All things MV-22 Osprey

[Roger_Waveoff]

A couple of questions from a nonvertical lift guy, so excuse my ignorance.

- Land As Soon As Possible - The report noted a helo pad and a smaller airport closer than the airfield they chose to divert to, does helo/VSTOL land ASAP options usually take into account help pads? Is there comprehensive info on helo pad location easily available like airfields? Second part of question, is land ASAP put the aircraft down on any available spot or the closest pad/airfield? And is there a difference between 'Land ASAP' and 'Land Right Fucking Now!'?

- V-22 Single Engine? A quick search finds that the V-22 can fly single engine but has some limitations doing so, so why isn't shutting down the engine part of the EP for a chips light? Was a catastrophic failure not considered likely? Too risky? Or do you wait for secondaries like in the 53?

We in the MV-22 community do not normally account for helo pads due to our size and extreme downwash. I'm sure many people here have seen the video of the CV-22 absolutely wrecking that hospital helipad in the UK.

Our NATOPS has Land Immediately, Land ASAPossible, and Land ASAPractical. Land ASAPossible for me as an aircraft commander normally means take it to the nearest airfield, assuming that's only like 10-15 minutes away which most of the time it is CONUS. But if all I have is a training LZ in the middle of the desert, I'll take that, too. Land Immediately means I'm looking off the nose and putting the plane down wherever it looks remotely safe to do so, whether that's a road or some farmer's field.

Shutting down 1 engine will not help you if it's a gearbox chips issue. Our interconnected drivetrain means the gearboxes are still working, just off the good engine as opposed to both engines. The load is still the same from idle up to single engine power.

 

[Flash]

We in the MV-22 community do not normally account for helo pads due to our size and extreme downwash. I'm sure many people here have seen the video of the CV-22 absolutely wrecking that hospital helipad in the UK.

Our NATOPS has Land Immediately, Land ASAPossible, and Land ASAPractical. Land ASAPossible for me as an aircraft commander normally means take it to the nearest airfield, assuming that's only like 10-15 minutes away which most of the time it is CONUS. But if all I have is a training LZ in the middle of the desert, I'll take that, too. Land Immediately means I'm looking off the nose and putting the plane down wherever it looks remotely safe to do so, whether that's a road or some farmer's field.

Shutting down 1 engine will not help you if it's a gearbox chips issue. Our interconnected drivetrain means the gearboxes are still working, just off the good engine as opposed to both engines. The load is still the same from idle up to single engine power.

Thank you very much! The Land Immediately and Land ASAPossible distinction is what I didn't know about, but wondered if there was something like that with vertical lift aircraft since I've seen helos land at random flat spot for emergencies sometimes. Good to know about chips and single engine.

Has there been or is one in the works to make a chips light Land Immediately vs Land ASAPossible after this mishap?

 

[Roger_Waveoff]

Thank you very much! The Land Immediately and Land ASAPossible distinction is what I didn't know about, but wondered if there was something like that with vertical lift aircraft since I've seen helos land at random flat spot for emergencies sometimes. Good to know about chips and single engine.

Has there been or is one in the works to make a chips light Land Immediately vs Land ASAPossible after this mishap?

It's Land Immediately with secondaries, Land ASAPossible if you don't. Should have clarified above, gearbox chips have always been *at least* Land ASAPossible.

 

[ChuckMK23]

And....

V-22 Osprey could see second life, with new drive system, wings in 2050s

The V-22 could see a second chapter, if the services keep the fuselages beyond the 2050s and give them new wings and drive systems to extend their lives.

www.defensenews.com

 

[ChuckMK23]

I thought it was interesting that both pilots on the mishap aircraft lacked rotary wing time prior to assignment to the V-22. I don't know if this was a factor - but flying a helo instills a certain mindset when it comes to XMSN issues...chip lights, oil press/temp, etc.

What do you guys think?

 

[phrogdriver]

I thought it was interesting that both pilots on the mishap aircraft lacked rotary wing time prior to assignment to the V-22. I don't know if this was a factor - but flying a helo instills a certain mindset when it comes to XMSN issues...chip lights, oil press/temp, etc.

What do you guys think?

It's not uncommon for F/W pilots to transition to the V-22. In fact, for at least some period of time, USAF initial assessions would come to the FRS with zero helo time, and would just get a couple extra sim rides to get them up to speed on "helicopterisms."

Generally speaking, the aircraft hovers so well that anything more than the basics of helicopter flight is unnecessary. As to whether helo guys take transmission failures more seriously, I don't know. "Land as soon a possible" and "land immediately" are supposed to speak for themselves, and any reasonable person should grasp that "spinny thing stops moving"=bad.

 

[Roger_Waveoff]

The Air Force has gone back and forth multiple times on which specific SUPT (Advanced) track produces CV-22 pilots. Currently, they come from the TH-1 helicopter track at Fort Rucker. Previously, CV-22 slots would drop to both T-38 and T-1 completers. The USAF is the outlier in that their V-22 pilots lack both fixed-wing and rotary-wing experience, but like phrogdriver said, there's room at VMMT-204 to massage this.

Looking at the most recent T&R manual, there are 2 simulator events that provide additional training on "Airplane flight, pattern, and EPs." When I was a CAT I student, these were written to provide additional helicopter fundamentals training. Noticed there's also an extra USAF-only Instrument flight, probably to rectify the huge disparity in IFR proficiency that almost certainly exists between Marine/Navy T-44 completers and USAF TH-1 completers.

 

[phrogdriver]

The Air Force has gone back and forth multiple times on which specific SUPT (Advanced) track produces CV-22 pilots. Currently, they come from the TH-1 helicopter track at Fort Rucker. Previously, CV-22 slots would drop to both T-38 and T-1 completers. The USAF is the outlier in that their V-22 pilots lack both fixed-wing and rotary-wing experience, but like phrogdriver said, there's room at VMMT-204 to massage this.

Looking at the most recent T&R manual, there are 2 simulator events that provide additional training on "Airplane flight, pattern, and EPs." When I was a CAT I student, these were written to provide additional helicopter fundamentals training. Noticed there's also an extra USAF-only Instrument flight, probably to rectify the huge disparity in IFR proficiency that almost certainly exists between Marine/Navy T-44 completers and USAF TH-1 completers.

I think that's not a great idea...better to take a F/W guy and give him a splash of helo landing, formation, and ground handling than vice versa.

 

[GroundPounder]

Marine who died trying to save crew in fiery Osprey crash to receive service's top noncombat medal

Collart "heroically reentered the burning cockpit of the aircraft in an attempt to rescue the trapped pilots," the official Marine Corps investigation into the crash found.

abc7chicago.com

WASHINGTON (AP) — Alexia and Bart Collart braced for a hard visit. Marines came to their home in Arlington, Virginia, last week to brief them on what caused the Osprey crash in Australia last year that resulted in the death of their son and two other Marines.

But they weren’t expecting to hear these words: Your son didn’t die in the crash.

Cpl. Spencer R. Collart had safely escaped the aircraft. But the 21-year-old saw that the Osprey’s two pilots were unaccounted for. Despite the smoke and flames, he went back in.


Make Shakespeare a liar, ensure that honor does live on with the living. Cpl. Collart sounds like a great person and Marine, prior to this incident, a certainly on that day.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Breaking....

 

[ChuckMK23]

Great read about the systemic failings of the contractor versus design of the aircraft.

Would welcome some color commentary by those of you in the industry or program level especially @phrogdriver

Flawed metal & failed communication: Breaking down the Air Force’s fatal Osprey crash

Documents reviewed by The Air Current reveal a persistent manufacturing problem with implications that extend beyond the V-22 Osprey and across military and civil aviation.

theaircurrent.com

 

[hscs]

Great read about the systemic failings of the contractor versus design of the aircraft.

Would welcome some color commentary by those of you in the industry or program level especially @phrogdriver

Flawed metal & failed communication: Breaking down the Air Force’s fatal Osprey crash

Documents reviewed by The Air Current reveal a persistent manufacturing problem with implications that extend beyond the V-22 Osprey and across military and civil aviation.

theaircurrent.com

Would disagree. A Monday morning QB article. They were in a Land ASA Practical after 3 x chip burns in 12 minutes and made decision to press to Kadena. That is a long, lonely stretch. We wouldn’t be talking if they landed.

Yes, there were manufacturing defects, but a risk decision was made of 10 events over thousands and thousands of flight hours. How many H60 MGBs, IGBs, TGBs had to be replaced for chips / failures for similar amount of flight time? A risk decision was made, and yes, the engineers were wrong, and it’s horrible. This type of risk decision happens every day across aviation and many other high risk enterprises. However, I will reiterate that landing when the ASA Practical triggered would have closed a critical Swiss cheese hole.

 

[ChuckMK23]

https://news.usni.org/2024/10/30/japan-grounds-osprey-fleet-following-takeoff-mishap-keen-sword-drills-with-u-s-continue

 

[ChuckMK23]

Last night on PBS Newshour, a expose style story on V-22 was aired. Its worth a watch - and goes into some of the specifics with both "hard clutch failure" and the wear/failure of drive components that caused the AF CV-22B mishap in Japan.

Notable as well was interview with former program technical official who stated repeatedly the core issue of the drive system lacks sufficient strength and there is a fundamental design issue. "The root cause of these mishaps is the clutch is too small"

I'm interested in your reaction to the specifics of this piece.

Also of note, the Marines interviewed and highlighted are all wearing the green 2-piece Massif NAVAIR flight suit. Single squadron patch on right sleeve. That's a new thing I believe - I have not seen Marines adopting this ensemble before. Again, also we see wings/name tag worn on left shoulder similar to AF. Anyone care to comment? Also aircrew sem to all have HGU-84/P vs HGU-56. Why?

 

[Roger_Waveoff]

The issue of the clutch being too small is new to me. I'm not saying I don't believe it. A ton of the V-22 design is a series of compromises, which is not something unique to the Osprey nor to aircraft design in general. You can't have everything. The hurricane-force downwash itself is a product of the rotor diameter which was made intentionally smaller-than-ideal for shipboard operating constraints.

Unfortunately, I have to wave-off on saying anything else because, being an ASO in a V-22 squadron, I have had access to privileged safety information and CUI from the Gundam 22 mishap (I'm not 100% in my mind on where I read one thing and where I read another).

8:50 - the proposed vibration alerting system is currently in the works and should be included in a new software load in 2025. That isn't to say the V-22 doesn't already post a caution with abnormal vibrations; it does, but for the rotor system and not the inner workings of the gearboxes themselves.

The 2-piece Massif flight suit is available via the flight equipment supply system but is typically only prioritized for deploying squadrons. It wasn't until over 3 years in the fleet that I received a set. It's especially preferred by female aircrew for (hopefully) obvious reasons related to mid-mission bladder relief. There is a "combat shirt" you can wear in place of the jacket which provides a fit similar to the FROG ensemble worn by ground troops. It gets much less hot wearing the CMU-38 vest over that compared to the traditional 1-piece flight suit. Namepatch on the shoulder of the combat shirt is a personal preference thing; I personally wear no patches on it when I fly.

Vast majority of USMC rotary-wing aircrew have been issued HGU-84 helmets. It wasn't until I think 2021 when people started getting issued the HGU-56. Our crew chiefs and aerial observers prefer the -84 because it's less wide (harder to randomly bump into stuff in the cabin) and all the sand and dust tends to mess with the tracks the visors ride on.