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USN Showdown between Super Hornet and F-35
- Thread starter ChuckMK23
- Start date
In short, it doesn't sound like it. The whole premise is based off of expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and LOCE. CMC wants to make short-lived multifunctional bases that support naval surface forces then collapse and move with in a 48-72 hour or less period. I've seen a few different COAs on this subject, and I'm skeptical we've seen the final version. I wouldn't take this as a solid product by any stretch of the imagination. Some of these concepts are based on R&D and acquisitions, and we're all aware of how that can be a total goat-rope. I think it's big risk, and may make us relevant in a very very unlikely conflict with the PLAN, but will also diminish are ability to react to more likely scenarios in various GCCs. Several commenters in the WSJ highlighted these issues.
Is this all HIMARS? Sounds like a great way to transition old-school artillery into the future fight.
Good question - maybe the new Precision Strike Missile. Perhaps some of the guys with arty backgrounds can chime in.
Lockheed Martin Conducts Second Flight Test of Precision Strike Missile
The test marks the second successful one for Lockheed’s PRsM.
thediplomat.com
U.S. Army Is Bringing Back Land-Based Missiles With A Vengeance In A Post-INF World
The Army is developing new long-range land-based missiles to give ground forces more means to strike distant targets and to target enemy missile batteries so that more air power can come into play. The death of the INF treaty takes the shackles off the effort.
www.forbes.com
Don't think they want a replacement for the M1A1.
However, upon further research apparently TOW is getting outfitted on LAV-25s, although historically LAR is "not employed the same way as infantry or mechanized infantry."
Max the Mad Russian
Hands off Ukraine! Feet too
Gents,
Why Marines neglect Army Stryker family? Due to the fact it's Army? Here in Russia now the epic battle for wheeled tanks is unfolding. The average MBT is expensive and simultaneously expendable as the Ukranian conflict shows. Wheeled machine will probably be cheaper. They are looking for Japanese Type 16 and US gunned Stryker as examples: 50 mph highway cruise speed , air mobility (by Il-76 and An-12), no amphib, low pressured gun of 100-120 mm, armour against 14.5-mm bullets, active protection and so on.
Why Marines neglect Army Stryker family? Due to the fact it's Army? Here in Russia now the epic battle for wheeled tanks is unfolding. The average MBT is expensive and simultaneously expendable as the Ukranian conflict shows. Wheeled machine will probably be cheaper. They are looking for Japanese Type 16 and US gunned Stryker as examples: 50 mph highway cruise speed , air mobility (by Il-76 and An-12), no amphib, low pressured gun of 100-120 mm, armour against 14.5-mm bullets, active protection and so on.
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From the Commandant: Force Design 2030
A few notes:
The most logical way to approach divestment is to take a systems perspective and reduce infantry battalions while proportionally reducing the organizations dedicated to supporting these battalions – direct support artillery, ground mobility assets, assault support aviation, light attack aviation, and combat service support capabilities whose capacity is similarly related to the size of the ground and air combat elements to be supported.
FINDINGS IN WHICH I HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE
A few notes:
The most logical way to approach divestment is to take a systems perspective and reduce infantry battalions while proportionally reducing the organizations dedicated to supporting these battalions – direct support artillery, ground mobility assets, assault support aviation, light attack aviation, and combat service support capabilities whose capacity is similarly related to the size of the ground and air combat elements to be supported.
FINDINGS IN WHICH I HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE
- Divestment of three infantry battalions
- Investment in additional rocket artillery batteries
- Divestment of tanks
- Divestment of three heavy helicopter squadrons
- Divestment of three medium-lift tiltrotor squadrons
- Divestment of at least two light attack helicopter squadrons
- Investment in additional Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
- Divestment of 2 AA companies and reduction of AAV and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) requirements
I guess there are some nerds who are going to be happy.
FWIW there is a SUAS COE stood up in 29 Palms at MAGTFTC.
I just did the FEA for their version of a WTI course.
Really good article in Proceedings about how to change the ARG/MEU.
Reimagine the ARG/MEU Team
Elevating aviation assets, simplifying command relationships, and narrowing mission focus will keep amphibious operations relevant.
A number of interesting proposals such as decreasing the number of LCU's and instead adding Mark VI patrol craft.
Reimagine the ARG/MEU Team
Elevating aviation assets, simplifying command relationships, and narrowing mission focus will keep amphibious operations relevant.
Max the Mad Russian
Hands off Ukraine! Feet too
Thanks. There should be CSG-alike CAG, as I thought long before
BTW, it's interesting to compare this article with the elder one in which the first notion of the words Hybrid Warfare took place
I'm confused as to how the ACE Commander would transform into a CAG while embarked and then back into the ACE Commander when not embarked.Really good article in Proceedings about how to change the ARG/MEU.
Reimagine the ARG/MEU Team
Elevating aviation assets, simplifying command relationships, and narrowing mission focus will keep amphibious operations relevant.
A number of interesting proposals such as decreasing the number of LCU's and instead adding Mark VI patrol craft.
Reimagine the ARG/MEU Team
Elevating aviation assets, simplifying command relationships, and narrowing mission focus will keep amphibious operations relevant.www.usni.org
Isn't the ACE commander the VMM Skipper currently?
It sounds like a design to move the HSC Det within a "LAG" (my new made up title, you saw it here first) and away from them belonging to the ship. The ARG command structure makes sense for a landing force.
I get the part about integrating the HSC Det and adding a HSM Det (thought there already was one?), but he talks about having an O6 CAG (or LAG, to "elevate" the dets embarked) when the ACE Commander is currently the VMM Skipper. I don't know if they'd just spot promote the VMM skipper or . . .?
Edit:
Just noticed one of the citations is Foxtrot Alpha . . .
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Yeah, I'm not sure the solution to the ARG mixup is another O6.
There's a good rationale behind the dual command construct back to the Pacific War. It does get different if the ARG isn't being amphibious. But then why bother dragging around a bunch of L class ships with an ACE that doesn't have a blue water mission? If you're going to use the LHD as a CVL then just embark a few squadrons of F-35s and put the MAG in charge. Sure it leaves HSC guys out in the cold but not sure what they'd be doing other than starboard D, day VFR suicide missions non-withstanding.
Quick thoughts:
-Purpose of a MEU is not built around strike aircraft.
-The ACE can supplement fleet OCA/DCA and joint air interdiction, but can come at the cost of supporting the CLF depending on the phase of a given operation. Concurrent operations would not be desirable. Command relationships play a big role here. Afloat or en route this is easy, but once we have forces ashore things become trickier. Marines need to get used to not having complete air or naval supremacy in the next big war. Guadalcanal has been brought up numerous times in the last year. This is informing our force structure redesign right now.
-Any change of the ACE or it’s aircraft will effect the mobility and lift of the Marines and their equipment onboard. I.e. It’s not a zero sum game with aircraft. You lose capability more than you do just the footprint of an aircraft.
-Current VMM (REIN), LHAs, and LHDs do not have the capability for 20-24 hour operations like a CVN. We don’t have the manpower, space, magazines, C2, and sustainment onboard to do that. It would require changes to the TO/E of the embarked squadron and Ships Air Ops department. Again, which come at a cost of trading something else out the MEU. This also plays into the design of a LHD/A vs a CVN. A CVN is built for aviation operations. A LHD/A is built for landing operations to include all of the below deck space for moving equipment and personnel. It would require a lot to make this happen.
-Concur, another 0-6 is a horrible idea. The fact the Navy has 3-4 0-6s in a standard PHIBRON right now is absurd. The surface Navy and probably to an extant the aviation side need to focus and evaluate where they place officers for career development. One of the biggest gripes of Marine Officers is the quality of junior Navy Officers in the L-Class fleet. Not sure if that’s a trend everywhere, and I understand there a vast cultural differences but it is a consistent friction area. The amount of “give-a-shit” is a pretty wide gap between the blue and green side. We’re not perfect by any means either.