy with the exception of some black ops. The elected officials in Washington didn't want to expand the war. When you're playing defense the entire time, the best you can hope for is a tie.
Second, a bombing campaign is effective to cripple industrial centers and supply lines for mechanized armies like Germany in WWII. It is marginally effective against disbursed, decentralized forces like the Viet Cong, especially given the collateral damage in a war where the U.S. is trying to convince the locals that it's the 'good guys.'
The comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam end with the fact that an unfavorable government is going to have control of the nation when we leave after decades of presence. The details of why we are having difficulty achieving the military and political objectives are different.
You're picking the wrong nit. Germany was heavily industrialized in that they had large factories that could be targeted. They also had supply lines that were more vulnerable to bombing, eg trains and convoys. NV had no real industry of their own and their supply lines were foot paths in the jungle. The US tried to make "land sonobuoys" to detect traffic on the ho chi Minh trail and then also deforested the jungle to try and find and attack the supply lines.So one question and one nitpick:
The nitpick: Germany in WWII was not really a mechanized army, it was mostly horse-drawn actually, although I get your point in that it was a conventional-style military force nonetheless.
The question: I get that the Vietcong were decentralized in how they fought, but their supply lines were still centralized right, so if you could take out those, then you could still cripple the guerilla forces.
The German army had tanks and was supported by aircraft. It was supplied by motor vehicles and trains. That makes it mechanized. When you bomb these things, they take a substantial amount of time and resources to replace, diminishing the ability for the Army to replace weapons of war and fight on the front lines. The same raw materials that are used to make a railway also make Panzers.So one question and one nitpick:
The nitpick: Germany in WWII was not really a mechanized army, it was mostly horse-drawn actually, although I get your point in that it was a conventional-style military force nonetheless.
The question: I get that the Vietcong were decentralized in how they fought, but their supply lines were still centralized right, so if you could take out those, then you could still cripple the guerilla forces.
@HAL Pilot are you packing?
They’re not going to AfghanistanImagine being, say, an AF Heavy bubba who just bailed to go to the show and now the show is taking you back to Afghanistan.
Insurgencies (underground resistance) survive and succeed by being externally fueled, logistically (and financially, concrete moral support, and practically). Without that external support, they wither away by becoming illegal, criminal activities (criminal under whatever regime is presently in power).
Per the same fact sheet:Per the fact sheet, CDRUSTRANSCOM controls the contracted aircraft only - not the personnel.Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a unique and significant part of the nation's air mobility resources. Selected aircraft contractually committed to CRAF, augment Department of Defense airlift requirementswww.af.mil