I heard it twice.
Not to mention the times he just said no about landing on the runway.
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US AIRWAYS Crash in the Hudson River
- Thread starter foampositz
- Start date
Not to mention the times he just said no about landing on the runway.
If I were about to plunge into a river on a day where the water temp and air temp are 30* and 20* respectively, while talking to an obviously frazzled controller who can't even get my callsign right, I'd be damn sure that he knew where to send rescue personnel ten minutes ago.
I'll bet he had his hands full in the cockpit to worry about talking to ATC.
After all, it's "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate"...he knocked the 1st two out of the ball park.
I'll bet he had his hands full in the cockpit to worry about talking to ATC.
After all, it's "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate"...he knocked the 1st two out of the ball park.
I'm arguing for him. He did mention the Hudson a few times, and for VERY good reason. I think he spanked the communication part too.
Here's the deal-io ... when the shit hits the fan, you either pony UP and get the job done ... or you don't.
They did a great job ... it was 'their day to shine' ... if it had happened to me or any number or 1000's of other crews ... 'we' could have also done 'the job' ... ifit was 'our day' ... otherwise ...??? You're dead, you're toast & just another statistic.
That's why we get paid ...
That's what we're trained for ...
And that's how we 'rise above' and do something 'over and above the call of duty' ... Sully & his crew are NOT 'gods' ... they're just regular 'guys' who did the job every day ... and when called upon ... they rose above the 'norm' and performed magnificently ... like so many of the rest of the guys do ... every day, every way ... except 'they' don't get the public attention and adulation ... mainly 'cause the public is stupid. And ignorant ...
Military or civilian. Every day. We/YOU do our jobs ...
Believe it ...
They did a great job ... it was 'their day to shine' ... if it had happened to me or any number or 1000's of other crews ... 'we' could have also done 'the job' ... ifit was 'our day' ... otherwise ...??? You're dead, you're toast & just another statistic.
That's why we get paid ...
That's what we're trained for ...
And that's how we 'rise above' and do something 'over and above the call of duty' ... Sully & his crew are NOT 'gods' ... they're just regular 'guys' who did the job every day ... and when called upon ... they rose above the 'norm' and performed magnificently ... like so many of the rest of the guys do ... every day, every way ... except 'they' don't get the public attention and adulation ... mainly 'cause the public is stupid. And ignorant ...
Military or civilian. Every day. We/YOU do our jobs ...
Believe it ...
We, pilots, like to complain that all a controller has to worry about is his cup of coffee where as a pilot has to worry about crashing and killing folks. Of course that is an exaggeration (controller error mid air anyone). In this case I am sure the controller was doing a lot more off the radio. He is calling Teterboro, calling out ARFF (the crash trucks), coordinating with LGA tower clearing the traffic in his sector, and probably getting a call off to EWR as well. All that with imperfect information because he is sitting in a darkened room looking at a one dimensional picture with very few actual landmarks. In his own way, he was stressed by this unusual occurrence. I am sure he didn't make it more difficult for the air crew. And they were professional enough to focus where needed.
squarebullet said:
And that's why they are miss-named ... i.e., 'controllers' ... as they don't 'CONTROL' anything ... they advise and suggest and try to coordinate and try to help -- when asked ... that's who they are, that's what they get paid for, that's why they are NOT tasked w/ the final responsibility ... if you NEVER checked in w/ 'em ... you'd still make it to the destination, wouldn't you ???
If YOU fuck up ... they CAN file a report on you ... but they still don't 'control' anything is this world or the next ...
I've said this before ... but it bears repeating every once and a while ...
The ONLY guy that 'controls' the aircraft or where/when it appears on an ATC radar screen ... IS THE CAPTAIN/PIC.
If you don't 'get' that concept ... then you still have a long, long way to go in aviation ...
Who dies if the pilot screws up -- the pilot or the 'controller' ... soooooooooo.... don't drink the KoolAid ... it makes your teeth rot.
Believe it indeed. I also know the Hudson is a whole lot wider and longer than any runway I ever landed on, if not as smooth. And most every pilot I flew with could grease a landing on any surface, concrete or water at idle (or less). Furthermore, decisions are pretty simple when circumstances give you no real other options.
I will be most happy when the final report comes out. I hope it will put to bed a some of the recent speculation I hear about how much thrust the one engine could produce, checklist run, etc.
This is why you always wait for the final NTSB report to come out, without second guessing unknown actions, superb or otherwise.
There is a new and extraordinary 3D reconstruction of Cactus flight 1549 into the Hudson River, from multiple key perspectives at this LINK
It is an amazing reconstruction, and requires a number of replays for those really interested to assimilate all the relevant information. And there is some new information here.
(Note: Some of my old Airbus colleagues wonder why TOGO (Take-Off, Go-Around power was never called for or never selected with some small amount of thrust apparently still available.) As far as an anatomy of an accident - prior to the final NTSB report - this is as good as it gets.
http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/pages/project_gallery/cactus_1549_hudson_river.html
It is an amazing reconstruction, and requires a number of replays for those really interested to assimilate all the relevant information. And there is some new information here.
(Note: Some of my old Airbus colleagues wonder why TOGO (Take-Off, Go-Around power was never called for or never selected with some small amount of thrust apparently still available.) As far as an anatomy of an accident - prior to the final NTSB report - this is as good as it gets.
http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/pages/project_gallery/cactus_1549_hudson_river.html