There is a feature article on the Chinese Air Force in this month's issue of Combat Aircraft, entitled "China's Hidden Power"
Given the astonishing growth of the Chinese economy and military budget over the past decade, it's surprising that more coverage hasn't been deveoted to this subject.
To draw on some of the article's key points:
Given the astonishing growth of the Chinese economy and military budget over the past decade, it's surprising that more coverage hasn't been deveoted to this subject.
To draw on some of the article's key points:
- Up until the 1990s, the Chinese air force was relegated to a secondary status within the hierarchy of the People's Liberation Army:
"Organizationally, the PLAAF is strictly subordinate to the Chinese ground forces in ways that no western air arm has ever had to contend with. Far from being on equal footing in the competition for resources or for strategic planning authority, the PLAAF has been obliged to play whatever secondary role that the Chinese armed forces see fit to relegate it under. Up until 1985, the chief air force officer wasn’t even an aviator: he was an army officer appointed to manage air force operations."
- This lack of status and respect for the role of air power was magnified by the purges that took place between 1966 and 1969 as part of the Cultural Revolution.
"Maintenance standards in the Chinese air force plummeted during this period, while the number of annual flight hours per pilot dropped from 122 in 1964, to fewer than 24 in 1968."
- This pattern did not change until after the 1991 Gulf War, which finally convinced China's leadership of the importance of air power in modern day warfare:
"In the words of one US Defense Department analyst, Operation Desert Storm 'had a devastating impact on Chinese force planners,' and came as a 'deep psychological shock'."
- Coupled with this has been the end of the Cold War, which has permitted the Chinese to tap into Russia's weapons expertise:
"The PLAAF, which had once hesitated to devote a little over a quarter of a billion dollars to purchase modern avionics for a mere 55 J-8 II fighters, was suddenly authorized to devote billions to acquire hundreds of fighter aircraft from the Russian Federation. The transformation in spending authority was both swift, and profound."
This article is apparently the first part in a two-part series. The second part of the article is expected to focus on more recent developments, and China's new J-10 fighter in particular.
