Sully retires ...

[bunk22]

To tie it all back in to Sully, the end state was the same and everyone survived. I still firmly believe that nothing on that EP-3 was worth a single life at the time. And from what little I know, and after having talked to several airline pilots to include A320 pilots, Capt Sully did a fine job when he ditched in the Hudson. What better outcome could have there been? I can't see one.

As much as it pains me to agree with Flash, I agree 100% here. Not at war, not worth the lives, or the risk with the EP-3. Capt Sully did what he had to do, regardless of how folks feel about him...those who worked for him I mean. Everyone walked away from a bad situation. There will always be the monday morning QB's who know exactly what they would have done in the same situation...sure, maybe, maybe not.

 

[East]

...... The only up side to that was any antennas or vents would have been cleaned off by those that went before.

Awesome quote that I have ever read, and only to be made by someone who was seventh in sequence....

 

[Flash]

... from an AF ISR perspective,...
the EP-3 incident gets discussed. I'm certainly not "in the know", but it seems there was little or no CONOPS written for these missions. Foul.
It's also good that EP-3 crews attend SV-83 "survival" at Fairchild AFB now. It sounds like Osborne and company were not given very good training/guidance from the outset.

You are right in that there was little official guidance, not even implied, MC discretion in most cases. And SV-83 was a 'nice to have' that was really hit and miss before the incident for us, I was one of the lucky few that got to go through it (the 'soft sell' for me.....).

 

[wink]

... what is getting taught during our MC boards NOW? Definitely not a landing.

I think this is possibly the final word on the controversy. When it is all said and done, no matter what any one here has read , their security clearance or friends they have in former squadrons or at work, the size of their gonads, their monkey skills or self styled patriotism, THE Navy has decided they don't want any more EP-3s landing in hostile countries. Some of us obviously don't think the spooky black boxes were worth lives, but the Navy thinks they were or they would not be teaching guys in MC work ups and boards to not land where the spooky stuff would be compromised. So young LT Osborne may not have been so instructed and did what he thought rigt at the time. Good enough. Honorable people may disagree on his actions at the time. But NOW, the Navy would like it if it didn't happen again. There must be a very good reason for that and I am sure it isn't because they value sailor's lives less now they did several years ago.

 

[bunk22]

I think this is possibly the final word on the controversy. When it is all said and done, no matter what any one here has read , their security clearance or friends they have in former squadrons or at work, the size of their gonads, their monkey skills or self styled patriotism, THE Navy has decided they don't want any more EP-3s landing in hostile countries. Some of us obviously don't think the spooky black boxes were worth lives, but the Navy thinks they were or they would not be teaching guys in MC work ups and boards to not land where the spooky stuff would be compromised. So young LT Osborne may not have been so instructed and did what he thought rigt at the time. Good enough. Honorable people may disagree on his actions at the time. But NOW, the Navy would like it if it didn't happen again. There must be a very good reason for that and I am sure it isn't because they value sailor's lives less now they did several years ago.

THE NAVY also wasn't in the cockpit on an out of control EP-3 that day. I get all the secret stuff but get just one of these policy makers spinning out of control towards the drink...their mind might just change.

 

[wink]

THE NAVY also wasn't in the cockpit on an out of control EP-3 that day. I get all the secret stuff but get just one of these policy makers spinning out of control towards the drink...their mind might just change.

First off, the aircraft was certainly not spinning out of control when it touched down in China. If it could be landed on terra firma it could be ditched. That said, I do not want to debate his decision at the time. Plenty of other folks are willing to do that here. My point was that it has been asserted that nothing on the plane was worth taking the risk of ditching the plane. Or in the dramatic rendering I have read here, nothing on that plane was worth the lives of the crew. The Navy has decide that is not the case and prefer MCs take the risk associated with ditching. If the lesson learned has driven the Navy to teach MC's to consider a different course then taken by LT Osborne, then they must not have found his decision optimal. Maybe that comes in retrospect. It certainly seems that many folks in the know at the time are willing to support his decision to this day. But if the Navy is not holding his case up as the model for handling a similar incident, and in fact is teaching the opposite, then there is a reason for it. I am left assuming the reason is subsequent national security damage. Even then you may not think it worth a life. If you are the AC/MC in a similar situation I trust you will do what you believe the right thing, and you will answer for your actions. I'll drink a toast to you whether over the bar, or your coffin, because I am guessing you did your best with what you had and knew at the time.

 

[exhelodrvr]

THE NAVY also wasn't in the cockpit on an out of control EP-3 that day. I get all the secret stuff but get just one of these policy makers spinning out of control towards the drink...their mind might just change.

And that's why you don't make policy while "spinning out of control towards the drink" - because individual survival instincts aren't always the best basis for policy.

 

[Flash]

....The Navy has decide that is not the case and prefer MCs take the risk associated with ditching. If the lesson learned has driven the Navy to teach MC's to consider a different course then taken by LT Osborne, then they must not have found his decision optimal. Maybe that comes in retrospect. It certainly seems that many folks in the know at the time are willing to support his decision to this day. But if the Navy is not holding his case up as the model for handling a similar incident, and in fact is teaching the opposite, then there is a reason for it. I am left assuming the reason is subsequent national security damage......

Not privy to current VP/VQ MC boards and their guidance but from past experience they were largely influenced by internal squadron/wing/community dynamics and decisions such as these in the boards, where there was no clear guidance, were largely discretionary and depended on the current community thinking. I would tend to believe that this is an internal VP, and maybe VQ, trend and not a 'Big Navy' decision. Unless of course there has been direction from above, that may not be for this forum though.

 

[bunk22]

And that's why you don't make policy while "spinning out of control towards the drink" - because individual survival instincts aren't always the best basis for policy.

Those policy's made by those folks who weren't there might change their mind in that situation. I'm hearing that because The Navy made the policy it's the right one. Sure, because the Navy never makes flawed policies :icon_wink It may very well be the correct thing to do, protect state secrets but my guess is sitting in that left or right seat, after colliding and going into an OCF situation in an aircraft that wasn't meant to go OCF and then recovering a damaged aircraft with questionable flying characteristics....it might alter one's perception a bit. My my whole point is unless you've been in that situation (Osbourne's or Sully's), tough one to criticize.

 

[wink]

Not privy to current VP/VQ MC boards and their guidance but from past experience they were largely influenced by internal squadron/wing/community dynamics and decisions such as these in the boards, where there was no clear guidance, were largely discretionary and depended on the current community thinking. I would tend to believe that this is an internal VP, and maybe VQ, trend and not a 'Big Navy' decision. Unless of course there has been direction from above, that may not be for this forum though.

In the VS of yore, AC and MC boards were much a you describe. Either way, big Navy or "current community thinking", the point stands. If it is organic thinking at the squadron and wing level fine, they should know best. If it was guidance from on high, so be it. One can only assume the guidance was thoughtful. We salute and carry on. What would one find more critical of LT Osborne's actions, his community of aviators determining they don't want similar outcomes or the Navy saying "no more". Take your pick.

Those policy's made by those folks who weren't there might change their mind in that situation. I'm hearing that because The Navy made the policy it's the right one. Sure, because the Navy never makes flawed policies :icon_wink It may very well be the correct thing to do, protect state secrets but my guess is sitting in that left or right seat, after colliding and going into an OCF situation in an aircraft that wasn't meant to go OCF and then recovering a damaged aircraft with questionable flying characteristics....it might alter one's perception a bit. My my whole point is unless you've been in that situation (Osbourne's or Sully's), tough one to criticize.

I am not sure how having just made a heroic recovery of your aircraft, the calculus of the value of state secrets versus crew risk would change. The information and equipment are no less classified, they will not do less damage to national security, the crew's lives did not become magically more precious. As mentioned before, it is a conops issue. It makes no difference if the aircraft was in OCF or was on fire or running out of fuel due to a leak. Either letting the spooky black boxes fall into hostile hands given a certain risk to crew is ok or it isn't. It doesn't matter how you get to that point. If LT Osborne was not briefed on certain conops and was left to make it up as he went, then fine. Now, apparently, specific guidance is being promulgated.

 

[Flash]

In the VS of yore, AC and MC boards were much a you describe. Either way, big Navy or "current community thinking", the point stands. If it is organic thinking at the squadron and wing level fine, they should know best. If it was guidance from on high, so be it. One can only assume the guidance was thoughtful. We salute and carry on. What would one find more critical of LT Osborne's actions, his community of aviators determining they don't want similar outcomes or the Navy saying "no more"....... Now, apparently, specific guidance is being promulgated.

Having talked to a few current types today the 'guidance' appears to be more of a VP-ism than anything else, not entirely reflective of how VQ thinks. And yes, they are still kinda separate communities for now.

 

[exhelodrvr]

My my whole point is unless you've been in that situation (Osbourne's or Sully's), tough one to criticize.

Agreed; I don't think anyone has criticized HIS decision, given the fact that their wasn't an established policy beforehand for that type of situation.

 

[bunk22]

I am not sure how having just made a heroic recovery of your aircraft, the calculus of the value of state secrets versus crew risk would change. The information and equipment are no less classified, they will not do less damage to national security, the crew's lives did not become magically more precious. As mentioned before, it is a conops issue. It makes no difference if the aircraft was in OCF or was on fire or running out of fuel due to a leak. Either letting the spooky black boxes fall into hostile hands given a certain risk to crew is ok or it isn't. It doesn't matter how you get to that point. If LT Osborne was not briefed on certain conops and was left to make it up as he went, then fine. Now, apparently, specific guidance is being promulgated.

Well, get back to me after you've been in that situation and let me know. I know many here are very tough and manly, John Wayne's and all. However, until then, policy is one thing and being in that situation is another...meaning it can have an effect on people. Granted, the policy is different now, the guidance I assume. I also assume there is a procedure for destroying equipment and material as well.

 

[A4sForever]

O.K. ... here we go again ... rant on:

Jesus ... com'on, folks ... "knowing what you're gonna' do" in ADVANCE in extremis is exactly WHY we train and practice for different & varying evolutions and circumstances. It's why you brief before takeoff ... it's why you think before you man up ... it's why you have certain bottom lines.

'Sully' did a GREAT FUCKING JOB (so did the rest of his crew) and he WAS LUCKY, which is always a good thing. A little here, a little there -- it could have been a disaster. He was an airline pilot and he selected the best option given the limitations of what was available. Ditching -- it's not 'airline policy' and it's not something you 'train for' per se... no matter what most of you think. And I worked and instructed for a couple of 'Pacific intensive' airlines ...

Military option --- picture this: an A-6 or F-4 driver (or a 100 other driver-types) has a mechanical or an 'event' and can't make it feet wet or to Danang or to Thailand ... so to save the lives of himself & his B/N or RIO ... he flies into say: bad-guy Bach Mai airfield in hostile-land, instead. Courageous choice?? Good deal or bad idea ??? By the way ... historical note: the FIRST VPAF 'combat' aircraft was a US built one flown in by a pilot from a neighboring country ... in this case, it was a T-28. It was also the first VPAF aircraft to later shoot down a US aircraft ...

Shane Osborne flew his bird into the bad-guy airport that was 'owned' by the ChiCom assholes he was eye-balling/surveiling and in my opinion it was a huge mistake. If he was driving a city bus -- OR AN AIRLINER ... then fine ... that's just great. But when he's flying a WARPLANE of our country and doing a 'REAL' mission against a 'hostile' country ... then what he did was a disgrace. It's my opinion and it ain't gonna' change.

He saved his crew, and that's great; that's always a plus. But ... there's some things that require a 'higher calling' than just saving your own asses. Saving your OWN lives is not necessarily the first concern of a military leader. That's one of the hard facts when you're in the military ... that's what's required sometimes ... making the 'hard decisions' ... and while no one 'wants to die', it might require that you put the MISSION and the COUNTRY before yourself. I note with passing interest who on this website continually puts 'crew lives' above the 'mission' and/or 'national interests'. Don't you guys EVER quit rationalizing ??? That tells me a lot about mindsets and training and the motivation of some individuals in the different communities ... and it's got NOTHING to do w/ whether or not you fly ATTACK or Fighter or HELOs or VP or any of the rest ... as I've seen it in the airlines, too -- it'd that different 'approach' to flying and 'tough stuff' when looked at by former military jocks vs. some former civie-street-trained jocks. Basically, it's a lot of what you 'bring to the party' when you sign up ...

But here's a bit of truth: the USN ain't the fucking airlines, is it ??? And it's not a fucking walk in the park, either ... sometimes you just have to suck it up ... you have to fish or cut bait.

Shane Osborne did a great job of flying and recovering from the proverbial death spiral. But then -- he flew his airplane -- part of his national trust -- into enemy hands. If Osborne did such a great fucking job of leadership and judgment -- then riddle me this: why did he 'get out' at the first opportunity? He would have/should have been GOLDEN for continuation in the USN and further success ... oh, that's right ... he wasn't and/or he didn't.

If you have to make it up as you go along ... make up the 'right' thing to do ... if you always need 'policy guidance' from above .... then something's missing in your basic skills, your basic knowledge, your basic judgment, your basic commitment, and your basic guts.

Some things you just know. If you don't 'know what you'd do' until you're face w/ a situation in extremis -- then stay out of my airplane. It's got nothing to do w/ John Wayne (who never served, by the way), but it's got everything with doing the right thing. When you come into the US military, there's just some things that don't require thinking and re-thinking and re-re-thinking and 'policy guidance' and 'direction' from higher-ups. Some things require a simple gut-check. To repeat: some things you just know.

If you don't 'know' that simple truth of military service and aren't willing to make the commitment to it, then you're in the WRONG line of work.

If you're a Naval Aviator and you still 'don't know it' ... then what can we say?? You make the argument for me.

Rant off.

*edit* .... actually ... no it's not ... some things just don't change, do they.

 

[zippy]

Not privy to current VP/VQ MC boards and their guidance...I would tend to believe that this is an internal VP, and maybe VQ, trend and not a 'Big Navy' decision. Unless of course there has been direction from above, that may not be for this forum though.

Having talked to a few current types today the 'guidance' appears to be more of a VP-ism than anything else, not entirely reflective of how VQ thinks. And yes, they are still kinda separate communities for now.

Your original decision not to get into a discussion of the guidance we use today, here, was a good one...

It appears that Shane Osborne and his crew did not have a lot to go on when the original incident happened. They made a series of decisions and our government collectively learned from them. We now have stricter guidance to operate with (and in hind sight should have had in the first place). Regardless of what we think of that guidance on a personal level we have a duty to and obligation to follow it if, and when, the time comes.