To get this thread back on track....three nights....(they're always at night...)
NIGHT 1: We were underway for two weeks and were doing DLQs behind a USNS because we could. I was a brand new HAC with maybe 20hrs of AC time. After an interesting set of bounces that included the 2P turning SAS off on final and taking his hands off the controls at about 100', I then hotseated the 2Ps. With CP #2, we started bouncing. #2 almost put us in the nets on the first bounce. On about the 3rd or 4th landing we started having trouble picking up our closure close in. After two rough approaches followed by two SCARY CLOSE wave offs, I decided to take a pass and give the new guy a breather. I rolled onto final and started getting vertigo right off the bat. The ship's lights were playing off the water in such a way that it made me feel like I low and fast. I kept pulling the nose back and then cross checking the gauges and realizing I was high and slow. I'd correct, and then look outside and do it all over again. I went to all instruments and told the CP to call out airpseed and altitude. It was the first time I had ever had vertigo and I was pretty sure my CP had it too. That approach felt like it took every ounce of concentration I had. Once on deck, I called for chocks and chains and said we'd had enough. My crewchief said "if you weren't going to call it, I was!" That night taught me a lot about spatial D, CRM, and knowing when enough is enough.
NIGHT 2: It was a standard CAG fish bowl night with no real visible horizon. We had just finished up a two ship day into night gunex off of Bahrain. I called for the re-join to bring us home. During the join up I made a right hand turn for Bahrain. After rolling out of the turn, I asked the aircrew where -2 was. As they said "standby" I looked to my 3 just in time to see a dark shape close by. I followed -2 as they completed their overrun right over my greenhouse with a few feet of seperation. After a second, I called them and asked if they were OK. They responded with "we're gonna take it home as a single." Turns out the CP of -2 was having trouble picking up closure so was trying to use the A/A TACAN DME. The CP had become fixated on the DME. By the time the CP looked up, -2 was in close so the CP tried to turn inside of use, but it wasn't going to happen. At that point -2's HAC pulled to the stops and cleared us by a few feet. Of course, my crew didn't know this until the debrief. We flew home wondering what the hell had just happened. It wasn't until after we sat down and heard -2's story that we got scared. Learned a lot about while you don't have to call your turns as lead and it's wings job to maintain seperation, it sure doesn't hurt to make that 2sec radio call that we even have a standard form for. I also learned that you need to brief it to death. Nothing, not even the joinup, is too small to brief in detail.
NIGHT 3: We were out doing a simulated HVBSS to Ches Light which is a light tower 30mi east of Norfolk. A storm had just passed and we were flying east, looking into the darkness that was the back of the storm. During the insert, -2 (whose HAC was my one of close friends) had ended up 180 deg out of his briefed position. So they went to do a pedal turn to flip the bird around. From the other bird I watched them start to turn, wobble, descend, and then start to slide. During the descent they keyed the mike and we heard one click from them. My thoughts went from "I guess they're turning to get positioned per the brief" to "are they going to land on the tower? we didn't brief that" to "are they going to land because of an EP?" to "what the hell are they doing" as they slid and continued to turn in between my a/c and the tower. As we pulled back to get out of their way, I continued to think "shit, they're going to hit the tower" and "fuck, they're going to put it in the water" I was getting ready to key the mic and transmit the mayday to giantkiller and order my AWs to dress out when they recovered. Turns out during the pedal turn they had lost sight of the tower and had no visual cues.