Disassociated tour for aviators on aircraft carriers/gators

[exNavyOffRec]

That's understandable enough, for sure. Time and again it makes me wonder, though, how the aviators can cope with such a huge and, eventually, surface ship, from the standpoint of a risk theory. I have a pair of suppositions, and they are:

1. Special training, mandatory for all the NAs and NFOs assigned to ship's company, as it have been noted in this thread by Mr. Flash earlier. I'm OK with it, but the time frame supposed for this training to be sufficient enough seems to be about a year for command posts and at least six months for some department heads. I surmise these numbers by my own experience as a staff officer in Russian Navy - to be appointed as the Dept Head of a surface ship which is commanded by the Captain (carrier, cruiser, DDG), the officer should complete a year of training in special installation chosen by his designator: same for the staff officer of the frigate brigade (roughly similar to DesDiv in USN), for example. As Dept Head of the Russian cruiser is the senior OOD by his main watch, the Communication Officer of the cruiser (Dept Head 4) who spent his previous time on duty mostly in the radio rooms or op center of the ship should possess much more knowledges and skills to run the ship properly while SOOD (good CO and XO can pay almost no attention to the good SOOD actions - all will be done brilliantly). This is very rough analogy but it's the most I can draw from what I know. Same things - NA or NFO has to learn something new to run the carrier. The problem is that if he doesn't know or forget something important, there should be someone who knows and can remind it. And if that is concerning the aviation realm, carrier CO has in his hand 15 or so NA/NFO Commanders who can and have to support him. But in the seamanship or, worse, engineering realms - or, the worst, damage control and fire protection one - he has only one or two SWO Cdrs/LCdrs. That is the point where the speculative (uncertain) risk of the carrier survivability becomes the straight one, a spot of the thinnest ice on the river;
2. Chiefs. The only kind of a personnell of the carrier ship's company who are not in hurry to change the assignment (divs, depts, ships, fleets etc) every couple of years are Chiefs. And maybe Chief Warrants. They are free from the flying tasks, and they, as I can imagine, form the skeleton's bones that allows the carrier to be alive and feel good. With the good Chiefs the carrier CO and most part of his officers can come from NASA, for example - an aviation installation, too - and all will be fine, either;-)




Same thing here. On the fleet oilers or T-AKE equivalent, the CO and XO are Navy officers, all the other are civilian mariners. I was just amazed by the fact that the Command Ship (that should have the highest security clearance for all the crewmembers, in Russian habit) is populated by merchant mariners, an opposite side of James Bond image. Don't pay an attention, it's just common Russian mental legacy after decades of total control (yet not finished while notably softer now).

The aviator CO's of CVN's have a bit of training before being CO's, the ones that I knew would be XO of a CVN, then CO of a deep draft vessel (past was AOE now I think it is LHA or equivalent), then they go to be CO of a CVN.

The training must work as I have only had one CO that I thought/was told from officer I know had no idea what he was doing on the bridge.

 

[BigRed389]

Nothing to do with mentorship, more like law. And there are a decent number of non aviators on board as part of ships company.

For CO, yes, I don't believe so for XO.

I don't think it's an unreasonable question.

The long term payoff for the Navy in having a CVN XO would only be if it makes them better at the CSG job. If CSG Command doesn't necessitate understanding effective use of airpower, or if a CVN XO tour is inadequate for that purpose, then OK, it's not helpful.
Right now, the only non-nuke SWOs that go to CVNs at all are usually ones that need to "help" their records.

 

[Brett327]

For CO, yes, I don't believe so for XO.

I don't think it's an unreasonable question.

The long term payoff for the Navy in having a CVN XO would only be if it makes them better at the CSG job. If CSG Command doesn't necessitate understanding effective use of airpower, or if a CVN XO tour is inadequate for that purpose, then OK, it's not helpful.
Right now, the only non-nuke SWOs that go to CVNs at all are usually ones that need to "help" their records.

Don't forget that the Big XO gig is the tour where that future CVN CO learns the ship in and out. I would venture that the Big XO tour is an essential part of that COs training track.

 

[Brett327]

...should possess much more knowledges...

Lightning strikes twice!

 

[exNavyOffRec]

Right now, the only non-nuke SWOs that go to CVNs at all are usually ones that need to "help" their records.

That explains some of the non-nuke SWO's I encountered on the carrier

 

[BigRed389]

Don't forget that the Big XO gig is the tour where that future CVN CO learns the ship in and out. I would venture that the Big XO tour is an essential part of that COs training track.

No disagreement there.

 

[Gatordev]

That's understandable enough, for sure. Time and again it makes me wonder, though, how the aviators can cope with such a huge and, eventually, surface ship, from the standpoint of a risk theory.

It really isn't that big of a leap to go from 90+ knots to 30+ knots (on a good day) and to figure stuff out in a 2D world versus a 3D one. The rest of the stuff is a lot of leadership 101 that a CVN CO is getting over the course of his/her's career, as well as the XO tour that Brett mentioned.

 

[FormerRecruitingGuru]

Can we all agree that me, yes me, escaped the possibility of going to a CVN to be the TRAINO is bittersweet. Eff that.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

The training must work as I have only had one CO that I thought/was told from officer I know had no idea what he was doing on the bridge.

The main reason that Brits still are sticking with the habit to have a navigation generalist in CO's armchair of any major surface combattant is that he/she has an adequate in-job training for that from the start of his/her career. The same for submarines of RN, even harder in claims. I.e. they have at least 12 years of service (usually 17-18) on similar ship or boat within the similar area of responsibility and according authority before that. Seems that every USN carrier CO is able to catch all that training without a leak of efficiency for a pair of years of carrier XO tenure and deep draft tour. For short, either every USN carrier CO is genius or there is something else to explain why the carriers as a largest and most sofisticated ships are still sailing mast up keel down, mostly like the other Navy ships and not upside down.
I'd like to imagine - if it's not classified, of course - what typical maneuvers the carrier herself is doing while deployed, and how it matched to the the typical maneuvers of DDG, for example? It seems to me that the underway replenishment, turning into the wind for flying and sharp veers to evade the enemy's torpedo attacks are the top best that carrier CO have to be able to provide. DDG skipper, aside of it, quite can be obliged to be moored in unfamous port without a single tug, so he should to know the ship's behavior around her pivot point and slightest response to the machinery and rudder. Going into Hamburg Port by Elba river without a pilot adds a bunch of grey hair to SWOs' heads but they are usually able to cope with it. Aside of it, again, the DDG skipper, being under sea skimmer's attack, should be able to get the missile abeam, port or starboard, by the very sharp turn indeed, to place it under fire of both CIWS/RAM, the bow and stern one, simultaneously, thus doubling the chances to shoot it down (at least in Russian Navy that's in such manner). If this is supersonic missile, the DDG skipper has a couple of seconds to react, and you need to have almost the gut feeling for that. Years as a Jig to imagine that in theory, years as OOD to try to model that, years as CO to do that at exercises etc...
By the way, who is the typical carrier OOD - the NA/NFOs or SWOs?
Again, if it is not sensitive. I kindly ask you don't hesitate to inform me when I have to shut up.

It really isn't that big of a leap to go from 90+ knots to 30+ knots (on a good day) and to figure stuff out in a 2D world versus a 3D one. The rest of the stuff is a lot of leadership 101 that a CVN CO is getting over the course of his/her's career, as well as the XO tour that Brett mentioned.

Well... thanks again, but it's not as easy as it seems. So what about feelings? There is the theory (of French origin addressed to the Med privateering time, some says it was Colbert or Jean Bart who was the author) that the good skipper feels the ship's side planking as his own skin, and the powder magazine as his own guts. Not a soap opera, really. Some kind of a sixth feeling instead. It seems to me that carrier CO in USN is far from that, while the submarine CO is directly hitting the mark with a subject... And in any case, if not CO, XO, NAV, OPSO or whoever else aviator, there should be a man on board of CVN who is in. Who? CHENG? First Lieutenant?

 

[Flash]

Yes Flash you are right in that and many other points. Aside of it, your Naval helo community seemingly contains the higher percentage of the Naval Aviators (1310/1315 Designator, as I can think) than the fixed-wings crowds except possibly VP one, since there are two single-anchored boys in every SH, HH, UH and AH, while the strike fighters (as most famous) in any case have just one Naval Aviator per cockpit. If so (for explainable reasons I cannot possess the definite numbers), then your rotorheads can carry within their subcommunity even more Naval Aviation ethos' features than even the Hornet boys....

This subject has come up many times on this forum and is a bit of a sore point for some helo guys, a reasonable one too. But one thing I have never seen is a breakdown of the percentages of which aviators are in which communities. It would be nice to see but the Navy hasn't seen bothered to publish those numbers, likely not because it wants to hide them but just plain laziness.

Another thing to note, in terms of counting total numbers for each community there is often no differentiation between NFO's and pilots for 'Big Navy' when it comes to personnel policy. They are given equal chances at command all the way up to Admiral unlike the USAF. Since there are no NFO's in helos it balances out the numbers a little bit better for the fixed-wing folks.

Some AOCS guys, relatively famous novellist Stephen Coonts for example (Vietnam era A-6 pilot), are not happy with this merger. Not so about the difference in the training environment (say Navy Chiefs at regular OCS instead of Marine drill Gunnies at old good AOCS), mostly about the substitution in the geography. Here in Russia there is the thought that some "stockpile of prayers" exists, i.e. old wooden church is better than new one of gold and jewelry, mostly because the former contains that centuries-old"stockpile of prayers" which really helps....

When they combined OCS's they kept the Marine DI's. As for geography, it is a little sad to see it leave it's historical home in Pensacola but it made more sense to consolidate initial officer training in one location, it just so happened that most of the rest of that was located in Newport.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

likely not because it wants to hide them but just plain laziness.

Yes you are probably right. Every national navy is probably messed up with such things until some undergrad in the cadre surfaces with the clear intention to make Ph.D. in sociology by using the communities' lists to account those numbers.

They are given equal chances at command all the way up to Admiral unlike the USAF.

This is good for Navy, I think. Here in Bearland since the Air Force ethos is prevailing, the local equivalent of NFO can make the chief of staff of, say, air regiment, but will never be a CO of this regiment. Silly enough in my opinion, as mere 10 years ago the pilot's educational/training pipeline was 4-years college course while so-called "navigation officers" of Air Force were educated and trained along the common university 5-years course. Now it's equal for 5 years for both but NFOs are still more intelligent and intellectual people than the pilots here. Even in civilian world, the Russian commercial aviation is still maintaining a practice to have a navigator (and air engineer, BTW) in the cockpit together with two pilots. Aside of the navigational job (up to celestial methods, to which they've been trained, too), the main task of the nav there was to speak English to at least airport's control, what the pilots cannot do ("simply because they are stupid", I've heard once). Soviets-built airliners like Tu-154A that are still loitering within CIS and some Middle Asia countries are still crewed with a nav and engineer (another 5-years degree). Sometimes it helps to a high degree, for example the force-landing of a Tu-154 with dead main circuits and a passengers aboard on a god-forsaken and years unoperational forest strip a couple of years ago. It is strange to me how the Polish AF on similar and absolutely operational aircraft had managed to kill almost all of the country top grass near Smolensk purely due to the navigational error.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

it made more sense to consolidate initial officer training in one location, it just so happened that most of the rest of that was located in Newport.

Maybe so. One of Russian naval colleges in Soviet time was located in now-independent country of Azerbaijan, in its capital, Baku City. Main faculty there have been navigational one, as the Caspian Sea provides almost all-year circumstances for the viable navigation training: visibility and a clean skies at nights, a lot of tall lighhouses, flat and predictable depths of sea and so on. Additionally, the College was placed on the shore and had its own installations for rowing, boat sailing, even scuba diving etc. When USSR came to a grave, Russians lost this pretty nice spot and most of the navigators are trained now on Baltic Sea, an opposite side of the weather and sea bottom. Those who graduated Baku and now are the professors of the nav faculties on Baltics installations, are crying for the past...

 

[CommodoreMid]

This subject has come up many times on this forum and is a bit of a sore point for some helo guys, a reasonable one too. But one thing I have never seen is a breakdown of the percentages of which aviators are in which communities. It would be nice to see but the Navy hasn't seen bothered to publish those numbers, likely not because it wants to hide them but just plain laziness.

Another thing to note, in terms of counting total numbers for each community there is often no differentiation between NFO's and pilots for 'Big Navy' when it comes to personnel policy. They are given equal chances at command all the way up to Admiral unlike the USAF. Since there are no NFO's in helos it balances out the numbers a little bit better for the fixed-wing folks.



When they combined OCS's they kept the Marine DI's. As for geography, it is a little sad to see it leave it's historical home in Pensacola but it made more sense to consolidate initial officer training in one location, it just so happened that most of the rest of that was located in Newport.

Each community's bubba list would give a good breakdown of the 1310/1320 flag types. Last year's MPRA list (don't have this year's in my personal email) had 8 flags and was 50/50 between designators. That favors the NFOs slightly since overall the ratio in MPRA is only a little lower than 3/2 for 1310/1320, but with such a small sample size of flags it really isn't significant. What would be interesting to know, however, is what percentage of aviator flags are helos and tail hook types. I've never bothered to do the math, but given community proportions in naval aviation if there are more than 24 aviator flags (which I'm guessing there probably are) then at least we can point out that MPRA is underrepresented.

 

[Flash]

Each community's bubba list would give a good breakdown of the 1310/1320 flag types. Last year's MPRA list (don't have this year's in my personal email) had 8 flags and was 50/50 between designators. That favors the NFOs slightly since overall the ratio in MPRA is only a little lower than 3/2 for 1310/1320, but with such a small sample size of flags it really isn't significant. What would be interesting to know, however, is what percentage of aviator flags are helos and tail hook types. I've never bothered to do the math, but given community proportions in naval aviation if there are more than 24 aviator flags (which I'm guessing there probably are) then at least we can point out that MPRA is underrepresented.

There was an article in Proceedings in the late 90's that had the numbers and percentages all pilot and NFO Admirals and which community they were from, and I think someone here counted them up by manually a few months ago for the ones they could find. But we still don't have the total numbers of aviators and communities they are in.

 

[Max the Mad Russian]

then at least we can point out that MPRA is underrepresented.

At least you are naval officers. Russian naval aviation, with exception of sole fixed-wing carrier-based unit (279th fighter air regiment on Su-33/MiG-29K), a pair of MiG-31 and Su-27 ground-based units on Kamchatka and old Koenigsberg respectively (which trapped under Navy control essentially by occassion), and half-dozen rotorhead units, is all MPRA now, which is about 70% of personnell. One recco Bear's (Tu-95 RTs) crew, i.e. 11 persons, is almost a half of all the carrier-qualified pilots in the whole Russia. Meanwhile, no one of MPRA guys will be Admirals, and only a few will reach MajGen and no more. But the tailhook dudes from 279th are forming cadres for the Naval Aviation CinC and his deputy slots for 20 years up to now. Fighters rule, for short...