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Sully retires ...
- Thread starter Catmando
- Start date
danpass
Well-Known Member
from the report: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1003.pdf
Simulation flights were run to determine whether the accident flight could have landed successfully at LGA or TEB following the bird strike. The simulations demonstrated that, to accomplish a successful flight to either airport, the airplane would have to have been turned toward the airport immediately after the bird strike. The immediate turn did not reflect or account for real-world considerations, such as the time delay required to recognize the extent of the engine thrust loss and decide on a course of action. The one simulator flight that took into account real-world considerations (a return to LGA runway 13 was attempted after a 35-second delay) was not successful. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the captain’s decision to ditch on the Hudson River rather than attempting to land at an airport provided the highest probability that the accident would be survivable.
Simulation flights were run to determine whether the accident flight could have landed successfully at LGA or TEB following the bird strike. The simulations demonstrated that, to accomplish a successful flight to either airport, the airplane would have to have been turned toward the airport immediately after the bird strike. The immediate turn did not reflect or account for real-world considerations, such as the time delay required to recognize the extent of the engine thrust loss and decide on a course of action. The one simulator flight that took into account real-world considerations (a return to LGA runway 13 was attempted after a 35-second delay) was not successful. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the captain’s decision to ditch on the Hudson River rather than attempting to land at an airport provided the highest probability that the accident would be survivable.
Sully was an average pilot who kept his passengers alive in a bad situation. For that he deserves praise. But the ditching was not a miracle and any airline pilot could have done it.
There is also a lot of debate if his decision to ditch was the best option or not. Most of us immediately turn toward the nearest airport automatically. If he had and then decided he couldn't make it, the river was still there. He might not have chose the best option, but since everyone lived he chose the right option.
But the NTSB obviously shows his airmanship was lacking. Good enough to keep everyone alive, but not the best.
His personal integrity with anyone but former US Airways East / USAPA (their former union prior to Aa merger) pilots is suspect. US Airways East / USAPA is widely despised by almost all other major pilots / unions for the way the fucked over America West / US Airways West pilots during that merger as well as the way they tried to fuck them over with the current US Airways - AA seniority merger. Sully used his fame to try and get Congress and the courts to side the the East - something he'd never have had a chance to do otherwise. Fortunately the federal courts saw through his and USAPA's bullshit. Any good will I had for his asshat was lost because of this.
There is also a lot of debate if his decision to ditch was the best option or not. Most of us immediately turn toward the nearest airport automatically. If he had and then decided he couldn't make it, the river was still there. He might not have chose the best option, but since everyone lived he chose the right option.
But the NTSB obviously shows his airmanship was lacking. Good enough to keep everyone alive, but not the best.
His personal integrity with anyone but former US Airways East / USAPA (their former union prior to Aa merger) pilots is suspect. US Airways East / USAPA is widely despised by almost all other major pilots / unions for the way the fucked over America West / US Airways West pilots during that merger as well as the way they tried to fuck them over with the current US Airways - AA seniority merger. Sully used his fame to try and get Congress and the courts to side the the East - something he'd never have had a chance to do otherwise. Fortunately the federal courts saw through his and USAPA's bullshit. Any good will I had for his asshat was lost because of this.
Thank you!
I'm by no means qualified to judge...but I also would've thought an IMMEDIATE turn back towards the airport would be second nature. 35 seconds is an eternity in aviation.
I can also see real life vs the simulator...it might have taken that much time for all the indications to pronounce a no-thrust situation compared to a single engine scenario. I'm not an expert on A320 single engine capes...so I don't have any room to argue against his decision.
Everyone did live though...whether through luck or airmanship. That in itself is worthy of at least a free beer or two from my pocket.
I'm not one to knock a guy for successfully getting his passengers back safely, especially after something as major as this. I'm sure he could have done a better job but it's always easier to discuss at 1g in a room or even in a simulator than it is in the actual plane when it's occurring. I take it more as a learning point instead of a criticism, too and I think a lot of people feel the same way.
That being said, it's interesting to hear the other side of things, especially from those in the industry (show, etc) on their thoughts on him. You only really hear about the flight and ditch itself and not the behind the scenes stuff.
That being said, it's interesting to hear the other side of things, especially from those in the industry (show, etc) on their thoughts on him. You only really hear about the flight and ditch itself and not the behind the scenes stuff.
http:// try to imagine what part of my life Tom Hanks would portray. I'm at my best in Key West, but this looks more like a Matt Damon role to me.
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We're not talking a HAPL/LAPL into OLF in the VTs Where you can speed/clean check-feather, or dump suck feather point, in a pattern with 5 other VT guys who are used to doing, and seeing others do the maneuver on a daily basis.
35 seconds is not a lot of time when analyzing the situation as a crew, executing immediate action items, analyzing their effects and discussing options/ making follow-on decisions, and coordinating with approach so you don't crash into other aircraft carrying hundreds of passengers trying to make a field.
A 35 second Margin for error is pretty thin in this case.
Plus you couple in an engine that is slowly dying and losing thrust. Airbus procedures are heavy on non memory items. The computer diagnoses and you follow the immediate actions or exceptions. Many of us still take some of these scenarios and what if them. But you still need time to analyze what's happening. Plenty of thrust and time one engine. Both gone and shits happening quick better bring your A game. Our chief pilot told us day one of Indoc, we live a career where we never know when we are going to the super bowl. You never know when you are going to have THAT flight. We have to be prepared for the worst. Military tactical missions are one thing. It's kind of a different animal when you have the safety of 180+ pax back there.
I could be wrong here, but didn't the Airbus in discussion loose both engines?
I have never flown anything close to the size and weight of an Airbus, and I have never been close to "the show" but I have flown GA into KTEB and I will say that there are a lot of tall obstacles between 3000 AGL over the Bronx Zoo and Tetterboro Field. I am surprised the NTSB thought he could make it.
I have never flown anything close to the size and weight of an Airbus, and I have never been close to "the show" but I have flown GA into KTEB and I will say that there are a lot of tall obstacles between 3000 AGL over the Bronx Zoo and Tetterboro Field. I am surprised the NTSB thought he could make it.
It did lose both engines, but I haven't read the NTSB report. I was just alluding to the fact that some engine failures decay with thrust and it is not immediately discernable what situation on climbout you may have. Hence the discussion on "35 seconds" to diagnose and make a decision. Majority of our training involves single engine failures and climbout either at V1 or at second stage. Vice a great deal of my Navy P3 time was spent with proper ditching techniques. Anyways, without going into the political side of it, I will just say I am happy that everyone walked away safely.
I've messed around in the P-3 and P-8 sim before and have done no engine ditches for shits and giggles and they're not easy. Energy management is key and it's a very different profile than a normal ditch. I did a high key (all four bagged) in the P-3 to KNUW and set my parameters ahead of time to see if it could be done (it could but you had to keep speed on the aircraft). In the P-8, I got surprised with a two engine out ditch and we made it, but it was a hard impact because I lost too much energy. I don't know if the airline guys practice no engine ditching, but I don't remember spending much time on it in the P-3.
I'll add that my proficiency levels in both aircraft were very different during either scenarios (way more proficient in the P-3).
I'll add that my proficiency levels in both aircraft were very different during either scenarios (way more proficient in the P-3).
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Agreed, and this is why my participation in "the show" is limited to extra-space seats in the back. I'm fine if it can autorotate or weighs less than a few thousand lbs fully loaded (on a sunny weekend day) but I'll leave the heavy stuff to the pros.
I think there were four syllabus items for ditching and then extra slots if the IP had time. Then for upgrading and IUT a lot of time spent demoing since your were in a low speed regime where things could go squirrelly if a stud did something you weren't ready for. But the night technique is solid. Configure aircraft. Set AOA and descent rate target and ride it in. And of course don't fuck up. My old SS1 during my first tour was on the masirah P3 ditch. Pretty eye opening talking to him about it.