SOAR

[taxi1]

I think Flash's point is that while the basic principles do hold what this will look for an AFSOC pilot is an initial qual of X hrs (with class and sim time) followed by a recurring prof requirement for X water landings every Y days.

I just don't think it is that hard. What is the currency requirement for landing the ski-equipped C-130s? They don't even have an analogy to a freshwater lake to practice on, they have to go all the way to Greenland for a training site. You could give the mission to the guard unit that does ski flying, they could own the oddball C-130 with alternatives to wheels mission set.

‘Old-school’ training gets aircrews qualified for LC-130 Arctic, Antarctic ops on JSTOR

Jason Sherman, ‘Old-school’ training gets aircrews qualified for LC-130 Arctic, Antarctic ops, Inside the Air Force, Vol. 28, No. 31 (August 4, 2017), pp. 7-9

www.jstor.org

And to you EAB proposal...how do you get the stuff off of the airplane when it's on floats? Don't say crane or beach party because then I'm going to ask what's the point if I need all this crap there ahead of time to make it work.

Inflatable causeway made from dropstitched materials. Already being developed. Or floating pallets. Or any number of other methods that clever engineers can think of.

You guys sure want it to not work.

 

[nittany03]

You could give the mission to the guard unit that does ski flying, they could own the oddball C-130 with alternatives to wheels mission set.

Balancing support to Antarctic science operations with completely unrelated INDOPACOM operational tasking using drilling reservists? That sounds like the OPSO job from hell.

 

[Jim123]

You keep saying this and keep promoting the notion that AFSOC "outflies" USN/USMC and I don't think you're being very objective in your analysis. AFSOC acquires and flies aircraft that meet their unique mission requirements.

The Marines self-certify as MEU(SOC). They did pick up O'Grady, albeit 25 years ago, but they still want to do those missions. I haven't heard the cliché "America's 911 force" but that kind of thinking (forward-deployed expeditionary task forces standing by at the ready) is still alive and going strong, right? R2P2 and six hours from order to execution.

I agree that AFSOC is unique, just pointing out that the Marines have a claim to a lot of the same requirements.

Balancing support to Antarctic science operations with completely unrelated INDOPACOM operational tasking using drilling reservists? That sounds like the OPSO job from hell.

I cringe a bit too but I've always been envious of the cargo handlers* when they do Deep Freeze when we were processing their orders and paying their travel claims. I mean how else is an average fella supposed to set foot on the seventh continent?



* said no one, ever

 

[scoolbubba]

Because it’s true. The marines came in and crashed a V-22 on a casevac mission creating more injuries because of poor airmanship. Think that was in Yemen? Training matters. The reason that the navy doesn’t do csar well is because the guy in the right seat of lead is playing five different roles as opposed to actually playing a single role in a large training event.

The 160th left half of an, ahem...very interesting...helo in OBLs backyard.

Drawing conclusions from an anecdotal combat loss doesn't prove much about the training or orthodoxy of one service over another.

Could the navy do CSAR? Yea, easy peezy. We've done a bunch in the past.

Is the juice worth the squeeze? Someone with stars and budgetary power decided no...so for all intents and purposes, it won't happen. Til it does when a different star thinks it's a good idea.

 

[taxi1]

Balancing support to Antarctic science operations with completely unrelated INDOPACOM operational tasking using drilling reservists? That sounds like the OPSO job from hell.

They (109th Air Wing) do provide your standard C-130 aero-trundling via some plain old wheeled birds along with the ski birds.

 

[Griz882]

With reference to the comments offered by @Flash and others I think the frustration is that right now the navy appears to be stuck in a post-modern version of Wood & Sails vs Steal & Steam. Except now it is "We'll stick with what we know because it gets us promoted." vs "We'll accept experimentation and readaptation to become a more relevent and flexible force."

People keep asking "why?" when it comes to this idea...well one good answer is that a C-130 has twice the range and greater cruise speed than a V-22 without the risk of dragging a refuler along on a mission. Saving a single pilot or even an aircrew of two guys is low-rent, small war stuff. What happens when the Chinese sink a carrier LHD, or even a cruiser? History notes that in sea battle like Leyte Gulf a large number of survivors (from Taffy 3) were not rescued for several days, and died unnecessarily as a consequence, because ships were too slow in crossing vast distances. On the other hand, most survivors from that battle were rescused by flying boats. BLUF...even confined areas of the Pacific are vast in scale.

But, back to the question...let's go small. Say the USS Bunker Hill (CG-52) goes down after having lost 75 crew trying to save the ship after a CHYCAP strike. That leaves about 260 sailors in the water. How are they rescued before the Pacific gobbles them up? I promise you we will not disengage a carrier (probably out looking to smash a few CHYCAP ships) from an operation. That same carrier (maybe short a cruiser in her defense package) will need the rest of her screen for protection. Now what? Will we have the USNS Kanawha dash over at a whole 20 knots? We could use an entire MV-22 complement off a ship like the Wasp...assuming they aren't otherwise occupied but they would require at least two refueling birds to come along.

Or...we could have a small fleet of long range amphibians and helicopters and V-22's standing by at any number of friendly airfields/harbors to do the work. We are a nation that wets our pants when as few as 13 good servicemen (and women) die but we are going to allow 200 to 300 to drown because it doesn't fit in with the standard, safe vision? Good luck keeping those stars, admiral.

But CSAR is just one tiny thing. I also fully grasp that it really isn't fair to compare AFSOC to the entire US Navy...but what is it with the contemporary reluctance to get a little "outside the box" thinking going? I think the USMC EABO concept is genuine forward thinking with an eye on the capabilities a known enemy. But, when someone says "Hey, let's plug a crap load of cruise missiles into the hull of a super-tanker!" or "Let's stand up a dedicated over-water CSAR capability focused on the ACTUAL realities of a war with China." and the automatic navy reply is "No, that's not how we do things." there is a fundamental leadership problem.

Of course all of this is based on an opinion that has the weight of air and I know that. Still, when my son comes to me and asks what service he should join I'll feel compelled to say - Not the one that will leave you drown in the Pacific because "that's not how we do things."

 

[jmcquate]

hey did pick up O'Grady, albeit 25 years ago, but they still want to do those missions.

I believe it was a TRAP mission that got the Strike Eagle that went down over Libya also.

 

[sevenhelmet]

With reference to the comments offered by @Flash and others I think the frustration is that right now the navy appears to be stuck in a post-modern version of Wood & Sails vs Steal & Steam. Except now it is "We'll stick with what we know because it gets us promoted." vs "We'll accept experimentation and readaptation to become a more relevent and flexible force."

People keep asking "why?" when it comes to this idea...

(more words, shortened for brevity)

...Of course all of this is based on an opinion that has the weight of air and I know that. Still, when my son comes to me and asks what service he should join I'll feel compelled to say - Not the one that will leave you drown in the Pacific because "that's not how we do things."

Griz, I totally agree with your mindset, but as long as we're innovating, let's innovate intelligently. Slapping giant floats on a C-130 brings with it a whole host of questions and potential issues, many of which could be mitigated by other designs, such as conformal fairings and sponsons to turn a Herc into a flying boat (which I'd still argue is not necessary, but is a better design). How heavy/thick will those floats need to be to withstand the hydrodynamic forces of takeoff and landing? (bet they'll need to be heavy) How much is range and carrying capacity impacted? (bet it's significant) What handling qualities issues will result? (bet there are a few) How necessary is this mission- really? (bet not very).

There are plenty of legitimately great ideas out there which deserve time and money. My opinion is that this is not one of them. I'd even wager if this goes through to completion of a few units, we'll see these Herc float kits sitting behind a hangar someplace rusting away in a few years.

 

[Griz882]

Griz, I totally agree with your mindset, but as long as we're innovating, let's innovate intelligently. Slapping giant floats on a C-130 brings with it a whole host of questions and potential issues, many of which could be mitigated by other designs, such as conformal fairings and sponsons to turn a Herc into a flying boat (which I'd still argue is not necessary, but is a better design). How heavy/thick will those floats need to be to withstand the hydrodynamic forces of takeoff and landing? (bet they'll need to be heavy) How much is range and carrying capacity impacted? (bet it's significant) What handling qualities issues will result? (bet there are a few) How necessary is this mission- really? (bet not very).

There are plenty of legitimately great ideas out there which deserve time and money. My opinion is that this is not one of them. I'd even wager if this goes through to completion of a few units, we'll see these Herc float kits sitting behind a hangar someplace rusting away in a few years.

No argument here. I'll be the first to admit that I'm just a dumbass historian that knows very little about engineering and just enough aerodynamics to get through AOCS. Still, smart innovation is critical and sometimes painful - take the LCS concept - but often leads to better readaptation of ideas like the new FFG-62.

 

[Gatordev]

It's like I can set my watch. Six months must have gone by because, yup, here's Chuck saying that the Navy helo community doesn't do anything despite not actually knowing what greater than 50% of the Navy helo community actually does. And Chuck, quoting someone who is from a community that's widely lampooned by the very people in the community for not having a mission doesn't mean other communities aren't doing very real world missions.

Could the Navy rotary be better? ABSOLUTELY. Capabilities continue to be added and the training program gets updated, albeit slowly. A bigger problem seems to be the loss of institutional knowledge at the WTI level. Despite what a Weapon School JO wants to tell you, the tactics now are pretty much the exact same as they were 20 years ago, they just call it something different and the capabilities of the airframes are significantly better (technically). But about every three years (hey, about when everyone PCSes), some "new" tactic is released, but it's either what was being done 6 years earlier or it's the same thing that was done 20 years ago with a new name.

So Chuck, to help you understand where the Navy places its importance for Navy rotary the following things have happened in the last 3-5 years: SEAL Sniper support, SOF ISR support, a myriad of interesting ESM information collected in noted hotspots that gets passed to people well above the DoN level, almost daily armed intercepts of UAS. And that's just one AOR (well, probably two, technically), and only on the UNCLASS level.

Is it as sexy as SOAR, or even -85? No, but that's not where the requirement is, nor will it be in the near-peer engagement.

 

[Pags]

I just don't think it is that hard. What is the currency requirement for landing the ski-equipped C-130s? They don't even have an analogy to a freshwater lake to practice on, they have to go all the way to Greenland for a training site. You could give the mission to the guard unit that does ski flying, they could own the oddball C-130 with alternatives to wheels mission set.

‘Old-school’ training gets aircrews qualified for LC-130 Arctic, Antarctic ops on JSTOR

Jason Sherman, ‘Old-school’ training gets aircrews qualified for LC-130 Arctic, Antarctic ops, Inside the Air Force, Vol. 28, No. 31 (August 4, 2017), pp. 7-9

www.jstor.org

Inflatable causeway made from dropstitched materials. Already being developed. Or floating pallets. Or any number of other methods that clever engineers can think of.

You guys sure want it to not work.

I just don't believe in the requirement enough to want to make it work. You've just tacked on a whole bunch of other requirements and therefore funding that are now necessary to make this happen. So much for the "just add pontoons and go!"

If there's some sort of actual requirement that makes sense then by all means do the creative thinking necessary to make it happen.

 

[Jim123]

I believe it was a TRAP mission that got the Strike Eagle that went down over Libya also.

I forgot about that- and about a year later I flew with one of the V-22 pilots who'd been on that one!

 

[jmcquate]

I'm confused about parts of this discussion (may be from ignorance). There have been multiple statements that the Navy doesn't do CSAR because of, budget, we're not good at it, and so on. The core of Naval Aviation is the CVW. The CVW deploys aboard CVs. CVs are an American asset that can be deployed any where in the word quickly and employ the CVW in combat operations. mostly unsupported, except for the capabilities of the battle group. So why wouldn't an robust organic CSAR component be part of a CVW?

 

[scoolbubba]

No bucks, no buck rogers.

 

[nittany03]

I'm confused about parts of this discussion (may be from ignorance). There have been multiple statements that the Navy doesn't do CSAR because of, budget, we're not good at it, and so on. The core of Naval Aviation is the CVW. The CVW deploys aboard CVs. CVs are an American asset that can be deployed any where in the word quickly and employ the CVW in combat operations. mostly unsupported, except for the capabilities of the battle group. So why wouldn't an robust organic CSAR component be part of a CVW?

The Navy does train to CSAR, unless something drastically changed in the last 8 years. But the idea that a CSG is going to operate “unsupported” is probably more Hollywood than reality.

This isn’t The Bridges of Toko-Ri or Flight of the Intruder. The JFACC and JFMCC are going to work together to accomplish what the theater commander needs to have accomplished. And in the event of a real-world CSAR, that’s an evolution that’s going to be run out of the personnel recovery cell in the CAOC. They’re going to have the full range of joint capabilities available to them, and the CSG’s Sierras are probably not going to be their first pick when there are assets such as an Air Force RQS, Marine TRAP, SOF assets, and so forth available.

It doesn’t mean the CVW would never be called; folks are just saying it’s very unlikely.