CVN 70 F-35 ramp strike mishap report

[johnboyA6E]

Story published regarding mishap report for the F-35 that hit the ramp, which was later recovered in 12K' of water.

According to this redacted account, no technical problems, mishap was due to pilot error.

According to the report, pilot attempted a SHB, had never done one before, became task saturated and forgot to go to auto mode, thought he was in auto and thus failed to add power when needed, by the time he realized his sink rate in close, and added power, it was too late. For others here who have read the actual report, is there anything that can be shared in this forum to shed more light?

Pilot error caused F-35 carrier crash and plunge into South China Sea

A Navy probe found the pilot did not act "in a reckless manner." The officer remains in the service, but is no longer flying.

www.navytimes.com

“As a result of the compressed timeline and the (pilot’s) lack of familiarity with the maneuver, the (pilot) lost situational awareness and failed to complete his landing checklist,” according to the investigation. “Specifically, the (pilot) remained in manual mode when he should have been (and thought he was) in an automated command mode designed to reduce pilot workload during landings.”

Question for the PLM bubbas here: in the tread about this mishap back when it happened, some of you made it clear that it's not possible to land an F-35 on the boat in manual, or if it is possible, then it's certainly not taught in the RAG or practiced. If that is true, seems strange that NATOPS did not mandate auto before this mishap.

"At the time of the mishap, the automated landing systems were optional for pilots, but following the mishap and the mishap pilot’s self-confessed “task saturation” at the time, Naval Air Forces now mandate that F-35 pilots use the automated assistance.

Among the recommendations adopted and ordered by the head of Naval Air Forces, Vice Adm. Kenneth Whitesell, was that pilots be required to use the automated landing systems.

Before last year’s mishap, pilots were directed to use the automated assistance “as desired.”

Report also recommended an alert for when the jet gets on speed. I guess this would come in handy during a SHB when you're at idle in a high angle turn trying to slow down, while looking outside the cockpit to your left at the 90.

"The investigation calls for the Navy and the jet’s manufacturer to develop more alerting systems for when pilots hit their desired angle of attack and for when a pilot is not in one of the automatic modes while attempting a landing."

Once again is seems, NATOPS is written in blood.

 

[sevenhelmet]

My comments in the earlier thread about "PLM only" for the F-35 were based on what I have been told- e.g. because the system is fully redundant, there is no need to train in manual, so pilots are learning PLM from day one. I did not intend to convey that pilots have no choice about whether to place the aircraft in PLM.

I've never flown the F-35, but to place a Rhino in PLM, there is a HOTAS command required. The airplane is not (and I would argue, should not be) in PLM by default when the gear is extended, and for good reason: The gear is typically extended before the airplane arrives on glideslope. What if you're landing on a runway and want to flare? What if you're flying a formation approach? What if you have a mechanical issue and need to tank while dirty? All of that makes PLM technically optional for the pilot, as it should be. In fact, we had RR discussions early in the program about when to engage PLM in the pattern, and which mode to use ("rate" or "path"). Putting a PLM requirement into NATOPS (presumably for ship ops only) may or may not be a good idea, but might make good sense for the F-35, which was designed more or less from the ground up with PLM in mind.

Having said that, I very much doubt the NATOPS change would have prevented this mishap. This pilot clearly did not intend to land in "manual", he done F'd it away out of the break... ouch.

 

[ChuckMK23]

Some fantastic analysis of the F-35C mishap on CVN 70 last year:

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23686824/f-35c-records-for-release-redacted-v2.pdf

Ward's analysis and commentary followed by CW's

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Interesing that CMV-22 COD MEDEVAC of seriously injured LSO was declined by crew. MH-60S folks stepped up to the plate and did the 450 NM MEDEVAC. What does the configuration of a MH-60S look like to do 450 NM MEDEVAC?

MP kept wings but no longer in flight status.

Fascinating stuff from experts.

 

[Brett327]

Bombshells? Really, Chuck?

 

[johnboyA6E]

thanks for that additional clarity, i wasn't thinking about the other situations where you would be slow and dirty and would not want PLM engaged. but for landing on the ship, seems like a good idea

there was also a recommendation to add an alert when in the landing config without auto engaged, seems like that would be a nuisance in those other situations, but maybe a good tradeoff

 

[sevenhelmet]

 

[ChuckMK23]

Bombshells? Really, Chuck?

I think so. An endorsement to mandate use of the automation when taking the jet aboard? I think thats pretty newsworthy and a culture shift. The chain of events that lead to the unstabilized approach are of course nothing new. Going full smash and then trying to lose that energy in a hurry and never getting stabilized - then getting slow/low has been killing crews for decades on land or at sea.

to whit:

I like the word "bombshell" - it gets views/likes! And surely gets me a comment from my good friend @Brett327

Happy Friday!

 

[ChuckMK23]

Mod please merge threads.

@johnboyA6E - sorry buddy - I searched and didnt see your thread before starting one - my bad!!!

 

[sevenhelmet]

thanks for that additional clarity, i wasn't thinking about the other situations where you would be slow and dirty and would not want PLM engaged. but for landing on the ship, seems like a good idea

there was also a recommendation to add an alert when in the landing config without auto engaged, seems like that would be a nuisance in those other situations, but maybe a good tradeoff

Possibly. At some point though, pilots just need to follow their procedures. You shouldn't land with the gear up, either, yet pilots try that with astonishing regularity.

Designing more "pilot proof" features into the system is nice, but only up to a point. Too many over-protective features can make the airplane harder to use and actually increase risk in some situations (not to mention complexity). Think about automation reliance in transport category communities, and the subsequent degradation of manual flying skills and the increase in "what's it doing now?" type of problems.

It's a careful balance for aircraft designers and folks who set operational policy.

 

[sevenhelmet]

I think so. An endorsement to mandate use of the automation when taking the jet aboard? I think thats pretty newsworthy and a culture shift.

Not really. PLM was already the standard for coming aboard, and I doubt this F-35 pilot was trying to land in manual. It comes down to going the fuck around if you're task-saturated and destabilized. The mishap pilot was a high-performer, so Paddles was undoubtedly giving him some rope, and it proved to be enough to hang himself by.

In my opinion, the NATOPS change doesn't make a damn bit of difference, it's just the typical "we have to change something" response to a mishap.

 

[taxi1]

From the report

9. During the start, middle, and in-close portions of the landing approach, the pilot applied
corrections via stick inputs under the assumption that the aircraft was in either APC or DFP PA
CLAW. These corrections did not engage the engine to provide additional thrust as the aircraft
was still operating in Manual PA CLAW with the throttle still at Flight IDLE.

Damn. Couple of questions, understand if they go unanswered:

- When in magic throttles mode, do the throttles move as the plane operates them? Pilots hover their hands over the throttle?
- Does the F35 in the groove make a nice smokey exhaust stream (ala Phantom) that gives paddles visual cues on power state?

 

[Brett327]

Worth noting here that this is NOT the mishap report. This is the JAGMAN Command Investigation. Different reports with different purposes, and very different information.

 

[sevenhelmet]

- Does the F35 in the groove make a nice smokey exhaust stream (ala Phantom) that gives paddles visual cues on power state?

He was likely trying to slow down through the approach turn and most of his time in the groove. So Paddles would most likely have seen a "Fast" AOA indication, and would not expect a lot of smoke or engine noise since the airplane was slowing down to on-speed AOA.

The old rule-of-thumb that I recall on the SHB was you needed to be established on-speed no later than in-the-middle to avoid being waved off. Not sure if that rule was applied in this case, but it certainly seems like it should have been.

 

[ChuckMK23]

He was likely trying to slow down through the approach turn and most of his time in the groove. So Paddles likely saw a "Fast" AOA indication, and would not expect to see a lot of smoke as the airplane was slowing down.

The old rule-of-thumb that I recall on the SHB was you needed to be established on-speed no later than in-the-middle to avoid being waved off. Not sure if that rule was applied in this case, but it certainly seems like it should have been.

Does paddles see the AOA indicator with the naked eye or are they using some sort sort of magnified display - or optics?

 

[sevenhelmet]

Does paddles see the AOA indicator with the naked eye or are they using some sort sort of magnified display - or optics?

There are external AOA indexers on the nose gear. That's part of the reason landing lights are turned off at the ship except in shitty weather. LSOs are also trained over many passes to look for visual cues that the aircraft is on-speed (hook and main gear in the same horizontal plane, for example).