F18 HARM shooters on 1986 Libya Raid?

[Catmando]

...
We just liked to drop bombs.
...

So did we (as F4s). We just never admitted it.

For general info to others and our unwashed youngsters, we all had a wide variety of differing air-to-ground missions. Thus we greatly varied our weapon loads and tactics (for all the different A/C within the Airwing) depending upon not only the target, but also the geographical area and especially the degree of enemy defenses.

Obviously, there was no CAS in the North. And in the South, we rarely had to loiter as the FACs always had a target – CAS or otherwise - for us as a section of F-4s or any aircraft immediately upon check-in. In the North, we did some uncontrolled 2-plane road recces in the more lightly defended areas that took some greater time and gas. We were looking for trucks, trains, barges, troops, bridges, or whoever happened to be shooting at us – SAMS or Triple-A sites. (Our XO once bagged a freight train with a Sidewinder on a road recce. I later got a train, but not with an air-to-air 'winder like I really wanted.)

However, in the really heavily defended areas – like the Than Hoa Bridge, Vinh, and especially Haiphong, Hanoi, and all the area between those two cities, only 30-plane Alpha Strikes occurred. No unprotected sections or divisions.

But the A-6 was the premier attack aircraft, and far ahead of any other Navy or Air Force attack aircraft. Not only were they the best for CAS, but also they were the essence of, and the heavy hitters within a "power-projection" Alpha strike. Unlike any other, they also could and did go out alone at night, low-level and fast to hit heavily defended targets that would normally need an entire Alpha Strike in the day. IMHO, theirs was toughest and most difficult mission in the entire air war (except for maybe Hal-3/Val-4, and the other in-country helos's that got shot down routinely, almost every day.)

Nevertheless, although F-4s didn't have those neat gizmo/pilot-crutches that that those wimpy attack drivers needed for a decent CEP, we with the iron-bombsight (and lots of practice) could usually embarrass those light attack SLUFs! (And maybe occasionally, some nugget medium attack 'uglies' )

Dropping "all-or-some bombs" per run also depended upon the target location, and enemy fire. Since F-4s usually only carried 6 Mk-82s or 83s, the FAC would request how many bombs he wanted us to drop on any bombing run. Also, when working a bridge in the North, without FACs and any enemy fire, I would drop 2 MK-82s just to check the wind drift, and then drop the remaining four MK-82s compensating for the observed wind drift. But as A4s has mentioned, in a heavily defended area, "multiple runs" were stupid and for us, 'verboten'.

On earlier cruises, my squadron had lost an excessive number of guys because they were making multiple runs on heavily defended targets. On my later cruise, our CAG and my CO fortunately outlawed any over the North multiple runs, or any "dueling with a flak-site."

Re the number of bombs dropped - individually, cluster, or ripple: I once caught an NVA tank out in the open. He was zigzagging as fast as he could. I dropped 2 MK-82s for effect and missed a little. Next run, I dropped 2 more and thought I got him… but he motored out of the dust and smoke. Dropped my last two directly right on him, and he unbelievably survived. I was pi**d! I thought no way he could survive that. Then, to my dismay, our FAC called in an A-6. He dropped however-many bombs he had on just one pass – cluster!…. And no more tank. (And then somebody (like the FAC) made a snide remark about my fighter A/C compared to a 'true attack' A-6 ….%$#@!.) [Upon review, I may have to edit or delete this embarrassing confession later]

Our F-4 loadout down South was normally a couple of Sidewinders, and 6 MK-82s.
Over the North, it was 4 'winders, and 2 Sparrows, and 6 MK-82s for road recces and TARCAP. For MiGCAP, it was 4 'winders and 4 Sparrows and lots of excited adrenalin, but no bombs, obviously.

We also had occasion to carry and drop from F-4s, anti-ship mines, CBU's, (Cluster Bomb Units), Snakes (retarded bombs) daisy cutters, and even F-4 designated and dropped LGBs (laser guided bombs) late in the war. Our airwing's A-7s also dropped a number of TV-guided Walleyes with great success, as well as their normal Shrikes.

 

[Pugs]

USS Saratoga was in Gulf of Sidra earlier, but left prior to El Dorado Canyon.

VF-102 Tomcat returns to USS America at dawn following El Dorado Canyon

One of the CV's did not have a Prowler squadron embarked and it was a mad rush at NUW to get a squadron together and over there prior. So, while those were the named squadrons I believe on of them was actually a mix of aircrew from different squadrons. My Cousin was an AE-2 in the VAQ-135 Black Ravens (aka the Cliff Clavens) at the time and he was over there.

 

[HeyJoe]

One of the CV's did not have a Prowler squadron embarked and it was a mad rush at NUW to get a squadron together and over there prior. So, while those were the named squadrons I believe on of them was actually a mix of aircrew from different squadrons. My Cousin was an AE-2 in the VAQ-135 Black Ravens (aka the Cliff Clavens) at the time and he was over there.

Actually, it was a mad rush x2. CVW-1 included VAQ-135 and we had just returned from Ocean Safari in fall of 1985 and were doing workups in spring of 1986 when we were told to return to Norfolk and get all jets ready for war with VAQ-135 being sent right away to Sara. We did engine changes and swept the jets and got all the parts we could never get to get every jet in tip top shape. VMAQ-2 showed up to replace the Black Ravens when we deployed. I was scheduled to leave Diamondbacks after 5 years, but was put on Op Hold (which I didn't protest at all because it was obvious Reagan was going to let us cross the so-called Line of Death and do whatever it took to get Kadfhy's attention). VMAQ-2 was pretty colorful at back end of boat....but were super folks and knew their trade. They helped immeasureably setting up EOB for HARM shooters (HARM had just arrived on our A-7Es in time for Ocean Safari).

 

[Lovebug201]

So did we (as F4s).

Words...

As often as we do the Blue/Green thing on this site, my respect and admiration for you Blue guys who went north on a daily basis is large. What you did made our work in the south seem like childs play. That childs play could still get you killed, but childs play non the less. HATS OFF TO YOU ALL!

In the south for us green F-4 types (including Laos) normal load outs would be 12 Mk-82 or 6 Mk-82 snakes and 3 nape cans. Plus we always carried 2 Sparrows in the rear detents, why I will never know made us feel like we could go A/A if needed I guess.

Our attack parameters were; 1 run ripple all in Laos, 3 runs max in the south unless in a TIC then what ever was necessary to put bombs where they were needed. Normal drop sequence would be 2-4-6. Occasionally we carried other stuff such as CBU, Rockeye, daisy cutters and queers.

Cat got a train, I remember getting a bulldozer once on uncle Ho's trail, normally we just took big trees and made toothpicks. We all do our part, no matter how exciting or glamorous/not, even today.

Again HATS OFF to you old guys who went north.

 

[Delta7]

This thread is ending up just as I hoped… lots of discussions and memories about that night in 1986 (and earlier!).

Funny how for many, El Dorado Canyon was billed as a “joint” attack against Libya. In fact, it was a near simultaneous attack with elements from different services. Now, thanks to this posting, I am reminded (by Renegade One’s post) that there were USMC aircraft involved that night too. In my mind, it was a USAF and USN show. I should have known better.

Also, I find it revealing that both/all the participating Hornet squadrons were Marine squadrons, and that might explain why/how a Navy Hornet pilot might not recall that F/A 18s were involved that night back in ’86 (reference my initial post/question) as HARM shooters.

After so many years, it’s good to find out how that night went from the perspective of the carrier-based participants in El Dorado Canyon. I’m sure we’d be able to fill many squadron “Doofer Books” (or whatever you call them in the Navy & Marine Corps) with other war- / sea-stories. We’d hear from the many tanker guys who rotated in from the States to refuel the mass gaggle heading south from the UK and the “Spark-Vark” EF-111 crews from Upper Heyford in the UK.

Similarly, there were submariners there that night as well. I know, for example, that we got a report from a sub off the Tripoli coast on what they “saw” regarding our one lost F-111 and its two crew members. Interestingly, the report from the sub was very different than what the guys flying 30 seconds behind the jet we lost saw. One source reported seeing flaming wreckage cart wheeling along the water, while the other saw what appeared to be an ejection (which, for the F-111 would involved a rocket launching the entire cockpit area away from the jet, rather than ejection seats). That report from that sub – at least for a while – left us with some hope that the crew might have survived an ejection. Tragically, that ended up not being the case. Still, it’d be nice to hear stories from the sub guys – what that night was like for them.

Frankly, I’ve never spoken with anyone outside of the F-111 community who was there that night. And to reiterate, I was not on the raid. Unfortunately, I was in my bed sleeping back home near RAF Lakenheath in the UK while so many of my military comrades were putting their lives on the line.

In future posts I’d like to chat about a couple of lessons learned. On this forum especially, I’d like to see how many know about the results of “Skipper Time.” I.e. when a strike package leaves a carrier, and they all have the time hack from the “Skipper’s watch,” what does that do to the timing of the overall package when the Skipper’s watch needs a new battery? J

I’d also like to hear from the attack guys. Did anyone have their weaponeers overruled by mental giants back in Washington (I honestly don’t know if it was from the Puzzle Palace or the White House) who insisted on a specific type of weapon? In our case, it was GBU10 versus GBU-12 (2000 versus 500 pound LGBs… Laser-Guided Bombs).

To finish, and as a tip of the hat to my brothers and sisters in Naval aviation... I was deployed to Turkey (Incirlik Air Base) a couple of weeks before the raid. As we had early range times, we had an “Oh Dark Thirty” show time for our flight. One of the AF guards manning a check point told us that he had just heard on the radio that the US Navy had shot down two Libyan fighters over the Gulf of Sidra. My flight lead, who was driving the truck that morning, starting pounding the dashboard of the truck (like a crazy man) and screaming something like, “those son-of-a-bitches” they got ‘em first.” At the time (and given the hour) I thought that his reaction was overly energetic and downright strange. After the events of April 15th, 1986, I understood. He was one of the original crews selected to fly, and knew that what he and a small group of ‘Vark crews had been practicing for months in the F-111 might now actually come to pass as the “Air war of the Gulf of Sidra” was heating up!

Cheers,
John

 

[Flash]

Similarly, there were submariners there that night as well. I know, for example, that we got a report from a sub off the Tripoli coast on what they “saw” regarding our one lost F-111 and its two crew members......Still, it’d be nice to hear stories from the sub guys – what that night was like for them.

Cheers,
John

Unfortunately for you, I doubt that you will get much information about what the sub guys saw. They are called the 'Silent Service' for several reasons, one of them being they rarely, if ever, talk about about the missions they do. It sometimes takes 30-40 years or more for just some of their missions to become public, and even then it is rarely advertised by the submariners themselves. The only recent instance that I can think of was a Naval History magazine article about a submarine that tracked a North Vietnamese trawler smuggling arms during the Vietnam War. Other than that, all I have seen are unauthorized leaks or just speculation.

 

[Delta7]

Requested 111 war story

I always thought the F-111/EF-111 was a cool platform (save the Navy application of course). Care to share any sea/land stories?

MIDNJAC,

Sorry, I somehow missed your post/question from the 6th and didn’t reply.

F-111 war/sea story? Hmmmm, let’s see.

I guess one of my personal favorites involves a squadron “bomb comp” while deployed to Turkey. For those reading who might not know, USAF squadrons in Europe deploy regularly away from Germany and England to take advantage of better weather/ranges/flying opportunities. We at RAF Lakenheath flying the ‘Vark, would deploy a couple times a year for two weeks to Turkey (Incirlik) or Spain (Zaragoza). Often, during those deployments, we’d have squadron bombing competitions (Bomb Comps) to liven things up a bit.

In this case, it was a competition to fly a rather long low-level and then drop a simulated nuke on the Konya range (in the central part of Turkey). You were scored both on timing and accuracy of your hit; but timing was especially important in this one competition. For example, even if you scored a “shack” (directly hitting the target), you would receive zero points for having a time of impact more than one minute off. As you might imagine, getting fragged by your buddy’s late-delivered nuke, might tend to ruin your whole day! Anyway, to be competitive, you’d have to have a TOI within about 5-10 seconds.

Each four-ship took off in one-minute intervals from Incirlik, flew single ship through the low-level (about an hour of low-level… yes, the Vark was BIG and carried lots of gas!), dropped his “blivet” on the range, went into a holding pattern before joining up with the rest of the four-ship and dropping back onto the range for a bit more while you still had enough gas. Finally, you’d bingo off the range and head back “home” to Incirlik, while the next 4-ship did the same thing.

As luck would have it, on the day of the competition, there were scattered thunderstorms throughout the low level. One of our newer crews (two lieutenants, O2s) were doing a lot of deviations around weather… along with the required site-seeing that one does while flying along at 200 feet (plus or MINUS… J) and 480-540 knots. Suddenly, this young crew realized that they were REALLY behind in timing from all their deviating. If they were going to get to the range in time to get any points, they’d need to speed up… a LOT!
Well, speeding up is ONE thing the F-111 was very good at! In fact, before they started de-tuning our motors (because they were starting to wear out and fail), an F-111F would go supersonic in mil power (i.e. no afterburner).

The good news: the guys made it to the range in time, and scored reasonably well on their first pass. The bad news: in the process of catching up, they flew over a small village (at what they swore was “just below mach”) and broke EVERY window in the village! Our guys were in the news throughout the country, are were promptly declared PNG (Persona Non Grata) by the Turkish government and ordered to leave the country the very next day.

As the bomb comp took place on a Friday, the O Club was hopping as usual that night. While there, we learned from the US Embassy that our two guys had been PNGd. When it came time for these two guys to board a C-141 headed back to the UK for their forced, early return, the entire squadron (those of us not still puking) showed up at the airplane at 7am-ish, lined up, stood at attention and rendered honors to our PNG heroes! Thankfully (for the reputation of the US military) that ceremony did not make it on Turkish TV! J

Cheers,
John

 

[HeyJoe]

Unfortunately for you, I doubt that you will get much information about what the sub guys saw. They are called the 'Silent Service' for several reasons, one of them being they rarely, if ever, talk about about the missions they do. It sometimes takes 30-40 years or more for just some of their missions to become public, and even then it is rarely advertised by the submariners themselves. The only recent instance that I can think of was a Naval History magazine article about a submarine that tracked a North Vietnamese trawler smuggling arms during the Vietnam War. Other than that, all I have seen are unauthorized leaks or just speculation.

Concur. Nuff said about subs here for OPSEC. You can read Blind Man's Bluff or Scorpion Down to get an inkling of why so many fast attacks and the stuff they and other subs do.

 

[HeyJoe]

I’d also like to hear from the attack guys. Did anyone have their weaponeers overruled by mental giants back in Washington (I honestly don’t know if it was from the Puzzle Palace or the White House) who insisted on a specific type of weapon? In our case, it was GBU10 versus GBU-12 (2000 versus 500 pound LGBs… Laser-Guided Bombs).

Cheers,
John

Not a attack guy, but I was "duty" TARPS guy in CVIC during planning and escorted the three USAF types who showed up to coordinate the "jointness" part. They had beautiful computer printed routes with doghouses (this was pre TAMPS, JMPS or anything else). We were stunned to learn that "patch wearers" far removed from squadron had planned routes, weapons, etc. They were equally amazing that we had a LTJG as a lead planner (Skipper's B/N and now CO of IKE). Different Strokes.

Fast forward to Desert Storm when USAF "Patch Wearers" tried to put weapons loadouts on ATO for Navy aircrews like they did for their folks. Showdown ensued and Navy missions then said "Best Weapon" giving Navy traditional flexibility to do its weaponeering at squadron level with CAG's approval.

 

[Fly Navy]

Blind Man's Bluff. Read it. Eye opening. Holy crap.

 

[Delta7]

Not a attack guy, but I was "duty" TARPS guy in CVIC during planning and escorted the three USAF types who showed up to coordinate the "jointness" part. They had beautiful computer printed routes with doghouses (this was pre TAMPS, JMPS or anything else). We were stunned to learn that "patch wearers" far removed from squadron had planned routes, weapons, etc. They were equally amazing that we had a LTJG as a lead planner (Skipper's B/N and now CO of IKE). Different Strokes.

Fast forward to Desert Storm when USAF "Patch Wearers" tried to put weapons loadouts on ATO for Navy aircrews like they did for their folks. Showdown ensued and Navy missions then said "Best Weapon" giving Navy traditional flexibility to do its weaponeering at squadron level with CAG's approval.

HeyJoe,

Sorry… another cultural/lingo problem. After all, as "A4sForever" has pointed out... I'm an "Air Force Jock." What does "patch wearer" mean to you?

For me, it means Fighter Weapons School graduate (normally, the guys in our fighter squadrons responsible for tactics and weaponeering); but I'm pretty sure that's not what it means to you. I'm "joint" enough to understand the black/brown shoe thing... and I assume it's not the Army thing, where you only wear a patch for the unit under which you served during combat.

As far as your "different strokes," I've gotta say, "BS." It's not "different," it's plain wrong when politicians decide tactics (as if we didn’t learn that lesson in Vietnam). In my somewhat dated experience, you guys did (and apparently still do) have it better than the AF with respect to tactics/routes/ROE/weapon selection/etc. when it comes to these more choreographed, short-duration conflicts. For us, El Do Canyon was a big deal… the AF Chief of Staff flew over to Lakenheath for the pre-brief and flew back to DC after RTB.

Since this was a continuation of an on-going “dust up” for the two CVGs involved, my guess is that it was much more “business as usual” for you guys, and that meant that the right people (i.e. the ones the “trigger pullers” wanted) were running the show and deciding tactics. In fact, our Wing Commander for Operations (an O-6) had real heartaches and apparently threatened to resign when presented with some of the changes/caveats/ROE constraints that came down from DC at the last minute. In the end, he lost the "shoulder check."

Many (in fact, probably all) of the original wing-level planners thought that much of our attack plan (tactics/routes/weapons/etc. imposed on us by "on high") was total BS. For example, we used GBU-10s versus GBu-12s in Tripoli because “they made bigger holes.” Our weaponeers, on the other hand, knew that our CEP was much lower for the smaller bombs. I’ll leave it at that.

But what do I know? I retired as an O-5!

Cheers,
John

ps. Message received. I will no longer ask/hope for more input from Navy submariners. As you suggested, 'nuff said.

 

[HAL Pilot]

/threadjack

This came to me while reading the above about who planned what.

If any of you are wondering about the best way to transition from military to airlines, Delta7 planned and executed the best transition I have ever seen. The man knew he wanted AA Miami, had the phone numbers and addresses of every pilot he ever flew with that had go to AA, had the names and numbers of everyone in the hiring process at AA, and had a plan to get himself there. And he did, quickly.

/end threadjack

 

[Orion4life]

Delta 7

Now ads for Delta 7 the book for sale on Amazon appear at the top of all the AW pages...coincidence?

 

[HeyJoe]

HeyJoe,

Sorry… another cultural/lingo problem. After all, as "A4sForever" has pointed out... I'm an "Air Force Jock." What does "patch wearer" mean to you?

For me, it means Fighter Weapons School graduate (normally, the guys in our fighter squadrons responsible for tactics and weaponeering); but I'm pretty sure that's not what it means to you. I'm "joint" enough to understand the black/brown shoe thing... and I assume it's not the Army thing, where you only wear a patch for the unit under which you served during combat.

It's exactly what I meant. At the time, the only guys wearing a weapons school patch in Navy squadrons were TOPGUN grads and back then, it was focused on Air-to-Air only so notion of a "patch-wearer" from a planning cell working tactics for a unit was an alien concept and incredulous to us.

As far as your "different strokes," I've gotta say, "BS." It's not "different," it's plain wrong when politicians decide tactics (as if we didn’t learn that lesson in Vietnam). In my somewhat dated experience, you guys did (and apparently still do) have it better than the AF with respect to tactics/routes/ROE/weapon selection/etc. when it comes to these more choreographed, short-duration conflicts. For us, El Do Canyon was a big deal… the AF Chief of Staff flew over to Lakenheath for the pre-brief and flew back to DC after RTB.

First off, I only said different strokes to mean we do it our way and USAF approaches it differently and when it's done right, everything works out, but....

letting politicians get involved (or high ranking folks far removed form cockpit whether they were rated or not....) is a recipe for disaster. Navy isn't immune though. We learned several lessons from 1983 Lebanon raid in which cumbersome chain of command processes led to Air Wing getting execute orders too late to get the ordnance of their choice to the flight deck and truncating the mission planning. We lost an A-6 and an A-7 as a result. However, it was a politician (Lehman) that directed sweeping changes afterwards that the Navy had instituted in large part by 1986. We got one visit from a 3 star (fleet commander) who stopped by each Ready Room without flourish in March when we were about to cross the line of death. I'll always remember him quietly slipping into room and chatting with CO saying "You guys do what you have to do and don't take a bloody nose" (referring to 1981 Libyan encounter in which ROE dictated that VF-41 jets had to go to the pass and wait until Libyans fired first even though other sknew there was hostile intent prior, but it was not conveyed to the aircrews). Since the 6th Fleet Commander was an old looking dude with bushy eyebrows wearing khakis with no ribbons and the stars weren't obvious unless you were close (nor did anyone expect him to pop into our living room that way), one of the LCDRs said (after he left quietly), "Who was that dude? thinking he was some Tech Rep who was giving a prep talk to the CO.

Since this was a continuation of an on-going “dust up” for the two CVGs involved, my guess is that it was much more “business as usual” for you guys, and that meant that the right people (i.e. the ones the “trigger pullers” wanted) were running the show and deciding tactics. In fact, our Wing Commander for Operations (an O-6) had real heartaches and apparently threatened to resign when presented with some of the changes/caveats/ROE constraints that came down from DC at the last minute. In the end, he lost the "shoulder check."

See earlier comment on Lebanon. "Your" situation reminds me of the 1972 Christmas raids by B-52s over Hanoi and vincinity in which SAC HQ was dictating tactics on 3 day ATO type cycle and Buffs were getting bagged despite cries from theatre to change tactics. Some great reads out there on that debacle of command structure and resistence to allow aircrews have a say. In that case, the Thai based Wing 0-6s stood up and didn't waver, but were subjected to flamethrower from SAC four star backed command level for bucking "the system". Very interesting case study in command at several levels.

Many (in fact, probably all) of the original wing-level planners thought that much of our attack plan (tactics/routes/weapons/etc. imposed on us by "on high") was total BS. For example, we used GBU-10s versus GBu-12s in Tripoli because “they made bigger holes.” Our weaponeers, on the other hand, knew that our CEP was much lower for the smaller bombs. I’ll leave it at that.

But what do I know? I retired as an O-5!

The three guys sent to coordinate with us (2 0-5s, one 0-4) defended their plan as being the unquestioned work of vaunted 'patch-wearers". I have talked to actual members of 48th since then who echoed your sentiments. Maybe these guys were USAFE "company men" and had to toe the line???

 

[Delta7]

HJ,

Thanks very much for your reply.

Looks like we're on the same wavelength.

And, upon reading my post, I must clarify that my "BS" flag was raised not against you, but the concept of politicians deciding tactics. I think you got that, but I should have written my comments more clearly. Your "different strokes" was much for diplomatic than my "BS" flag!

I think you're correct in your assessment of who the USAF "patch wearers" were. Although I’m pretty sure that one of the liaison O-5s would have been one of our F-111 squadron commanders. I wouldn’t be surprised if he were briefed on the importance of not airing any “USAF dirty laundry” with respect to disagreements on tactics within the AF community while onboard the carrier. As you know, the attack plan was changed at the last minute to have a much larger number of aircraft coming in on the same attack axis (actually two axes running basically north to south toward the two main target areas associated with the Al Azziziyah Barracks and the Sidi Balal training facility).

I can’t find my copy of his book, but retired Colonel Richard Venkus’ book, “Raid on Qaddafi” talks in some detail about the misgivings our 48th TFW tacticians had about how our attack was to be executed. I may have this wrong (I’m relying on my memory), but our Ops CC (a well thought of O-6) was confronted by a superior after he complained about the imposed tactics and told that if he didn’t like it, they’d find someone else to lead the attack. I wasn’t part of that inner circle, much less present for some of those fireworks, but it sure rings true to me based on what we were hearing through the “grape vine.”

Cheers,
John